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Abstract 
My thesis situates itself within the field of the Philosophy of Worldviews. Specifically, it aims to 
address the normative question of what the task should be of such a philosophy when faced with the 
problem of conflicting beliefs between religious worldviews. To answer this question, I turn to the 
procedure of aporetical analysis, in short, aporetics. Firstly, aporetics offers a distinct method of 
consistency restoration within inconsistent sets on the basis of thesis rejection and thesis modifica-
tion. Secondly, aporetics leads to an understanding of the availability of aporetic exits on the basis 
of epistemic criteria. On the one hand, this leads us to opt for an orientational monism/pluralism, 
which steers the middle course between the epistemic stances of exclusivism and pluralism. On the 
other hand, it allows us to identify epistemic criteria for worldview acquisition on the basis of three 
distinct superclasses. These superclasses can be derived from Jürgen Habermas' validity claims, and 
applied to the self-understanding of contemporary theories of religion. 
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Introduction 
Setting the Stage 
The problem of religious diversity has arguably been one of the main topics within the academic 
field of the Philosophy of Religion since the latter half of the twentieth century. This problem is 
rooted in the fact that different religious traditions exist in the world that seemingly make differing 
and contradicting claims. This diversity effectively introduces choice and begs the question which 
of those claims we should accept, and how we should proceed from here. Thus, a commonly asked 
question is whether, on religious matters, only one religious tradition is right or whether multiple 
traditions are right, even if they happen to contradict each another.  
 A general consensus exists amongst scholars — and, of course, no consensus is without its 
detractors — that we have four options to choose from, to wit, (1) naturalism, (2) religious exclu-
sivism, (3) religious inclusivism, and (4) religious pluralism. The first option, naturalism, represents 
the idea or belief that only natural forces exist and that there are no supernatural forces. More gen-
erally, naturalism denotes a catch-all concept for all specifically non-religious approaches. Propo-
nents of the naturalist option deny all religious claims — no one is right as all religious claims are 
false — and often hold a worldview dominated by science.  
 Since  naturalism is a non-religious approach, the tendency exists amongst religious scholars 
to reduce the quadripartite typology to a tripartite typology centred around the three religious op-
tions of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. On an exclusivist approach, one typically accepts 
the claims of just one religious tradition. The claims of other traditions are claimed to be unaccept-
able, or false. On an inclusivist approach, one accepts the claims of just one religious tradition, but 
grants truth or value to other religious worldviews as long as these are consistent with one’s own. 
Finally, the pluralist grants equal validity to multiple religious traditions.  
 A common framework for understanding religious traditions is to see them as being centred 
not just on truths but on salvific truths, i.e., truth claims that set the believer free from a certain un-
desirable predicament, be it sin, evil, negative karma, and so on. On this basis, the exclusivist 
claims that his or her own tradition is the only true religion, and therefore the only one that can of-
fer salvation. The inclusivist on the other hand accepts that people in other religious tradition can 
still find salvation, although perhaps in an inferior way, and as long as the basic precepts of one 
home’s religion have not been denied. The pluralist will argue that salvific truth is present in multi-
ple religions, either because they all share in the same universal truth, like mountain climbers as-
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cending the same mountain from multiple directions, or because they represent different types of 
(salvific) truth — rather than versions of truth. 
 Despite a consensus on the nature of these four options, no agreement has yet been reached 
on the issue of which one of these options is the most appropriate one to take. Therefore, to our ini-
tial question of how we should approach religious diversity, we currently have four answers, but no 
consensus as to which option is best. Each one of the four options — or three, depending on who 
you ask — has been defended by numerous scholars. This has often led to entrenched positions. Ar-
guably, the strongest voices within these debates have been the religious pluralists, undoubtedly re-
flecting broader tendencies within our contemporary post-modern world, where no single foundry 
of knowledge is deemed to exist. Moreover, the pluralist’s desire to argue against religious exclu-
sivists — who they regard as their main opponents — has not only kept the debates fuelled, but has 
also forced the exclusivists to repeatedly defend their own stance.  
 Reflecting on these matters, Perry Schmidt-Leukel (2005) has argued that (1) the choice be-
tween these epistemic epistemic stances towards religious diversity is a forced choice, where we 
have to choose one and only one of these options and that (2) we can achieve such a decision by 
giving reasons for or against each epistemic position. Doing so, Schmidt-Leukel has defended the 
pluralist option as being the most appropriate one.  
 Since the choice of epistemic stances is a forced choice, it follows that on this matter only 
an exclusivist option is available: only one epistemic option is acceptable or right. One might deem 
it ironic that this exclusivist route should be the only option available to all parties involved, that is, 
to both religious exclusivists and pluralists. This is especially so given that Schmidt-Leukel himself 
supports a pluralist stance. Of course, a religious pluralist is by no means forced to also hold a plu-
ralist position towards the epistemic positions. However, given the fact that religious pluralism is 
seemingly a viable and — according to pluralists — preferable option in the matter of religious di-
versity, should we not also consider the same option with respect to the epistemic options them-
selves? If so, what would the consequences be for the present typology?  
 The upshot of a pluralist perspective to the different stances will be that multiple epistemic 
stances become acceptable and not just one. This begs the question whether we would not benefit 
from having a “fifth option” available to us — despite Schmidt-Leukel’s insistence that we can only 
access four — namely a higher-order stance that allows for open access to the different variations 
in epistemic positions. Furthermore, despite Schmidt-Leukel’s suggestion that a solution to the 
problem can be found by giving (more) reasons for or against each option, all parties involved have 
already put their cards on the table. This event has neither forced a consensus, nor a deliberate deci-
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sion. Seemingly, therefore, the mere giving of reasons has been unable to answer the question. This 
leads me to conclude that what Schmidt-Leukel suggests is an insufficient strategy.  
 In my dissertation I will argue that the problem of epistemic positions is an example of an 
aporetic situation — or aporia —, as defined by Nicholas Rescher (2009).  On this account, an apo1 -
ria is a cognitive impasse where we have good reasons for a number of contentions, but taken to-
gether the contentions are inconsistent, and thereby incompatible. Giving more reasons is not a vi-
able solution, since all the available reasons are already on the table, this being the inherent assump-
tion of the aporia. The crux of the matter is that the aporia exists because no single standard can be 
found by which we are able to assess the reasons given for or against each of the different positions. 
 Given the aporetic nature of the problem of religious diversity, an inquiry into the mechanics 
of how to dissolve aporias — what Rescher calls “Aporetics” (Rescher, 2009)— seems warranted; 
Such an aporetics has broader implications for our field of study (i.e., religious diversity) if we take 
into account that the diversity of religious worldviews is itself of an aporetic nature. To recapitulate, 
the different epistemic positions represent different solutions to the problem of religious diversity, 
which consists of the coming together of worldview claims. These worldview claims, forwarded by 
the religious traditions, are backed up by good reasons — the condition for being awarded plausibil-
ity, and thereby gain entry to rational discourse between peers — but taken together those claims 
are inconsistent and incompatible. Hence, they constitute a first-order aporia. However, as I have 
shown, the solutions available to this problem (i.e., the epistemic stances) also represent an aporetic 
situation: we thus end up with a second-order aporia.  
 An Aporetics of Religious Diversity — the title of my dissertation — is relevant from the 
point of view of several formal and informal interests. Firstly, it is relevant to all who are interested 
in the structural and comparative analysis of worldviews, specifically pertaining to coordination 
problems at the boundaries between worldviews. An aporetics, understood as the management of 
cognitive conflict, can therefore aid in understanding the issues and providing a procedure for con-
flict dissolution. It is also relevant for those interested in the problem of conflicting epistemic 
stances, arguably a persistent issue in the theology and philosophy of religions; arguably, because 
the proponents of each position deem that their solution settles the problem. In that sense, my pro-
posal contributes to the same purpose.  
 The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines “aporetic” as both an adjective and a noun. Used as an adjective, the 1
common meaning is “to be at a loss,” “impassable,” and “inclined to doubt, or to raise objections.” Used as a noun, the 
common meaning is “state of the aporetic” and “a perplexity or difficulty.” Following Rescher, I will solely use the term 
in its philosophical and specialised meaning as a group of individually plausible but collectively incompatible theses.
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Aim(s) of the Dissertation 
My dissertation deals with the normative question of which one of the epistemic stances we should 
take towards religious diversity. The most defended position for the last few decades has been plu-
ralism, spurring responses from exclusivists and inclusivists. Given that the camp of non-pluralists 
— as we may call them — has offered equal amounts of justification for their stances, it should be-
hoove us to take this camp equally serious. This would amount to a pluralist stance towards the ty-
pology. The implication of such stance is that all of the epistemic stances towards religious diversity 
suddenly become available for acceptance, including those stances rejected by religious pluralists. 
My research question is how we go about achieving this.   
 Moreover, a certain analogy appears between what is a first-order problem, namely the di-
versity of religious worldviews and the claims they contain, and the second-order problem of which 
stance we should take towards this diversity. Both represent aporetic situations where we can find 
enough reasons to be rationally justified to take up our own position, but the same is true for the 
positions of others. Thus we are faced with two aporias: (1) the aporia of religious diversity, and (2) 
the aporia of epistemic stances. This analogous situation therefore holds the promise that our 
aporetic efforts might be useful — and hopefully successful — in both cases.  
 Rather than defending one or the other of the different epistemic positions of the quadripar-
tite typology, I will argue for an integral application of the different epistemic positions in matters 
of aporetic decision making to worldview questions. From this follows that I will not merely argue 
for the viability of each one of the different epistemic positions separately; this case, as it were, has 
already been made by the defenders and apologists of the different positions (see supra). Instead, I 
will make a claim for an integrated approach that sees each of these four options as useful aporetic 
procedures for the purpose of worldview formation and worldview maintenance. This then is the 
central thesis (or aim) of my dissertation. Tied in with the above aim is my intention to take on 
board Rescher’s theory of Orientational Pluralism, and apply it to the problem of the diversity of 
epistemic stances. Concretely, I will argue that Orientational Pluralism offers a solution to the sec-
ond-order problem of epistemic stances that steers the middle between exclusivism and pluralism. 
However, I will show that Orientational Pluralism itself is a third-order theory, and should therefore 
not be confused with the second-order epistemic stances of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.  
 To be clear, Orientational Pluralism has been applied to religious diversity before.  The most 2
well-know case is the work of S. Mark Heim, particularly his Salvations (1995) and The Depth of 
 Cf. James, 2003; Kiplinger, 2005; Saarinen, 2003; Thomas, 1994.2
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the Riches (2001). My approach however differs from Heim’s: where Heim opts to be an inclusivist, 
on my approach the full spectrum of epistemic options remains open. The crux of the matter is the 
distinction (see supra) between the second-order epistemic stances, forming an aporetic problem, 
and the third-order solution of Orientational Pluralism. Orientational Pluralism allows access to all 
three epistemic stances of the tripartite typology, but only under two conditions: (1) one must take 
up a specific stance to the first-order issue of religious diversity, and (2) one must recognise that 
different epistemic orientations are always possible. 
 Although it can be shown empirically that the main world religions readily avail themselves 
of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, my dissertation remains fully philosophical - I will leave 
the empirical research to the historians of religion. Nevertheless, the fact that the different world 
religions make ample use of those options agrees well with my own thesis. In contrast, someone 
who takes the classic approach to the epistemic stances, will be burdened by either having to ex-
plain the presence of contradictory strategies, or otherwise denouncing what religious people al-
ready do themselves.  
 Further, since I do not deliberately delve into the cognitive content of actual religious 
claims, I will prima facie accept that religious traditions have warrants or justification for their 
claims. Similarly, I will leave further analysis of particular claims to the comparative philosopher, 
or the scholar of comparative religious studies. Although my interests are in Aporetics as the disso-
lution of cognitive conflict between religious claims, I will deliberately limit myself to meta-philo-
sophical concerns. Specifically, I will inquire into the following issuess: What do we need to know 
so that the aporetician — a word we can coin to denote any scholar involved in Aporetics — can do 
his or her work? More specific to the field of religious diversity, what does the aporetician interest-
ed in religious peer conflict need to know? Finally, is the existing aporetic procedure sufficiently 
equipped to tackle religious worldview issues, or do we need to add anything to it? The latter con-
cern derives from certain critiques on Rescher’s work. For instance, Stephen Boulter argues that, 
while Rescher has a very clear insight in the nature of aporias, his pragmatic procedure fails to 
“provide a principled way of making the less plausible give way to greater plausibility” (Boulter, 
2013, p. 38), and thus resolving the aporias. A further elaboration is therefore needed. Firstly, I will 
qualify “plausibility” by making a distinction between (a) initial plausibility, to be established by 
the giving of reasons and evidence, and (b) final plausibility — which I will call acceptability — to 
be established by the use of right-of-way criteria. While initial plausibility offers good reasons for 
the contentions on the table, final plausibility (or acceptability) decides on what makes some rea-
sons “better.” Secondly, I will suggest that the structural analysis of worldviews shows that different 
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types of claims are present within worldviews. Each type of claim will (a) have conditions for ac-
ceptability, as well as (b) form incompatibles when mutual acceptance of claims within that type 
leads to absurdity. However, claims will only compete on the basis of a similar set of injunctions, 
and therefore within the same validity claim. Therefore, at least some aporias will turn out to be 
prima facie. Contentions that are subject to different validity claims will still, however, lack a solu-
tion. Our only way out in that case will be to force a solution based on our specific epistemic  val-
ues, our epistemic stance, and the goals of our deliberations. In conclusion, although we can get rid 
of aporias temporarily, diversity is likely to persist, and therefore the potential for new aporias to 
arise. However, this should not be seen as a failure: the more diverse worldviews are, the richer 
human experience becomes. 
Philosophical Method  
To establish my thesis, I will rely on a cognitive instrumentarium or toolkit that includes such con-
cepts as worldview, aporia, speech acts, validity claim, and so on. Each of these terms represent a 
particular field of study, such as Worldview Theory (Smart, 1983, 1995; Aerts & Apostel, 1994; 
Heylighen 1993, 1997; Vidal 2008), Aporetics (Rescher, 2009, 2011), Speech Act Theory (Austin, 
1962; Searle, 1969), Universal Pragmatics (Habermas, 1984), and so on.  
 Firstly, I approach these disciplines with a certain philosophical naiveté. Secondly, I tie the 
different strands together by means of a philosophical bricolage of some sorts.  Given that this con3 -
cept is rather an uncommon one in the English-speaking world — being derived from the French 
“bricolage philosophique” — I will pause here to explain it further. Most scholars who use the term 
(philosophical) bricolage refer to the structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, and his classic 
work La Pensée Sauvage (The Savage Mind, 1962). For Lévi-Strauss, the “bricoleur” stood in op-
position to the “ingénieur” or engineer (i.e., the modern scientist). Joan E. DeJean writes on this: 
The bricoleur, firmly anchored in origins and the past, is less an inventor than a remodeler. 
“La règle de son jeu est de toujours s’arranger avec les ‘moyens du bord,’ c’est-à-dire un en-
semble à chaque instant fini d’outils et de matériaux” [Lévi-Straus, 1962] (p. 26). From his 
already formed stock of materials, the bricoleur chooses those appropriate for the job at 
hand. His means are always already there, while the scientist is constantly forced to create 
 One could argue that religious worldviews are also typically the product of philosophical bricolage. In fact, Claude 3
Lévi-Strauss made use of the term bricolage in particular to describe and refer to the structure of mythopoetic world-
views.
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his. The bricoleur manipulates a stock of secondhand remnants, fragments with a past that he 
deconstructs, reconstructs, and reshuffles. Even when he shapes these borrowed fragments 
into new formations, the bricoleur does not sever them completely from the context of their 
origin (DeJean, 1984, p. 101; between square brackets mine). 
In other words, the engineer starts from a worked out project plan, and then asks what kind of re-
sources he will need. The bricoleur, on the other hand, starts from what is at hand, and then works 
towards a solution to his problem.  
 The moral philosopher Jeffrey Stout, in his Ethics After Babylon (2001), refers to bricolage 
as the “selective retrieval and eclectic reconfiguration of traditional…elements in hope of solving 
problems at hand” (Stout, 2001, p. 293). Cornell West argues that Stout’s use of creative of moral 
bricolage —what West himself likes to call “improvisational criticism” — amounts to bringing to-
gether “fragments of traditions” and “strands and streams of our traditions” (West, 1989, p. 66-68). 
This serves to “disclose common ground between supposedly antagonistic positions,” while avoid-
ing “relativistic versions of eclecticism” (ibid.). West also cogently points out that, while Stout’s 
approach is fundamentally dialectical, it is Socratic rather than Hegelian. This means that Stout’s 
methodological process does not lead him to a “grand third moment or emergent synthesis with el-
ements of both positions intact, but rather [to] a mutual recognition by both sides of fallacious as-
sumptions and convergent values that bond them” (ibid.). The latter comment is particularly valu-
able since N. Rescher and J. Habermas have often been at odds in defending their respective posi-
tions. However, I will therefore not engage in the polemics between both authors — particularly on 
their notions of pluralism — but rather take what I need from both to establish my own position. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
I consider Worldview Theory, Aporetics, Speech Act Theory, and Universal Pragmatics to be the 
primary dramatis personae in play.  As such they will fulfil multiple roles, firstly, in defining the 4
problem of religious diversity (i.e., a diagnostic role), and secondly in formulating a solution (i.e., a 
therapeutic role), both in the context of (a) the first-order problem of religious diversity, as well as 
(b) the second-order problem of a forced choice between the epistemic positions towards religious 
diversity. I deal with the diagnostic aspect in chapters 2, 3, and 4, while in chapters 5 and 6 I  dis-
 From the Greek verb δρᾶµα, to act. The focus of drama therefore is on the performance of actions by actors. Similarly, 4
speech and communication perform acts, as the pragmatists have made clear. However, wether our focus is on the 
communicating subject or on the speech act itself is a matter of epistemic orientation (cf. the debates between Habermas 
and Nicklas Luhmann)
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cuss some of the tools for dissolving cognitive conflict. In chapter 7, I present a solution to the sec-
ond-order issue of epistemic stances and argue for an Orientational Pluralism that consists of a loca-
tive exclusivism and non-locative pluralism while preserving access to each one of the different 
stances. 
 In Chapter One, The Philosophy of Worldviews, I argue for an inclusion of the term world-
view into our cognitive instrumentarium. Ever since Immanuel Kant first introduced the term, it has 
been extensively used in philosophical discourse. Moreover, Scottish philosopher Ninian Smart 
(1983, 1995, 1997) has passionately argued for the inclusion of the term in the Philosophy of Reli-
gion. Hence, my use of the term worldview can be seen as an extension and continuation of this 
work. Firstly, I will define a worldview as a coherent whole of statements by means of which we 
attempt to understand ourselves, others, and the world. Following the work of Leo Apostel and col-
leagues (Aerts & Apostel, 1994), I will argue that the function of a worldview is to provide answers 
to fundamental questions on the nature of reality and life, the kind of actions we can take, and so 
on. Secondly, I will define religious traditions both in terms of worldviews, as well as in terms of an 
intentional object. Thirdly, I will define the tasks of a Philosophy of Worldviews, which finds its 
purpose in the coordination of worldviews, as a (at least) three-fold agenda of structural analysis, 
comparative analysis, and the categorisation of criteria. 
 In Chapter Two, The Problem of Religious Diversity, I will categorise the different answers 
to worldview questions as the formal elements of a worldview, comprising at least three different 
types of speech acts: descriptive, normative, and practical. Those answers that are deemed most im-
portant to the community will form the base or centre of the worldview to which all other beliefs 
are related in systemic fashion. I will focus on how different answers to the same questions, — and 
a cornucopia of answers abounds — will give rise to different worldviews and garner support from 
different communities of peers. As William A. Christian (1972) has noted, these three types of 
speech acts (i.e., descriptive, normative and practical) can and will also form incompatibles. Thus, 
incompatibles will occur both within the confines of a worldview, as well as across worldviews, 
giving rise respectively to intra-faith and inter-faith cognitive conflict. While the diversity of an-
swers to worldview questions leads to different worldviews, it is only the coming together of 
worldviews that will create incompatibles at their mutual boundaries, i.e., at the boundary between 
centre and field. The mapping of such boundary issues will therefore constitute a specific task for 
worldview analysis. I will further argue that the problem of religious diversity constitutes a first-or-
der problem of conflicting worldview claims, and a second-order problem of four epistemic stances 
of the quadripartite typology — which I will subsequently categorise as aporetic (chapters 5 & 7). 
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This will also allow me to state (chapter 7) that the four stances in fact represent generic strategies 
for exiting the first-order problem. However, they themselves cause another aporia to appear: we 
have good reasons for accepting any of the four exists, but taken together they form an inconsistent 
set.  From this follows that the first diagnostic role of aporetics is to identify two different aporias 5
constituted by: (a) the problem of religious diversity, and (b) the problem of the forced choice be-
tween epistemic stances. The second diagnostic role is to show how aporias defy solutions that 
merely insist on providing good reasons for one’s claims, since what makes a reason good will de-
pend on certain value orientations by means of which criteria of judgement get pre-selected. This 
guarantees a diversity in positions.  
 In Chapter Three, Jürgen Habermas and Validity Claims, I will present an analysis of 
Habermas’s cognitive architecture in defence of a Universal Pragmatics that aims to identify the 
formal structures of communication. I will show how speech acts are typically oriented to three dif-
ferent quasi-ontological worlds, i.e., a subjective, intersubjective, and objective world, by means of 
three different and related epistemologies. I will specifically refer to Habermas’s concept of a valid-
ity claim which denotes in what way claims can be redeemed. Objective claims will be redeemed in 
reference to truth, subjective claims in reference to authenticity and sincerity, and intersubjective 
claims in reference to normative rightness. This is of particular importance to the first-order prob-
lem of religious diversity. Given that this problem is constituted by the coming together of different 
types of claims, how such claims are to redeemed will be crucial for resolving mutual conflict. 
 In Chapter Four, George Lindbeck and the Nature of Doctrine, I will compare Habermas’s 
conclusions to George Lindbeck’s classic work The Nature of Doctrine (1984). In this work, Lind-
beck identified three different types of religious understanding of doctrines found within the schol-
arly literature. These three types can be equated to the three functions of language identified by 
Habermas, namely, to express one’s subjective life world, to refer to a normative background of 
shared meaning and social relationships, and to describe objects and events in the external and ob-
jective world. I will further show these three types of religious language also present a divide in the 
literature on religious diversity, causing scholars to interpret such conflict in different ways, namely 
either as a conflict between truth claims, or as a conflict between normative rules, or as a conflict 
between subjective appropriations of symbol systems. While Lindbeck prefers the normative ap-
proach to religious conflict in order to explain doctrinal reconciliation without change, I will argue 
that such strategy puts the cart before the horse, i.e., because this strategy seemingly allows for rec-
 The reason this aporia is indeed of a second-order nature consists of the fact that the second aporia is caused by the 5
solutions to the first aporia.
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onciliation, we should therefore understand religious language as being intersubjective and norma-
tive. Instead, I will argue for an integral understanding where religious doctrines can raise all three 
validity claim. The task of the aporetician will therefore be to identify which validity claims are 
raised in which pragmatic contexts. 
 In Chapter Five, Nicholas Rescher and Aporetics, I will category religious worldviews as 
representing aporetic situations, i.e., displaying an aporia, or cognitive impasse. Rescher (2001) has 
defined an aporia as a group of contentions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsis-
tent. In other words, the different religious traditions forward claims they believe to be plausible 
and acceptable. However, taken together, those claims form a collective inconsistency. In particular, 
I will analyse Rescher’s aporetic strategy of consistency restoration by means of a plausibility 
analysis designed to find the weakest link of such aporetic sets. While the initial plausibility of 
claims is dependent on the giving of good reasons, the final acceptability of claims will be depen-
dent on preferential right-of-way criteria. 
 In Chapter Six, Worldview Criteria, I will reflect on Rescher’s right-of-way-criteria by ap-
plying Habermas’s validity claims. In particular, I will discuss the work of Francis Heylighen 
(1997, 2000) and Clément Vidal (2008, 2012) who have identified three classes of selector criteria 
in worldview formation, namely subjective, intersubjective and objective superclasses. Heylighen 
shows how objective criteria aim for selection for fit to the outside object, how subjective criteria 
deal with selection for acceptance by the individual subject, and finally how intersubjective criteria 
aim for selection for sharing between subjects. From this follows that the acceptability of claims 
will depend on three superclasses. Whether any given claim will fulfils any of the three functions of 
language will be measured on the basis of objective, subjective and intersubjective parameters 
found within the three superclasses of selection criteria. The more of these parameters are fulfilled, 
the more likely it is that the particular claim will be able to redeem its associate validity claim of 
objective truth, subjective authenticity, and intersubjective normativity.  In other words, redemption 6
of the validity claim will determine the plausibility or acceptability of the claim, understood here in 
terms of truth, truthfulness, and rightness. Once redeemed, the claim will become or remain part of 
the worldview as an objective claim per se, or as an objectively charged claim, leaving room for 
other validity claims. A similar process will take place when claims come into contact with conflict-
ing claims where we not only have to establish initial plausibility, but also final acceptability. 
 Note that such a process is not an absolute guarantor of truth.6
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 Finally, in Chapter Seven, Orientational Pluralism, I will discuss the second-order aporia of 
the different epistemic stances, Firstly, I will present Nicholas Rescher’s responses to cognitive plu-
ralism and how this leads him to an Orientational Pluralism. Such a pluralist stance combines a ra-
tional preferentialism to the issue of final acceptability, with a supra-locative pluralism to the issue 
of initial plausibility. Secondly, I will present Schmidt-Leukel’s quadripartite typology of epistemic 
stances as constituting an aporia. As stated supra, in order to solve this aporia, we cannot suffice by 
merely giving reasons for or against claims: we also have to establish final acceptability which is 
based on a rational but preferential orientation.  
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1. The Philosophy of Worldviews 
1.1. Introduction 
On numerous occasions throughout his distinguished career, Scottish philosopher and historian of 
religion Ninian Smart persistently made an argument for the inclusion of the term worldview into 
the cognitive instrumentarium of the philosophy of religion. To wit, the concept of worldview was 
by no means a novel one. Starting with Immanuel Kant's first use of the term “Weltanschauung” — 
in his Critique of Judgment (1790) —, the term has had a longstanding history in both philosophy 
and other disciplines.  Smart’s proposal was nevertheless notable for its insistence that so central a 7
role should be given to the term that it warrants the transformation of the discipline into “the Phi-
losophy of Worldviews.”  
 Such a startling statement no doubt deserves closer examination. Even more so because 
Smart’s proposal, commendable as it might have been, has not been taken up. It is my intention to 
revisit Smart’s worldview model and investigate whether we can employ it as a platform for an 
Aporetics of Religious Diversity. The overarching question of such a project is how worldview the-
ory can help us understand religious diversity, how it can offer insights into the epistemic peer con-
flict that between different religious traditions, and more importantly how it can provide inroads 
into a satisfactory solution or dissolution of such conflicts.  While these are the tasks for my disser8 -
tation in toto, in this chapter, I will provide a necessary introduction to the Philosophy of World-
views: (1) what constitutes a worldview, (2) what makes up a religious worldview, and (3) what are 
the tasks of a Philosophy of Religion. 
1.2. A Turn to the Philosophy of Worldviews 
Smart's argument for primacy of the term worldview has to be seen in light of his views on what we 
can call traditional philosophy of religion. Smart understood that, historically, the philosophy of 
religion had focussed solely on philosophical questions relevant to Western theism, and that it had 
therefore been wanting in two areas, both internal and external to the existing philosophical agenda. 
 For an excellent historical overview, see Naugle (2002). Other researchers have conducted more in-depth studies of the 7
use of the worldview concept by particular authors, for instance, Kreiter (2007), or Basso (2012). Note that I prefer to 
use the composite word worldview rather than the more lexical form of world view. 
 John Valk similarly argues that the “use of the term worldview, rather than exclusively religion, might enhance dia8 -
logue, broaden the discussion and expand the parameters to create a more level playing field” (Valk, 2009, p. 1). It is 
important to note here that what determines a satisfactory solution depends on our goals and values. For instance, Valk 
is interested in the coordination of values and actions in the public sphere, which might or might not require a disposi-
tion of being consensus-oriented. May aims are to discuss Aporetics from a meta-philosophical point of view, which 
remains neutral to both options of consensus and dissensus.
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Internally, the philosophy of religion — and by this Smart meant British analytic philosophy  — 9
had been cut off for too long from continental theology, in particular the modern systematic inter-
pretations offered by scholars in the German-speaking world. Furthermore, the philosopher of reli-
gion had ignored the study of religions in terms of religious practice and "forms of life,” as well as 
the means by which to do so, namely the burgeoning field of the history of religion.  Externally, 10
the philosophers of religion had not sufficiently considered the challenge posed to Western theism 
by other religious traditions. It was here also that the history of religion revealed remarkable con-
trasts between the different religions in both practices and beliefs. Moreover, Western theism was 
equally, if not more, challenged by non-religious ideologies, and for this reason, Smart argued, the 
struggle between ideologies and religions should be in the purview of the philosophy of religion. 
 Smart framed his critique in such a way that the introduction of the term worldview could 
help us overcome these ills. Making the term worldview a primary concept would not only assist us 
in understanding our own religion more fully, but also other religious traditions and non-religious 
ideologies. On the basis of this, Smart argued for the idea that both religions and ideologies could 
be seen as examples of existential worldviews:  both ideologies and religions guide people regard11 -
ing the meaning of life, and have some fundamental properties in common.  Thus, the concept of 12
an existential worldview was meant to provide the philosopher of religion with a common frame-
work to help us map religious and non-religious traditions. This was possible because both types 
were in fact not radically different, but vied for the same kind of territory, i.e., to provide answers to 
the same existential questions. To strengthen his argument, Smart further demonstrated that theolo-
gy itself was often the result of the struggle between a religious tradition and an ideology. Thus, for 
all these reasons, Smart argued that the discipline would better be called "philosophy of world-
views.”   13
 In his much quoted 1995 article he mentions such names as John Wisdom (1904 - 1993), Antony Flew (1923-2010), 9
John Hick (1922-2012), Ronald Hepburn (1927-2008) and D. Z. Philips (1934-2006). 
 This harks back to the well-known insight that religions do not just make “truth claims,” but also include religious 10
practices and symbolism. Christianity does not just include theism, that is, a philosophy, but also "living sacrament.”
 The idea that ideologies are worldviews is also defended by Michael Kearney in his 1984 monograph, Worldview.11
 He suggests the following properties, in random order: (a) closely relating theory and practice, (b) not being straight12 -
forward verifiable or falsifiable, (c) calling for dedicated commitment, possessing an account of human history, imply-
ing ethical principles, possessing a doctrine of human nature, being capable of intellectual and practical development, 
having an eschatological orientation, possessing a cosmology, having a theory about the genesis of religion. Smart adds 
that "importantly some religions and some ideologies are thus" (1995, pp. 18-19). 
 Smart also suggested that we call it Weltanschauungswissenshaft. Clearly, this German term would too cumbersome 13
to use in the English languages. Although it translates as “worldview science,” my preference lies with calling it 
“worldview theory.” 
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 Not every philosopher of religion might agree that we should indeed include ideologies. If 
so, this would at least take some justification away from rebranding our field. However, whether we 
should rename the discipline should matter less than what we can learn from including the concept 
of worldviews into our philosophical deliberations. Therefore, I am less interested in rocking the 
boat of the discipline by rebranding it than I am in investigating the potential of an aporetic world-
view analysis to help us address the so-called problem of religious diversity. Having said this, I do 
believe the inclusion of ideologies into our purview to be pertinent to the very same discussion on 
religious diversity. This is despite the fact that, within the scholarly literature on religious diversity, 
it is not at all uncommon to find that ideologies — usually under the moniker of non-religious or 
atheistic forms of thought — are being dismissed as irrelevant for both inter-religious dialogue and 
theories of religious pluralism. The argument goes that such a delineation allows scholars of reli-
gion to focus on what they hold to be the real problem, viz., the diversity in religious traditions. 
Given that the naturalist position rejects religions altogether — by rejecting super-natural explana-
tions — it makes the debates between the religious traditions pointless, thereby undermining the 
project that these scholars of religion have set out for themselves.  
  In contrast, I will argue for a criterion-based approach to the settlement of cognitive 
conflict. On this view, the delineation between religious and non-religious worldviews is imaginary, 
since both types of worldviews can be beholden to the same kinds of criteria. For instance, if we 
take a propositionalist stance to religious language, both religious and non-religious camps can en-
gage in the same type of propositional discourse centred on truth claims. Such a discourse is legiti-
mate since the same type of criteria — guidelines for the acceptability of claims — are applied to 
both areas. Such criteria allow us to perform a comparative analysis of the total set of claims where 
we judge how each worldview responds to the same set of criteria. On such a view, both religious 
and non-religious camps (i.e., science) can take religious claims seriously: that is, they forward such 
claims as truth candidates. However, more often than not such a comparative analysis is avoided 
because it is deemed that religious claims, one way or another, escape the confines of strict empiri-
cal truths. For instance, John Hick quotes Mircea Eliade, who writes:  14
Because religion is human it must for that very reason be something social, something lin-
guistic, something economic,  — you cannot think of man apart for language and society. 
 Hick adds that Eliade expresses Hick’s own premise here (ibid., p 15).14
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But it would be hopeless to try and explain religions in terms of any one of those basic func-
tions (Eliade, 1958, xi; also quoted in Hick, 1989, p. 15 f1). 
John Hick, who describes religion as a human response to the transcendent, argues that two differ-
ent attitudes exist towards Reality: a religious and a non-religious attitude (Hick, 1989, p. 3). Each 
one of these is persistent in the sense that neither can be easily refuted. On the basis of this, Hick 
attempts to formulate a hypothesis on Reality that would be acceptable to both. Hick’s theory, how-
ever, is based on the presupposition that the transcendent is noumenally Real, and that the religious 
traditions represent authentic but phenomenally diverse responses. The hidden premise is that the 
mere existence of religious traditions implies that the transcendent is at least noumenally real. Sci-
ence is unable to refute this because its realm of investigation is the phenomenal, and Hick’s syn-
thesis does not require one to state that the transcendent is also phenomenally real (i.e., deities phe-
nomenally exist). The upshot of this is that the naturalist worldview — a poison that could erode the 
religious traditions — has not only been rendered powerless in any subsequent inter-religious de-
bates, but also irrelevant. Hick’s hypothesis therefore does not represent a bridge between naturalist 
and religious worldviews; rather, its main function is to show how it can accommodate the diversity 
of religions. 
 Not every scholar of religion will understand religious doctrines in a propositional way. 
However, even this will fail as a basis for excluding non-religious worldviews from our debates, 
since the raising of different types of truth is congruent with the various possibilities for discourse. 
The demand for explicating how one understands one’s claims is equally present in the debates be-
tween science and religion as it is in inter-religious debates. Put differently, if debates between sci-
ence and religion demand that we raise the question of what constitutes (religious) truth, then the 
same question can and should be raised in inter-religious dialogue, given that our answers to this 
question determine how we understand our particular claims. Not only would this render the per-
ceived differences between both endeavours moot, it would also allow us to employ a common 
framework for both types of discourse, and not just for inter-religious discourse.  
1.3. Definition of a Worldview 
Before we look at what kind of tasks the Philosophy of Worldviews is supposed to perform, it be-
hooves us to have a closer look at the term worldview itself. Smart himself does little effort to pro-
vide us with a definition. This omission might have its roots in the fact that Smart is equally loathe 
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to define the phenomenon of religion. Moreover, as I have stated, the term has been frequently used 
in both philosophy and the cultural sciences. Arguably, Smart is therefore relying on a philosophical 
a priori understanding of the term.  
 I will return to Smart’s writings on the topic when I discuss the tasks of the philosophy of 
worldviews (see 1.4). For now, I will have a look at some of the historical developments of the term 
while focussing on the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1.3.1), discuss some contemporary definitions 
(1.3.2), and finally look at what makes religious worldviews religious (1.3.3). 
1.3.1. A Brief Historical Overview 
The English term worldview is a direct translation from the German concept of “Weltanschauung.” 
This term was first coined by Immanuel Kant in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) — despite 
Gadamer’s insistence that Hegel was the first (Gadamer, 1993, p. 98)—, as a simple compound of 
Welt and Anschauung.  Although for Kant a worldview denoted “an intuition of the world based on 15
sense perception” (Naugle, 2002, p. 61), it soon acquired a different and more complex meaning. 
 Olthuis argues that a technical definition of the term was first formulated as early as 1838 by 
Søren Kierkegaard, but fails to mention the actual definition (Olthuis, 1989, p. 55 f3). Despite this, 
Kierkegaard only mentions the term five times in his whole oeuvre. Instead, he makes ample use of 
the semantically related concept of life view (Naugle, 2002, p. 73). For Kierkegaard, a lifeview is “a 
deep and satisfying view of life that would enable him to become a total human self” (Naugle, ibid., 
p. 74).   16
 Arguably, the concept of a Weltanschauung received its greatest attention in the work of 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), and Heinrich Rickert 
(1863-1936). This allows Wolters to conclude that the popularity of the term reached its peak in 
 Kant writes: "Das gegebene Unendliche aber dennoch ohne Widerspruch auch nur denken zu können, dazu wird ein 15
Vermögen, das selbst übersinnlich ist, im menschlichen Gemüte erfordert. Denn nur durch dieses und dessen Idee eines 
Noumenons, welches selbst keine Anschauung verstattet, aber doch der Weltanschauung, als bloßer Erscheinung, zum 
Substrat untergelegt wird, wird das Unendliche der Sinnenwelt, in der reinen intellektuellen Größenschätzung, unter 
einem Begriffe ganz zusammengefaßt, obzwar es in der mathematischendurch Zahlenbegriffe nie ganz gedacht werden 
kann" (2012, p. 176-177). Since Kant mentions the concept only once, it was  hardly an important concept to his phi-
losophy. Albert Wolters (1983) calls Kant's coinage “incidental.”
 Danish: livsanskuelse; Ger.: Lebensanschauung. Albert Wolters calls life-view the “central category” in Kierkegaard's 16
philosophy (Naugle, ibid., p. 384 f.24). Clément Vidal (2012, p. 314) makes a distinction between a "lifeworld" (Ger.: 
Levenswelt), which is experiential and subjective, and a “worldview," which is social or intersubjective. However, he 
sees the "lifeworld" as but one aspect of a worldview. Hence, the term worldview for Vidal is an ambiguous term, since 
it can both include and exclude the concept of lifeworld. Alternatively, we could state that lifeview denotes the lifeview 
of the individual, while worldview denotes the worldview of the community, or society. Note that here as well I prefer 
to use lifeview instead of the lexical form of life view.
 !5
1910 (Olthuis, 1989, p. 55 f3). Given that Dilthey’s work is instrumental in understanding contem-
porary definitions of a worldview, I will briefly outline Dilthey’s work on a typology of worldviews 
(Ger.: Weltanschauungstypologie), specifically in Das Wesen der Philosophie (1907) and Die Typen 
der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen (1911).  F i r s t l y , 
Dilthey was a personal student of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, and therefore influenced by his 
worldview theory (Kreiter, 2007, p. 13). In his Naturrecht auf deb Grunde der Ethik, Trendelen-
burg, defines a worldview as a “fundamental conception” (Ger.: Grundgedanke), which cannot be 
"deduced from other conceptions or principles" (Kreitner, 2007, p. 13). As a foundational notion, a 
worldview underlies a philosophical system and attempts to elicit from it the answers to a meta-
physical question, namely, how thought and being are related. The possible answers to this question 
can then be used to classify philosophical systems into three categories, generating three corre-
sponding types of worldviews, namely: (1) naturalism, (2) idealism (Platonism, or the "organic" 
worldview), and (3) Spinozism. Each Weltanschauung gives a unique answer to the question how 
thought and being are related. Furthermore, a worldview functions as an ordering principle which 
brings together all knowledge into a coherent totality (Ger.: zum Ganzen einigt), by bringing it into 
relation with the fundamental metaphysical conception.  
 Secondly, Dilthey distinguishes between different kinds (i.e., religious, artistic, and meta-
physical) and types (i.e., naturalism, the idealism of freedom, and objective idealism).  Dilthey ar17 -
gues that each type of worldview is rooted in a particular concept of life (Ger.: Leben). He writes: 
“Die letzte Wurzel der Weltanschauung ist das Leben” (Dilthey, 1911, p. 78; quoted in Kreiter, p. 
65). Therefore, it is the particular life world of the individual (Ger.: Lebenswelt), or his lived expe-
rience, that gives rise to a worldview.   18
 While, according to Berend Kreiter (2007), even in Dilthey’s work the life concept remains 
vague, we can nevertheless identify some important features (Kreiter, 2007, p. 63). Kreiter observes 
that, for Dilthey, life acts as a medium, and that it therefore exhibits two essential features: (a) a 
medium is not directly accessible or visible, and (b) connects distant parts together. Similarly, life is 
neither rationally accessible [a] in the immediate moment, nor [b] in its totality. Although life hap-
pens immediately, it cannot be known immediately. For this reason, life is irrational. However, as 
rational beings we can still reflect on the products of life, which are (i) our own subjective life expe-
riences (i.e., recollections of immediate life experiences), and (ii) cultural objectifications. Each 
 Cf. Kreiter, 2007, p. 64-65.17
 For Dilthey, knowing what constitutes life is equally fundamental to a worldview as it is for Kierkegaard. For 18
Kierkegaard's influence on Dilthey, see Basso (2012, p. 94 and onwards).
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individual subject, in order to understand life (and the world), has to engage in an interpretative re-
construction of it, and these reconstructions or interpretations make up a worldview. Thus, although 
life as such cannot be known immediately, it can still be known medially; although life cannot be 
known in its totality, it can still be known partially. The individual subject is connected to life in two 
different ways: firstly, through Lebendigkeit — what I translate as vitality — understood as individ-
ual consciousness (e.g., emotions, thoughts, feelings, etc.), and secondly, through Welt. The latter is 
everything to which Lebendigkeit is connected by means of so-called Lebensbezüge, i.e., life-con-
nections (Kreiter, 2007, p. 67).  
 In Dilthey's metaphysics, life creates its own world from the perspective of every 
individual.  That is, life gives rise to reflection on life in each and every individual.  However, the 19 20
individual, monadic as he/she might be, is not alone in the world. The world, seen as exteriority, is 
primarily a human world. A worldview cannot emerge without other people, since "my self-inter-
pretation and individuation [are only] possible through processes of learning and 
individuation" (Nelson, 2011, p. 19; between square brackets mine). The subject is dependent for 
his or her formation on a social world of other subjects. Hence, the individual lifeview is equally 
dependent on the socially accepted worldview. This shared life experience (Ger.: allgemeine 
Lebenserfahrung) of individual subjects, all engaged in the same activity as life expresses itself, 
also gives rise to certain patterns behind worldviews: life yields the same questions over and over 
again for each individual (i.e., hence the existence of so-called cultural objectifications). Dilthey 
writes: 
The riddle of existence faces all ages of mankind with the same mysterious countenance; we 
catch sight of its features, but we must guess at the soul behind it. This riddle is always 
bound up organically with that of the world itself and with the question what I am supposed 
to do in this world, why I am in it, and how my life in it will end. Where did I come from? 
Why do I exist? What will become of me? This is the most general question of all questions 
and the one that most concerns me. The answer to this question is sought in common by the 
poetic genius [i.e., art], the prophet [i.e., religion] and the thinker [i.e., metaphyics] (Dilthey, 
Gesammelte Schriften, 8:208-9; quoted in Naugle, 2002, p. 82; between square brackets 
mine). 
 Typen, 79: "So schafft das Leben von jedem Individuum aus sich seine eigene Welt."19
 The individual is therefore not a single event, but a plural event. Hence, life becomes known in multiple ways, giving 20
rise to multiple world and life views.
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Dilthey adds, again reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s view, that these riddles of existence — specifical-
ly the experiences of birth, death and the finitude of man — prevent the individual from being able 
"to unite his life-experiences into a meaningful totality" (Kreiter, 2007, p. 68). Eric Nelson points 
out, in this regard, how Dilthey from his earlier to his later works was consistently occupied with 
the question of interconnectedness or unity (Ger.: Zusammenhang). One of Dilthey’s enduring 
quests was to investigate how [a] explanatory scientific thought, [b] interpretive understanding of 
others, and [c] self-reflection (Ger.: Selbstbesinnung) could arise together (Nelson, 2007, p. 
109-110). These three elements together can be seen to foreshadow Karl Brüner's work on Real-
itätsbezüge (i.e., relations to reality), as well as Jürgen Habermas's work on the notion of Sprech-
handlung (i.e., speech act). To preview what is to come (see chapter 3), as subjects we are simulta-
neously oriented towards (1) ourselves (i.e., the subjective world), (2) towards others (i.e, the social 
and intersubjective world), and towards (3) things and events (i.e., the objective world). Each of 
these three domains generates data for the subject, on the basis of which he or she formulates be-
liefs about him or herself, about others, and about the external world. Although both the subject and 
others can equally be considered to constitute objects and events within the one objective world, the 
data from those object domains are in fact “mined” in different ways. Hence the need for different 
methodologies, respectively, self-reflection, interpretive understanding (between subjects), and ex-
planatory scientific thinking, as the trifecta for all discourse, including religious discourse.  21
 Dilthey also discusses the conflict between worldviews at great length (Ger.: Widerstreit).  22
He claims that the historically proven fact of a multitude of mutually exclusive metaphysical sys-
tems — each claiming universal validity — produces a tension of unbearable proportions (Naugle, 
2002, p. 85). He writes that “every single one of these systems excludes the other, each one refutes 
the other, and none can prove itself fully” (Naugle, ibid., p. 85). Thus we end up with a paradox: 
while a worldview serves to provide cognitive unity for the individual, the fact is that a diversity of 
worldviews exists that are seemingly equally plausible. Therefore no such cognitive unity seems to 
exist for the community of all people. A similar observation is what motivates Nicholas Rescher to 
develop his Aporetics (see Chapter 5). First of all, Rescher argues that the overdetermination of an-
swers to life’s questions creates paradoxes, or aporias. Secondly, Rescher argues that we can devel-
op aporetic strategies that allow us to develop exits out of the inconsistencies generated. Thirdly, 
 Moreover, while our own subjective life experiences, and their cultural objectifications, can be said to be irrational, 21
we can still rationally reflect on them.
 Cf. Nelson, 2011, p. 27 and further.22
 !8
Rescher claims that we can validly claim universality for our preferred solutions under the condi-
tion that we recognise that other orientations are possible from which different sets of claims are 
equally plausible.  The latter point allows him to develop a so-called orientational pluralism, 23
which serves as an alternative to the options of exclusivism and pluralism (see chapter 7). 
1.3.2. Contemporary Definitions 
Fast forward to the present day, and a cornucopia of related definitions can be found, more or less 
influenced by previous historical developments. Given that a full overview of the various defini-
tions would lead me too far afield, I will only present a small selection of such definitions, by such 
authors as Olthuis, Valk, and Apostel.  24
1.3.2.1. James H. Olthuis 
Firstly, there is the often cited article On Worldviews by James H. Olthuis (1985), republished in 
Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science (Marshall et al., 1989, pp. 26-40). Olthuis writes: 
A worldview (or vision of life) is a framework or set of fundamental beliefs through which 
we view the world and our calling and future in it. This vision need not be fully articulated: 
it may be so internalised that it goes largely unquestioned; it may not be explicitly devel-
oped into a systematic conception of life; it may not be theoretically deepened into a philos-
ophy; it may not even be codified into a creedal form; it may be refined through cultural-his-
torical development. Nevertheless, this vision is a channel for the ultimate beliefs which 
give direction and meaning to life. It is the integrative and interpretative framework by 
which order and disorder are judged; it is the standard by which reality is managed and pur-
sued; it is the set of hinges on which all of our everyday thinking and doing turns (Marshall 
et al., 1989, p. 29; also quoted in Naugle, 2002, p. 349). 
Jacob Klapwijk writes that for Olthuis a worldview is “an ultimate vision of life, in which people 
integrate their daily experiences” (1989, p. 41).  This implies that religious claims can only be 25
 Universality implies that under the same conditions we should arrive at the same conclusion.23
 See also Walsh and Middelton (1984), Wolters (1983, 2005), Fowler (1996), etc.24
 Interestingly, Klapwijk adds that Olthuis nowhere gives a definition of the term worldview (Klapwijk, 1989, p. 41). 25
In fact, he deems it “impossible to present a closed, rationally adequate definition of it” (ibid., p. 42). However, Naugle 
regards the quote given to be in fact Olthuis’s definition (2002, p. 349).
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properly understood within the context of the integrative framework that is a worldview. Such a 
view is consistent with what Berger and Luckmann (1997) call “plausibility structures,” that is, 
“socially accepted patterns of beliefs by which all other beliefs are judged” (Valk, ibid., p. 10).  
 David Naugle also writes that on Olthuis’s view worldviews have both descriptive and pre-
scriptive functions (Naugle, 2002, p. 350). Not only do worldviews present beliefs about what con-
stitutes the world, but they also provide us with courses of actions that define how we should act in 
the world.  Similarly, Klapwijk writes: 26
Olthuis shows how a worldview functions in concrete human existence simultaneously as a 
vision of life and a vision for life. He points very convincingly to the practical and norma-
tive implications involved in a worldview. A worldview is not just a view of how the world 
is but also a view of how the world should be. It not only a view of the world but also a view 
of how to shape the world; it is, in short, a deeply rooted, inspiring source of action… It is 
not just a framework for a set of beliefs. Rather, it is a fundamental awareness of the mean-
ing of life, of our calling in the world, and of my own personal responsibility (Klapwijk, 
1989, p. 43). 
However, Klapwijk is critical of Olthuis’s idea that worldviews are mediators between faith com-
mitment and all other modes of human experience. He writes that mediation presupposes two oppo-
site poles standing in need of mediation on account of their opposition (Klapwijk, ibid., p. 44). This 
would mean that Olthuis’s definition of worldview as a “mediator” implies that faith stands in op-
position to all other modes of human experience. However, Klapwijk argues that everyday experi-
ence is characterised by “the unity and unbreakable coherence of human experience in all its differ-
ent modes” (ibid., p. 44). Accordingly, “in every possible act of experience… all modi are present 
simultaneously” (ibid., p. 44). Klapwijk’s view therefore comes close to Dilthey’s understanding of 
a unity in experience between three different modes of experience. Throughout my dissertation I 
will refer to these three modes of experience as the subjective, the intersubjective (i.e., social), and 
the objective (see my discussion of Habermas in chapter 3). 
 Shortly, I will show how this understanding was also already present in Dilthey’s definition of worldview (see infra). 26
It is therefore part of a classical understanding.
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1.3.2.2. John Valk 
A pertinent and elegant definition of worldview can also be found in John Valk’s Religion or World-
view (2009). Valk, no doubt influenced by Olthuis, defines a worldview as follows: 
Worldviews are comprehensive and integrative frameworks by which we understand our-
selves, others, and the world in which we live. They are the lenses, glasses or filters that 
inform our perceptions of reality, and in turn form our perceptions of reality. But as much as 
worldviews are visions of life, they are also ways of life. Though individual and personal in 
nature, worldviews become communal and public in scope and structure when common vi-
sions bind adherents together in communities of thought and action (Valk, 2009, p. 6).  
Of note here is that, for Valk, a worldview is a comprehensive framework by which we understand 
(1) ourselves, (2) others, and (3) the world. This view is congruent with Habermas’s understanding 
of three relationships to reality, the so-called Realitätsbezüge, which I will discuss in depth infra. 
While for Valk a worldview orients us to the world in three different ways, Habermas argues that 
these three relationships are always already present in speech itself.  
 Similar to Olthuis, Valk points out that worldviews are “ways of life,” and that they lead be-
lievers to perform actions. This also implies that individuals and communities will reflect on such 
actions, and include these reflections within their worldview as specific worldview claims. 
  
1.3.2.3. Leo Apostel 
The late Belgian philosopher Leo Apostel, together with collaborators (Aerts, Apostel et al., 1994), 
defined a worldview as follows: 
A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to con-
struct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our 
experience as possible. Societies, as well as individuals, have always contemplated deep 
questions relating to their being and becoming, and to the being and becoming of the world. 
The configuration of answers to these questions forms their world view (1994, p. 8).  27
 Key concepts: coherent collection, concepts, global, image  of the world, elements of experience, societies and indi27 -
viduals, deep questions, being and becoming, (self and) the world.
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A world view is a system of co-ordinates or a frame of reference in which everything pre-
sented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representa-
tion that allows us to integrate everything we know about the world and ourselves into a 
global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a certain culture 
(1994, p. 9).  28
Firstly, a worldview is a coherent collection of concepts, and represents a symbolic system of repre-
sentation.  Hence, concepts and symbols within the worldview cohere with one another, and are 29
systematically related. However, the elements of worldviews are typically not concepts, but rather 
beliefs (i.e., statements that are acceptable to the religious believer). Beliefs, as such, are made up 
of sentences, rather than mere concepts. Similarly, worldview conflicts between religious traditions 
will consist of conflicts between sentences that are integrally connected to a worldview.  30
 Secondly, if a worldview is a system of representation, we need to state what it is that is be-
ing represented, viz., a worldview offers a global “picture” or image of the world. A worldview is 
therefore what it says on the tin, i.e., it represents our view of (i.e., image) or outlook on the world. 
If the term worldview relies on the concept of world, to fully understand the meaning of the former 
we first have to understand the latter.  The authors of the manifest write: 31
The "world” is the broadest environment that is cognitively, practically and emotionally rel-
evant. We thus talk about “the world” in which we live, the “Lebenswelt” (Edmund 
Husserl). This “world” can differ, depending on the culture that we consider. Therefore we 
can speak of “the world of Antiquity,” or “the world of the Eskimos.” “The world” should 
not be identified with “the earth,” nor with “the cosmos,” nor with “the observable 
universe,” but with the totality in which we live and to which we can relate ourselves in a 
meaningful way (Apostel, et al., 1994, p. 8). 
 Key concepts: system of co-ordinates, frame of reference, our diverse experiences symbolic system of representation, 28
(what) we know about the world and ourselves, global picture, illuminates, reality as it is presented to us, within a cer-
tain culture.
 The dictionary definition of a symbol suggests: (especially in semiotics) a word, phrase, image, or the like having a 29
complex of associated meanings and perceived as having inherent value separable from that which is symbolised, as 
being part of that which is symbolised, and as performing its normal function of standing for or representing that which 
is symbolised: usually conceived as deriving its meaning chiefly from the structure in which it appears, and generally 
distinguished from a sign.
 This serves as an argument also for my preference for the concept of a worldview, rather other related terms such as a 30
conceptual scheme.
 Some bootstrapping must take place: how we define "the world" will be dependent on our worldview.31
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Thus, on Apostel’s interpretation, a worldview offers a picture or view of the world as the totality in 
which we live, to which we can relate ourselves, in a meaningful way, both (a) cognitively, (a) prac-
tically, and (c) emotionally.  In other words, we orientate ourselves to the world in at least three 32
different ways: cognitively (i.e., producing propositional content), pragmatically (i.e., interacting 
with the world), and emotionally (i.e., expressively).   33
 The ideas contained within Apostel’s world definition are undoubtedly influenced by 
Dilthey’s. For Dilthey, there was an “identical structure” to the mind of all humans — what Noam 
Chomsky (1965) would call a “deep structure” — that consisted of three parts: mind, emotion, and 
will. These three structures of the mind accordingly influenced the generation of worldviews. 
Dilthey understood these aspects in terms of “levels of consciousness” where the “upper level of 
consciousness” consisted of the highest ideals and the greatest good. The resultant of all three struc-
tures on a worldview was a “comprehensive life plan, a highest good, the highest norms of action, 
an ideal of shaping one’s personal life as well as that of society” (Dilthey, 1957, p. 25; also quoted 
in Naugle, 2002, p. 87). David Naugle (2002) concludes: 
Thus for Dilthey, the metaphysical, axiological, and moral structure of a worldview is de-
rived from the constituents of the human psyche — intellect, emotion, and will respectively 
(Naugle, ibid, p.  87). 
In brief, worldviews spring from the totality of human psychological existence: intellectual-
ly in the cognition of reality, affectively in the appraisal of life, and volitionally in the active 
performance of the will (Naugle, ibid., p. 88). 
From this follows that for Dilthey — and similarly for Apostel — every worldview contains at least 
a metaphysical, axiological, and moral structure.  
 Thirdly, for Apostel, a worldview answers deep or big questions about the being and becom-
ing of ourselves and the world. Naugle, writing on Dilthey, calls this function “the interrogative 
 And we could add 'spiritually.' These different categories will reappear throughout my dissertation.32
 Examples of such interaction would be, respectively, science, crafts, and the arts. The concept of emotionality will be 33
taken up again by Vidal, for whom it becomes a criterion for the acceptance of worldviews (see infra). Also note that I 
equate the emotional relationship with the world as an instance of subjective expression (see the discussion on Haber-
mas).
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mood” (Naugle, 2002, p. 83): worldviews constitute answers to questions on life and the world. In-
stead, I will call this the erotetic function of a worldview, since its function is to answer questions. 
Apostle and colleagues identify seven such returning questions, which they believe structure and 
define worldviews: 
1. What exists? What is reality? 
2. Why is the world the way it is? Where do we come from? 
3. Where are we going? Will the world come to an end? 
4. What is good and what is evil? What should we strive for? 
5. How should we act? How can we tackle our problems? 
6. What is true and what is false? How can we know? 
7. Where do we start answering these questions?  
These same authors also point out that the first six fundamental questions can be equated with 
philosophically relevant categories, respectively, (1) ontology, (2) metaphysics, (3) futurology, (4) 
axiology, (5) praxeology, and (6) epistemology.  They do not, however, categorise the seventh 34
question. Therefore, I suggest we make use of the term methodology to refer to the seventh ques-
tion, namely, the systematic and theoretical analysis of the methods used to generate data in a cer-
tain field (i.e., ontology, metaphysics, etc.).   35
 As we have seen, Dilthey also formulated worldviews in terms of questions: what I am sup-
posed to do in this world, why I am in it, how will my life end, where did I come from, and so on. 
For Dilthey’s teacher Trendelenburg a worldview contained an ordering principle that gave a unique 
answer to the question how thought and being were related, and which brought together all knowl-
edge into a coherent totality. While such an idea was still present in Dilthey’s presentation, —lead-
ing to different types of worldviews — Apostel’s definition does no rely on such “ordering princi-
ples.” However it can be said that, here, the “configuration of answers” to the different life and 
world questions function as an “ordering principle” for what we believe about the world, how we 
act, and so on.  
 Futurology is, arguably, an unfamiliar concept to philosophers. Manifestations of futurology are, for instance, escha34 -
tology and teleology, concepts which are familiar to philosophers (e.g.., of religion). Also note that all worldview ques-
tions come in doubles. In some cases, as we will see, this expresses a double nature of some of the categories.
 James Sire, in The Universe Next Door (2009), also defines worldviews by reference to seven questions.35
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 As a corollary, Apostel’s worldview categories make for a useful heuristic with which to an-
alyse and compare worldviews. Firstly, by means of a structural analysis (see infra) we can identify 
those claims that pertain to ontology, metaphysics, futorology, axiology, praxeology, and epistemol-
ogy, as a simple instance of cataloguing claims. Secondly, we can then compare claims from one 
ontology with the claims of another ontology, such as a Christian ontology and a Buddhist 
ontology.  Of course, the same could then be done with the other categories. Thirdly, we can then 36
address the differences between category-specific claims by means of an aporetic method. I will 
return to the question of the different functions of worldview theory shortly (see infra). 
1.3.3. Religious Worldviews 
The question what defines a religious worldview hinges on the question what defines a religion. As 
many authors argue (Hick, 1989; Harrison, 2006; Hedges, 2010; Fitzgerald, 2000), this is not a 
question with a simple answer, due to the fact that no single definition captures all of the religions: 
one definition will typically capture too little, while another will capture too much, including belief 
systems that nobody, including the worldview holders themselves, considers to be religious in na-
ture. This has lead some scholars to accept Wittgenstein's analogy of family resemblances: some 
traditions will share some characteristics while sharing other characteristics with other traditions 
(Hick, 1989, p. 3). Others, such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962), argue that we drop the term reli-
gion altogether. Smith, in The Meaning and End of Religion (1962, 1991), writes: 
Neither religion in general nor any one of the religions, I will contend, is in itself an intelli-
gible entity, a valid object of inquiry, or of concern whether for the scholar or the man of 
faith (Smith, 1991, p. 12).  
Timothy Fitzgerald makes a similar argument in The Ideology of Religious Studies (2000) critiquing 
the category of religion as a cross-cultural analytical concept by arguing that there is no clear way 
of distinguishing between “a religion” and “a quasi religion,” or between these and “secular ideolo-
gy” (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. x). In other words, there is no clear way of distinguishing a religious 
worldview from a non-religious worldview: hence, we should abandon the search for a sui generis 
definition of a religious worldview (Fitzgerald, ibid., p. 3). Moreover, Fitzgerald concludes that the 
 Note that this does not need to imply that there is such a thing as a singular Christian ontology, or a singular Bud36 -
dhist. Rather, the Christian worldview — if we must use a singular term — will represent a family of worldviews, and 
by extension, a family of ontologies. 
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field of religious studies is akin to ideology, i.e., it delivers specific first-order, positioned points of 
view on the basis of putative presumptions. However, the fact that there is no consensus on what 
constitutes a religion, or even on whether it is a useful category or not, does not imply that there is 
no definition of religion to be found. In fact, a plethora of definitions exists within such diverse 
fields as the philosophy of religion, theology and religious studies, anthropology and sociology, 
psychology of religion, and so on.  Since an in-depth analysis of such definitions would lead me 37
too far, I will suffice here by only mentioning a few types of definitions that I deem useful. 
 Firstly, some of the definitions of religion come close to our definitions of a worldview. As 
such, they would be good candidates for use in the philosophy of worldviews. For instance, Paul J. 
Griffiths, in his Problems of Religious Diversity (2001), considers a religion to be "a form of life 
that seems to those who belong to it to be comprehensive, incapable of abandonment, and of central 
importance" (p. 22). He writes: 
Your religion… by definition provides answers to (or at least a mode of addressing) 
those questions that seem to you of central importance to the ordering of your life. 
Such questions might include: Should I kill other humans? Is sensual pleasure the 
highest human good? Are there duties to God? — and so on (Griffiths, 2001, pp. 34-
35). 
Similarly, Paul Tillich in Dynamics of Faith (1968) argues that the dynamics of faith are “the dy-
namics of man’s ultimate preoccupation,” or what he calls “ultimate concern” (Tillich, 1968, p. 19). 
On this account, a religious worldview contains a central pre-occupation, or an overarching con-
cern, to which anything else within the worldview is subjected. William A. Christian writes that re-
ligious doctrines are “generated by a certain vision of life, and this vision is suggested and shaped 
by particular historical and social settings” (1972, p. 15). Peter Cottrell, writing on Christian missi-
ology, defines religion as "any coherent philosophical system which attempts to answer the funda-
mental questions" (quoted in Ferdinando, 1995, p. 16). Ninian Smart, who obviously understands 
religions in terms of worldviews, argues for a model that explicates the logical structure of religious 
systems in terms of six dimensions, viz., experiential, mythic, doctrinal, ethical, ritual and social 
dimensions (Smart, 1969, 1983). However, Michael Levine (1997) points out that implicit or “un-
 For instance, the Encyclopedia of Religion and Society (Swatos and Kivisto, 1998, p. 129-133), focusing on anthro37 -
pology and sociology, offers a number of definitions according to four different classes: substantive, functional, verste-
hende, and formal definitions.
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derstated” in Smart’s understanding is a Geertzian view on religion. Clifford Geertz (1973), as an 
anthropologist of religion, defines religion as follows: 
[A religion is] a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of ex-
istence and clothing these concepts with such an aura of factuality that the moods and moti-
vations seem uniquely realistic (1973, p. 90)…and by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life (ibid., p. 89).  38
Geertz’s definition (1973, pp. 112-114) comes close to what we understand by a worldview. There-
fore, Levine agrees that the idea that “religion is after all a worldview…is consonant with Geertz’s 
conception of religion” (Levine, 1997, p. 18). 
 Secondly, it can be argued that the most common type of definitions are those that define 
religion “by a common faith in the transcendent or the divine—belief in superhuman agencies, or 
preferably in one supreme being who gives meaning and purpose to human history" (Fitzgerald, 
2000, p. 3). British philosopher and theologian Keith Ward (2004) offers such definition that states 
that religion is "a set of practices for establishing relationship to a supernatural or transcendent real-
ity for the sake of obtaining human good or avoiding harm" (p. 3). Pluralist philosopher of religion 
John Hick writes that religion involves “an understanding of the universe, together with an appro-
priate way of living within it, which involves reference beyond the natural world to God or gods or 
to the Absolute or to a transcendent order or process” (Hick, 1993, p. 133).  Such definitions can 39
seemingly still be framed in terms of worldview for any references to supernatural entities or tran-
scendent realities can be incorporated into the ontologies and metaphysics of worldviews. The dif-
ference between a naturalist and religious ontology is that the latter “presupposes the reality of the 
intentional object of religious though,” defined as a super-natural or transcendent reality (Hick, 
1993, p. 3), while the former rejects it. While Ward stresses the normative aspects of worldviews, 
Hick also refers to the practical or praxeological dimension of worldviews. Thus, by applying the 
worldview concept to the study of religion we can in fact leave room for a variety of different inter-
pretations of what constitutes religion.  
 For “Religion as a Cultural System,' see chapter 4, pp. 87- 125; for 'Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred 38
Symbols,’ see chapter 5, pp. 126-141.
 Also published in Pojman, 2008, p. 509-516. Joseph Runzo follows a similar view (Pojman, ibid., p. 542).39
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 Given the lack of a consensus on what constitutes religion, we can also sidestep the question 
of what makes a worldview religious — at least for the purpose of the Aporetics of religious diver-
sity —, by referring to religions not just as generic worldviews, but rather as specific worldviews. 
For instance, for both the Christian and the Buddhist (and so on), what it means to be religious will 
coincide with what it means to be a Christian or a Buddhist respectively. Rather than looking for an 
etic approach to religion we can suffice by relying on emic descriptions for the purpose of aporetic 
deliberations. For instance, in the case of a Christian religious worldview, claims will be selected on 
the basis of their being Christian, i.e., corresponding to Christian criteria, rather than their being 
(generically) religious. An argument could therefore be made that, at least in the case of Aporetics, 
the distinction between a worldview and a religious worldview is superfluous. In a similar way, the 
distinction between religious and non-religious worldviews will often be pragmatically irrelevant 
for our aporetic purposes (i.e, what I previously called an imaginary distinction). 
1.4. Tasks of the Philosophy of Worldviews 
Having defined both generic and religious worldviews, I will now proceed with a brief analysis of 
the tasks of the Philosophy of Worldviews. Ninian Smart, who instigated the field of Philosophy of 
Worldview, mentions two such tasks, namely worldview analysis, consisting of structural analysis 
and comparative analysis (1.4.1), and clarification of criteria (1.4.2). However, before I proceed, I 
should note that these tasks are specific tasks for a Philosophy of Worldviews that knows its pur-
pose. It is one thing to discuss what we will be doing, but another as to why we are doing it. In this 
regard, Stephen Boulter sees it as the aim of philosophy in general “to provide a description and 
explanatory account of the nature of reality and the place of human beings within it” (ibid., p. 33): 
The idea, explicit in some and implicit in others, has been that knowing something about 
the nature of the world we live in, and something of our own human nature, is bound to 
shed light on what kind of lives human beings should lead and what kinds of actions human 
beings ought to perform and which to avoid. It is for this reason that philosophy is always 
associated with the “Big Questions” (Boulter, 2013, p. 33). 
However, despite Boulter’s insistence that it is philosophy’s role to provide an account of the world, 
he also argues that a division of labour exists between philosophy and other (first-order) sciences. 
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Philosophy itself does not necessarily provide the basic materials out of which the Big Picture is to 
be developed. 
The contribution of the philosopher qua philosopher to the grand project is to draw on pre-
existing materials derived from the special sciences and truth-directed subjects of the hu-
manities, as well as out store of pre-theoretical beliefs, and to coordinate this material into a 
coherent picture of human beings an our place in the Universe. It is this second-order task 
of coordination, lying outside the remit of any special science, which is specifically philo-
sophical, and the problems encountered in the pursuance of this task are specifically philo-
sophical problems (Boulter, 2013, p. 33).  
Boulter further writes that coordination problems arise when “one notices a tension, real or other-
wise, between beliefs or lines of thought that one is otherwise inclined to accept” (2013, p. 34). 
When worldviews come in contact with one another — for instance, through dialogue between 
worldview holders  —, a worldview system can become stressed at its boundaries. Claims belong40 -
ing to other worldviews put cognitive stress on our beliefs by force of being different, that is, by 
being inconsistent with ours. This means that we are in need of a clear and practical approach to 
effect the dissolution of such cognitive stress. It is here that worldview philosophers, including 
philosophers of religion who reflect on religious diversity, will find themselves called to action to 
bring to bear their particular heuristic methods. Thus, Boulter argues that the second-order task of 
solving the coordination problems between our Big Pictures belongs to the specific tasks of philos-
ophy, rather than to the first-order disciplines that produce the cognitive problems. In fact, Boulter 
goes one step further by claiming that such second-order problem solving is the “raison d’être of the 
philosopher qua philosopher,” and constitutes his or her “specific contribution to the general intel-
lectual economy” (2013, p. 34). In this, Boulter also follows Nicholas Rescher who writes that the 
impetus to remove such problems is a prime mover of “philosophical innovation” (2006, p. 17). 
Both Rescher and Boulter turn to the “aporetic method” of Aristotle, viz., the aporetikê technê, or 
the art of solving aporiai. With this turn, aporia resolution — what Rescher calls Aporetics — be-
comes the philosopher’s principal occupation. 
 What Smart calls an “informal project” (see infra).40
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1.4.1. First Desideratum: Worldview Analysis 
Smart argues that a first desideratum is that we conduct a "worldview analysis" (1995, p. 21; see 
also Smart, 1986, pp. 72 and further). Smart sees this as a "vital task,” which should either be un-
dertaken by the philosophy of religion, or at least for it (1995, p. 21).  Worldview analysis consist 41
of two aspects: (a) a structural analysis of worldviews (i.e., internal), and (b) a comparative analysis 
of worldviews (i.e., external). Concerning worldview analysis, Smart writes: 
From history and from the comparative study of religion we can begin to piece together the 
so-to-speak logical structure of systems — how the different dimensions of religion, such 
as doctrine, myth, ritual and experience are bound to one another in relations of implication 
and suggestion, of expression and definition; also too how within the range of doctrines in a 
system they are mutually related and organically influence one another (Smart, 1995, p. 
20). 
In short, worldview analysis represents an analysis of a worldview in terms of it being a "suggestive 
web of interconnections" (ibid., p. 20). This is congruent with the different definitions of world-
views that I have presented. Smart adds that such interconnections between claims are rarely ones 
of direct entailment, but will exhibit “significant kinds of mutual dependence" (ibid., p. 20). As I 
will show, such interconnections will be specifically relevant for Aporetics. When worldview claims 
conflict between different religious worldviews, the interconnectedness of claims will ensure that 
such conflict will both be pervasive and run through the whole belief system — particularly if the 
beliefs that conflict are essential to the worldview (see chapter 2, 5). Smart states that a structural 
analysis also allows us to inquire into the grammar of gesture and symbolism, as well as into the 
grammar of symbolic action. For Smart, symbols have emotional impact. He writes eloquently: 
There is a major task of analysis to unravel the modes whereby things and acts are especial-
ly charged with existential meaning, for it is such symbolic meaning which provides the 
bridge between pure cosmology and a world picture, between pure history and a philosophy 
or theory of history, between scientific and value-free descriptions and expressions of the 
symbolic substance of things. Even a kind of agnostic nihilism has to reject meaningful pat-
terns: it does not simply fail to affirm them (ibid., p. 23). 
 This seems to imply that the philosophy of worldviews is an interdisciplinary field, where some of the tasks might be 41
fulfilled by, for instance, a historian of religion, or a comparative or cross-cultural philosopher.
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Thus for Smart, an important dimension of worldviews is the experiential and emotional dimension 
which gets expressed through value-laden symbols. This points to what we could call an irrational 
component to worldviews. In chapter 5, I will show how epistemic values are the driving force be-
hind Aporetics, but that such a fact should not a priori be deemed irrational. Even though Aporetic 
management is based on values, and values are preferential, they can still be grounded by reasons. 
 While structural analysis studies the web of interconnections within a particular worldview, 
comparative analysis — its methodological twin — studies the connections between different 
worldviews. Smart argues that one of the main questions of a comparative analysis of worldviews is 
what kinds of evidence there are for and against the truth of a religious claim. He suggests that the 
impact of and answer to this question will depend on the "actual organic version of a religious faith 
under inquiry" (ibid., p. 21). This, of course, is also one of the main concerns of an Aporetics of re-
ligious diversity. The study of Aporetics shows us that cognitive disagreement can and will origi-
nate between claims on the basis of different kinds of evidence. What counts as evidence is decided 
by a certain evaluative stance tied in with the epistemic value system —  what I will call an epis-
temic orientation — inherent in each worldview. Since different answers can be legitimately given 
to the same basic worldview questions, this will lead us to conclude to what is essentially an epis-
temological pluralism based on orientational differences (see infra).  
 By no means does Smart suggest that worldview comparison is solely to be used to demon-
strate how worldviews conflict. We can equally show how worldviews converge, or how they are 
similar to one another. Ideally, comparative analysis is therefore a dialectical method, where study-
ing similarities point to differences, and vice versa. However, we can easily take up vantage points 
from which either one of the poles of similarity and divergence, or consensus and dissensus, appear 
preferential. Smart also distinguishes between two different types of projects, one formal and one 
informal. The formal project is one of arm-chair philosophy where worldviews, and particularly the 
claims contained within worldviews, are studied from an observer or third-person point of view. 
The informal project is one of dialogue between worldview holders, where participants representing 
a certain faith tradition enter into second-person dialogue and encounter with one another. He 
writes: "The Christian, say a Catholic, who engages in serious conversations with a Marxist is prob-
ing to see how far there are collisions and tensions between the two systems" (ibid., p. 21). Smart 
adds the caveat that the formal project systematic theology can be both descriptive and constructive. 
The constructive project equates to "the fashioning of a new Christian (or Jewish, etc.) system of 
belief: a new worldview" (ibid., p. 21). Similarly, the informal dialogue of mutual exploration can 
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equally lead to new positions on both sides of the dialogue. Of course, this is dependent on how one 
understands the function of such dialogues in the first place. For instance, for George Lindbeck, the 
purpose of such talks is to come to a reconciliation between dialogue partners but without capitula-
tion of claims and without change (1984). Lindbeck’s solution will equate to a functional dissensus, 
where the different partners in dialogue will agree to different cognitive frameworks (see chapter 4). 
 This peculiar phenomenon of dissensus versus consensus can also be seen to divide the 
scholarship on religious diversity. As I stated in my Introduction, not only are exclusivists pitted 
against pluralists, even within the pluralist camp some will argue for unity or identity between all of 
the major religious systems (i.e., consensus), while others will argue for difference (i.e., dissensus). 
The same issue also divides two of the main authors referenced in my dissertation, namely Jürgen 
Habermas and Nicholas Rescher, where the former aims at consensus and the latter defends dis-
sensus. While indeed Aporetics finds a starting point in doctrinal differences between worldviews, 
where claims are in contradiction with one another, I should note that the outcome of our aporetic 
deliberations can either be a dissensus or a consensus. 
  
1.4.2. Second Desideratum: Clarification of Criteria 
Having exposed a first desideratum, Smart continues by proposing what he thinks should in fact be 
the main task of the philosophy of religion, namely "to clarify the criteria for determining the truth 
as between worldviews" (1995, p. 24). Thus, in Smart's view, structural and comparative analysis 
come first, followed by the pièce de resistance, which is the higher-order question of criteria. Smart 
writes that there is a "special valuational weight" to tensions between worldviews where one range 
of data "is existentially more significant than another seen from within the perspective of the 
worldview which is making sense of the data" (1995, p. 24). He writes: 
Looked at from the angle of experience, the history of religion is a ballet of different kinds: 
prophetic, mystical, shamanistic, psychedelic, conversional. How much weight to place 
upon each of these of these varieties? Both epistemologically and spiritually, that is, both as 
regards authority and application to one's own life, the answers will be important. Since the 
differing experiences tend to lead in differing directions, of calm, fervor, dualism, monism, 
fullness, emptiness, worship, meditation, ethical resolve, quietism, and so forth (ibid.). 
Valuational weight is not only relevant to worldview formation, it also plays a pivotal role in the 
aporetic resolutions of boundary conflicts between worldviews, and is in fact what drives the diver-
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gence in aporetic solutions. As Rescher shows, epistemic criteria play a crucial role in aporetic 
management (see chapter 5). Smart also argues that it is not just a question of criteria of truth, but 
truth wedded to practice, and so also a matter of criteria of “correctness or appropriateness” (ibid., 
p. 24). This implies that criteria can be used as measures by which we judge or determine the truth 
of worldview claims understood as correctness and appropriateness. In the course of my disserta-
tion, I will show how criteria for truth are only some of the criteria that are at play: equally relevant 
will be criteria for determining the subjective and intersubjective correctness and acceptability of 
claims (chapter 6). This particular issue is a bone of contention for Michael Levine (1997), a fervent 
critic of Smart’s project of a Philosophy of Worldviews. Levine writes that Smart never explains his 
notion of truth, and that, when he lists his considerations relative to the truth of worldviews, it be-
comes apparent that he is not talking about truth in the ordinary objective sense. Levine writes: 
Instead, he is talking about something more like subjective plausibility or ‘acceptability,’ 
and how various factors affect the acceptability of particular worldviews in context. For ex-
ample, worldviews that have more ‘internal tensions’ (e.g., inconsistencies about doctrines, 
or serious divergences between theory and practice or experience), or less ‘comprehensive-
ness’ may be less ‘true’ than others. Those that have less tension or are more comprehensive 
may be, according to Smart ‘superior’ (Levine, 1997, p. 21). 
He further adds that Smart’s considerations, such as “ethical insights, “social fruits of differing sys-
tems,” the capacity to exhibit a sensitive epistemology,” and “psychological utility” are not, as 
Smart claims, “criteria of truth” (ibid., p. 22). While Levine’s observations are undoubtedly correct, 
there is however little here in terms of a critique. We can easily admit that objective truth is not the 
only determining factor when it comes to solving the tensions between different worldviews. Thus, 
as Levine states, it makes more sense to use the concept of plausibility or acceptability. For in-
stance, as I will show in chapter 5, Rescher’s Aporetics is not framed in terms of truth as such, but 
rather in terms of the plausibility and acceptability of claims, where plausibility is determined by 
the giving of reasons, and acceptability is determined by epistemic right-of-way criteria. In other 
words, the acceptability of claims is a rational plausibility and acceptability, and not just a “subjec-
tive plausibility,” as Levine claims. This does not take away the fact that, for the individual, subjec-
tive factors (i.e., subjective criteria) will equally be at play in formulating a worldview or in making 
aporetic decisions (see chapter 6). 
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1.5. Conclusion  
As I wrote in my Introduction, one of the aims of my dissertation in toto is to provide a diagnostic 
analysis of the problem of religious diversity as well as the therapeutic means to effect a solution to 
that problem. Both aspects can be understood in terms of worldview theory. We can understand the 
problem of diversity as deriving from the fact that worldview claims will conflict across different 
worldview. I will return to Smart’s heuristic of “higher-order questions” in my next chapter. In par-
ticular, I will apply his heuristic to define the problem of religious diversity in terms of a first-order 
and second-order problem. 
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2. The Problem of Religious Diversity 
2.1. Introduction 
In my previous chapter, I have introduced the concept of a worldview and defined it as a cognitive 
belief system that represents everything we come to know and believe about ourselves and the 
world. I further argued that worldview systems typically contain different types of claims reflective 
of the kind of questions that we ask about life and the world. For instance, we want to know what 
exists, what we should do, what is wrong and wright, and so on. The resultant answers to these 
questions allow us to position ourselves in the world, and take a stand. They define what we believe 
and hold dear.  However, different individuals and groups of individuals will give different answers 
to the same questions leading to a variety of worldviews, both religious and non-religious. Thus we 
end up with a number of distinct faith traditions, each of which provide their own sets of worldview 
claims. Moreover, many faith traditions are also internally diverse, where faith adherents have ral-
lied around different interpretations of traditional beliefs.  42
 However, in matters of religious faith, as in most matters, one would expect agreement to at 
least some of these worldview questions. As human beings operating in the world we expect a sin-
gle account of how things are: does the Sun come up everyday or not (and why), is it wrong to steal 
someone’s property or not (and why), and so on. This is as true for everyday reality as it is for reli-
gious matters. Some of the basic questions in religious traditions are, for instance: is there a divine 
being or not, is there something like an afterlife in a heavenly realm or not, and so on. Here too we 
expect consistency and coherence from our account of the world. From this follows that the fact of 
religious diversity also presents a problem of religious diversity, namely, a problem of disagreement 
between peers on how to answer worldview questions. 
 In the present chapter, I will analyse the problem of religious diversity as consisting of two 
separate but interrelated issues: (1) a first-order problem of conflicting claims, and (2) a second-or-
der problem of epistemic stances. From a first-order perspective, the problem of religious diversity 
consists of a conflict between worldview claims that belong to different traditions. Such a conflict is 
best approached through the application of aporetic methods as I will discuss in chapter 5. Howev-
er, we can also approach the same problem through a second-order question, which reflects on the 
nature of those particular conflicts: what kind of stance should we take towards the set of conflict-
 Religious diversity, on a broad understanding of the term, includes both intra-religious and inter-religious diversity.42
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ing claims? This distinction will  allow me to state that both problems are aporetic in nature, from 
which I derive a first-order and second-order aporia. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in 2.2, I will discuss the notion of different 
orders of philosophical activities. Next, I will present the first-order problem of conflicting claims 
(2.3) and the second-order problem of epistemic stances (2.4), respectively. Concerning the first-
order problem, I will present a structural analysis of worldview claims — one of the first desiderata 
of a Philosophy of Worldviews. I will show how worldview claims can be classified into different 
types and how they can form incompatibles accordingly. Concerning the second-order problem, I 
will introduce the so-called tripartite typology of stances towards religious diversity, and discuss the 
different options contained therein. The purpose of this chapter is therefore an analytical one (i.e., 
diagnostic). 
2.2. Higher and Lower-Order 
In the previous chapter I introduced one of the main protagonists of the Philosophy of Worldviews, 
namely Ninian Smart. In his early work Reasons and Faiths (1958), Smart pointed out that we can 
make a “somewhat crude distinction between higher and lower-order utterances” (1958, p. 2). A 
lower-order statement, in this context, is a religious statement made from the point of view of a 
faith adherent belonging to a certain tradition. A higher-order statement, on the other hand, is “a 
statement about a statement, not a straight statement” (idem, p. 2). According to Smart, as philoso-
phers of religion, we are primarily concerned with making higher-order observations, and thus with 
maintaining doctrinal neutrality. The role of the philosopher of religion is to “classify [religious] 
statements and expressions” by excavating “properties relevant to two main questions — namely 
(1) how we confirm the truth, correctness, etc., of statements, commands, etc.; and (2) how state-
ments, etc., are logically connected or disconnected” (ibid., p. 2). Smart argues that both activities 
are in fact “neutral” since the task of the philosopher is not “to establish particular truths (however 
wide-ranging these may be), but to elucidate their nature” (ibid., p. 3).  
 However, Smart adds that it is still possible to speak of “the philosophy of the Christian re-
ligion,” and so on. To preserve the above distinctions, he refers to the philosophy of a certain reli-
gious tradition as “metaphysics,” rather than philosophy, with the understanding that this does not 
restrict the philosopher from doing metaphysics. To abate possible confusion of terms, Smart 
chooses in his later work to opt for the term “worldview” instead of metaphysics, while reinterpret-
ing the philosophy of religion as the higher-order analysis of such worldviews. He further adds that 
our view on higher-order claims should somewhat be modified "when we recognise that a theology, 
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for instance, may have a philosophical component, a view of how one tells the truth" (ibid., p. 24). 
In other words, the answers to this question might already be built into the worldview itself.  Al43 -
though this seemingly muddles the concept of higher-order levels, Smart thinks that the concept can 
still be useful as "a kind of heuristic device or as a mode of orientation" (ibid., p. 24).  
 John Hick (1991) makes use of a similar distinction between first-order and second-order 
religious language.  For instance, he writes that we can find first-order religious language in 44
"prayer and prophecy and proclamation, in the confession of sin and the spontaneous utterances of 
love and joy, and awe in the presence of God" (Hick, 1991, p. xi).  Second-order religious lan45 -
guage is the language of theology "which treats the first-order expressions of faith as data to be in-
terpreted in systematic theologies" (Hick, 1991, p. xi).  
 Clément Vidal, writing on Apostel’s definition of a worldview, makes similar distinctions, 
but based on the work of Mortimer Adler (1993, p. 13-16). In The Four Dimensions of Philosophy 
(1993), Adler cogently writes that knowledge is of the first order “if it is knowledge about reality,” 
and of the second order if it is “knowledge about knowledge itself” (Adler, 1993, p. 13-14).  Vidal 46
proposes that the first five worldview questions in Apostel’s definition are first-order questions in 
the sense that they directly question our world, as well as how we should interact with it (Vidal, 
2012a, p. 310). As I have pointed out, Apostel’s first five worldview questions lead to the philo-
sophical categories of (1) ontology, (2) metaphysics, (3) futurology, (4) axiology, and (5) praxeolo-
gy. In contrast, the last two questions are second-order questions, i.e., they deal with the answers to 
the first-order questions, and "are about the origin of our answers to those first-order 
questions" (ibid., p. 310).  
 In short, the logic or principle behind the two orders seems to be this: first-order questions 
take their data directly from ‘our world’ and generate first-order results. These results are then taken 
up as data for second-order questions or inquiry. However, Vidal adds that second-order questions 
are not disconnected from first-order ones, since first-order questions — either implicitly or explic-
itly — determine second-order analysis (Adler, 1965, p. 45; Vidal, 2012a, p. 311). The fact that sec-
 As we have seen in Apostel’s presentation of a worldview, methodology is also built into the worldview. However, 43
this does not take away the fact that methodology takes the answers to the first six questions as its topic. I will come 
back to this later (see infra).
 See also Livingston, 2003, p. 60.44
 Reflecting on what is to come, besides being first-order expressions, these also typify first-person subjective expres45 -
sions and are therefore subject to the validity claim of truthfulness, sincerity, and authenticity. In fact, this is what Hick 
refers to as "personal faith," following Wilfred Cantwell Smith's use of the term.
 We can see the same logic operating in certain other fields. For instance, in functional analysis, a ‘functional’ or high46 -
er-order function is considered to be a function of a function. In other words, a functional takes functions as its input.
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ond-order questions are determined by first-order questions should not surprise us as second-order 
questions take their data from the first-order ones. I will call this upward causation.  Vidal also 47
seems to hint at another process when he write that second-order reflections have implications in 
our epistemology, and therefore on how to model and predict the world (2012a, p. 311). We could 
refer to this process as downward causation.  
 Based on the work of Charlie Dunbar Broad (1947; 1958), Vidal also identifies the philo-
sophical activities of (a) analysis, (b) synopsis, and (c) synthesis. The first two are second-order ac-
tivities, while the third (c) is a third-order philosophical activity. While analysis is the analysis of 
concepts and their interrelations, synopsis is the deliberate attempt to view together aspects of hu-
man experience which are generally viewed apart, and the endeavour to see how they are intercon-
nected (Broad, 1958, p. 116). Synopsis is a second-order activity which "describe different and 
sometimes contradictory positions on issues" (Vidal, 2012, p. 311). The goal of such philosophising 
is to remain “point-of-viewless,” and consists of stating or reconstructing issues and a variety of 
positions toward them (Vidal, ibid., p. 311). Vidal refers to these activities as “dialectical” instead of 
doctrinal. On the same matter, Vidal warns against the temptation to come to the conclusion of syn-
cretism, namely, to accept all positions distinguished. He argues that a mere conjunction of contra-
dictory positions is self-contradictory and that it stems from a confusion between first- and second-
order philosophising (see also Rescher’s view; chapter 7). 
 Further following Dunbar, Vidal also posits a third-order which he calls synthetical philoso-
phy. He suggests that synthesis involves “the integration of first- and second-order dimensions of 
philosophising…to fully exploit this dialectical effort in a doctrinal way" (Vidal, 2010, p. 4). On 
Vidal’s view, synthesis is the activity of combining elements into a whole (i.e., integration), namely 
of the data generated by both (a) the worldview questions, as well as by (b) the analytical and syn-
optical inquiries. The purpose of synthesis is "to supply a set of concepts and principles which shall 
cover satisfactorily all the various regions which are being viewed synoptically" (Broad, 1974, p. 
126). Note that on Vidal’s view, the second-order philosophical activities are not doctrinal activities 
— since no specific first-order philosophical position is achieved — but that synthesis is again doc-
trinal. Doctrinal activity is by necessity exclusivist, that is, excludes what is inconsistent with it, and 
 I have taken this concept from the philosophical debates on ‘emergentism’ where emergent properties arise out of 47
lower level entities. The emergent properties are said, by some, to be able to causally interact with the lower levels in a 
process of downward causation. Conversely, when lower levels causally interact with higher levels this is called ‘up-
ward causation.’ See, “Emergent Properties,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (O'Connor and Wong, 2012). I 
use both terms here loosely to express the idea that (1) emergent data are fed back into the system at lower levels 
(downward causation), or that (2) the data of a lower level are taken up at a higher level (upward causation). I therefore 
take the term “causation” to mean here: the process of delivering data for processing.
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does so on the basis of pre-selected parameters. This has as a consequence that a synthetic position, 
given its doctrinal nature, will not be able to avoid being just one model of synthesis amongst many 
(see further chapter 7).  48
 Finally, Vidal argues that we can distinguish six dimensions in philosophy, namely: (1) de-
scriptive, (2) normative, (3) practical, (4) critical, (5) dialectical, and (6) synthetical dimensions. He 
subsequently relates these six dimensions to Apostel's worldview categories, as well as to Adler’s 
orders and Broad’s categories (2010, p. 5). I have summarised the different correspondences in Ta-
ble 1. 
Table 1: Comparative Chart of Worldview Categories, Orders and Dimensions. 
As we can tell, the first three dimensions are first-order activities. On Vidal’s view, first-order phi-
losophy is a doctrinal activity, since it provides clear answers to our basic erotetic inquiries about 
the world. This view is partly similar to Stephen Boulter’s, who also argued that philosophy is a 
world-generating philosophy (Boulter, 2013). However, on Boulter’s view, philosophy’s main task 
is the second-order activity of worldview coordination. Further, Vidal points out that on the second-
order level we find the critical and dialectical dimensions. This is also congruent with Smart’s 









1. Ontology Descriptive First-order
2. Metaphysics Descriptive First-order
3. Futurology Descriptive First-order
4. Axiology Normative First-order
5. Praxeology Practical First-order
6. Epistemology Critical Second-order Analysis
7. Methodology Dialectical Second-order Synopsis
8. - Synthetical Third-order Synthesis
 Thus requiring higher orders of further synthesis in a potentially never-ending process.48
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the critical dimension, and comparative analysis, which is dialectical in nature. From this we can 
conclude that Smart’s vision of the Philosophy of Worldviews is as a second-order philosophy.  
 Thus, a first-order inquiry provides us with definite answers, and these can be — to use a 
spatial metaphor— located on a cognitive map. Second-order inquiry, on the other hand, provides 
us with the map itself onto which we locate our doctrinal answers. Thomas A. Tweed (2006) sug-
gests a similar albeit different spatial metaphor when writing about the externalist and internalist 
perspectives forwarded by Hilary Putnam (1981, pp. 49–74). In Reason, Truth and History (1981), 
Putnam writes that we can distinguish between two different philosophical perspectives. On the ex-
ternalist perspective, "[t]here is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world 
is'" (idem, p. 49). On the internalist perspective, one holds that the question “what objects does the 
world consist of?” only makes sense from within a theory or description. Philosophers who take an 
internalist perspective often hold that there is more than one 'true' theory or description of the 
world. Putnam writes: 
'Truth', in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability — some 
sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as 
those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system — and not corre-
spondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of affairs' (Put-
nam, 1981, p. 49-50).  49
Tweed suggests that we can understand the externalist perspective as “supra-locative,” and the in-
ternalist perspective as “locative.” Given that, on the externalist perspective, one takes "a God's Eye 
point of view" (Putnam, 1981, p. 49), the supra-locative approach presupposes that the interpreter is 
everywhere at once and nowhere in particular (Tweed, 2006, p. 16). Thus, the supra-located per-
spective floats “above” (i.e., supra) the map of located positions with an all-seeing eye. In contrast, 
the internalist perspective (on truth) is a “locative” perspective because here the focus is on actual 
"points of views" that can be “located” or situated on a map. Putnam writes: 
 Victoria Harrison (2006) developed an "internal pluralist" in response to the problem of religious diversity on the 49
basis of this view. My view of religious truth will be somewhere in between these positions: I hold an externalist view 
to religious truth as objective truth, i.e., our views fit what is out there. However, at the same time I will hold an inter-
nalist view when it comes to subjective and intersubjective types of religious truth (see chapter 4).
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There is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are 
only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and pur-
poses that their descriptions and theories subserve (Putnam, 1981, p. 50). 
On the internalist perspective, the focus is on actual "points of views" that can be located, or "situ-
ated," as Tweed writes. As a consequence, on the supra-locative approach truth is singular, while on 
the locative approach truth is multi-perspectival. While Tweed suggests that the external perspective 
is supra-locative and the internalist perspective is locative, the relationships between the terms do 
not necessarily run both ways. That is, Putnam’s theory is a theory on truth, while Tweed’s theory is 
a theory on perspectives. In other words, one does not necessarily need to ascribe to an externalist 
theory of truth when taking up a supra-located perspective.  
 In conclusion, lower-order statements provide us with specific statements or truths about the 
world. These statements can be mapped out and exhibit a definitive location: something is such and 
such, and not otherwise. Higher-order statements, as we have seen, are statements about lower-or-
der statements. On Smart’s view, higher-order statements are “neutral” when it comes to the truth of 
lower-order positions. They are therefore “unhinged” from any locative mapping, and are supra-
locative. On Vidal’s view, the goal of second-order philosophising is to remain “point-of-viewless.” 
However, he also identifies a third-order philosophical activity of synthesis, which he sees as the 
summum bonum of philosophy, which is again doctrinal, that is locative. Thus, both Smart and Vi-
dal equate first-order with locative philosophy, and second-order with supra-locative philosophy.  
 While I will make ample use of both heuristics — i.e., the distinction between orders, and 
the distinction between locative and supra-locative positions —, I will also keep both separate. 
While the idea of second-order states that it takes the data from the first-order philosophical activity 
as its object, this does not need to imply that the results of such activity have no location and remain 
supra-locative. On my view, the distinction between orders is a methodological one rather a than 
material one. We can liken this to a hawk who, like Putnam’s God, oversees or purveys the land-
scape. Overseeing and purveying is a methodological act. However, even a hawk has to perch from 
time to time, and rest in a given position. Rescher’s orientational pluralism, for instance, as an an-
swer to the second-order problem of epistemic positions, will steer the middle between a locative 
and supra-locative position. It will be locative since Orientational Pluralism promotes taking up a 
locative stance; however, it will also be a supra-locative strategy since it constantly purveys the 
cognitive landscape. Like the hawk, it both purveys and perches. Furthermore, I will call Rescher’s 
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solution a third-order solution since it takes the second-order epistemic positions as its data (see 
chapter 7). 
2.3. The First-Order Problem of Religious Diversity 
The first-order problem of religious diversity arises from the fact of religious diversity, which 
brings together three separate observations (or assumptions): (1) there is a plurality or diversity of 
religious traditions, (2) the religious traditions make truth claims, (3) the religious traditions make 
differing and inconsistent claims. Taken together, these three observations lead us to conclude to the 
problem of religious diversity, seen as a conflict between specific first-order worldview claims. 
2.3.1. Multiple Religious Traditions 
The first observation is that there is a diversity of religious traditions. From this follows that we can 
make a distinction between a home religion, to which a particular believer belongs, and all other 
foreign religions, i.e., all the other religions to which the particular believer does not belong to. I 
use the term foreign religion here in opposition to Paul J. Griffiths’s preferred use of the term “alien 
religion” (2001, p. xiv). My argument is that the term alien could easily imply that other religions 
are so alien to our interpretive schemes that they are de facto untranslatable, or worse, unintelligi-
ble. The term foreign, on the other hand, often implies a sense of novelty, wonder, etc., as when we, 
for example, visit a foreign country.  
 Some religious believers will assert that they belong to two — or more — religions. If this is 
true, then we should consider both religions to be the believer's home religion: the believer is, more 
or less, at home with both. This phenomenon of having two home religions is variously called dou-
ble religious belonging, dual belonging, or dual citizenship, as part of a larger phenomenon of Mul-
tiple Religious Belonging (MRB).  In other words, what was originally a foreign worldview can 50
become increasingly familiar, so much so that one identifies with two different religions at the same 
time. However, Griffiths denies that it is possible to belong to more than one religion (2001, p. 
34-35). He argues that religious traditions bear a relationship of “non-compossibility" to one anoth-
er: you cannot simply add up the answers to the different worldview questions to create a composite 
religion. He writes:  
 See for instance Panikkar (1978), Cornille (2002; 2003), Drew (2008), Schmidt-Leukel (2009). Historically, common 50
examples have been, for instance, the Taoist-Confucianist hybrid identifies in China, or the Shinto-Buddhist hybrid 
identities in Japan. A common contemporary Western example is Christian-Buddhist dual belonging. Note that the mul-
tiple religious belonged is confronted with the problem of religious diversity by default.
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Simultaneous assent to or acceptance of different answers to these questions is both practi-
cally and logically impossible, from which it follows that simultaneous habitation of more 
than one religion is also impossible (Griffiths, 2001, pp. 34-35). 
The idea of a home religion fits well with our view that religious traditions provide their adherents 
with a worldview. As I pointed out, worldviews are comprehensive and integrative frameworks that 
guide us in life and help us navigate the world. One of its main characteristics is that a worldview 
constitutes a "web of belief" (Griffiths, 2001; Quine and Ullian, 1978). This implies that some be-
liefs will be more central to the web of belief than others. For instance, "Jesus is the Son of God" is 
an essential claim of Christianity: many other beliefs will be dependent on it. If one were to deny it, 
then the part of the “web of belief” that depends on it would lose its grounding. Following a similar 
line of thought, Griffiths makes a distinction between doctrines and teachings. He points out that to 
belong to a religious tradition requires from the believer that he or she either (a) assents to or (b) 
accepts its main claims (2001, pp. 27-28). The difference between assenting to and acceptance of a 
claim, Griffiths writes, is that (a) is largely an involuntary matter — as it does not involve choice or 
deliberation —, while (b) is subject to voluntary control: one entertains a claim. From this follows 
that doctrines are claims which are required by the home religion as a social institution, while 
teachings are claims that are merely suggested but not required by it (ibid., p. 24-26).  In short, 51
while doctrines are central to the web of belief, teachings are less so and are therefore at the periph-
ery of the worldview. Obviously, given the essential nature of doctrines, they will be held to a high-
er value and importance than non-essential teachings. This will also have consequences for cogni-
tive conflict between worldviews to the degree that the chances for consensus between dialogue 
partners will be significantly reduced if the conflict centres on doctrines, since there will be no ob-
vious way out of the conflict outside of one party giving up their essential claims.  52
2.3.2. Making Truth Claims 
The second observation is that religions make truth claims. A simple example of a religious truth 
claim would be “God exists.” The religious believer affirms the truth-value of this proposition by 
asserting: “It is true that God exists." Truth claims are statements or propositions that claim truth 
 One implication of this is that one cannot state that one belongs to a religion unless one deliberately assents to its 51
main claims. William A. Christian argues that a doctrine of a religious community is something (a) which is taught, or 
(b) set forth for acceptance of belief by that community (1972, p. 2). 
 Whether one should come to a consensus or not will be a separate issue (see infra).52
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and have truth-value: they are either true or false. A proposition is true if and only if the state of af-
fairs to which it refers is as the proposition asserts it to be. In all other cases, the proposition is con-
sidered to be false. We can take the belief that something is the case to be a propositional attitude 
(Russell, 1962, p. 18). On this account, a belief typically presupposes belief in the propositional 
content of the statement. Michael Peterson adds: "Beliefs, we shall say, are statements (i.e., proposi-
tions) that are accepted as true; they are truth-claims” (Peterson et al., 2009, p. 7).  
 However, Harold Netland, in Dissonant Voices (1991), writes that although truth is a quality 
or property of propositions and only of propositions, this does not need to imply that the terms 
“true” and “truth” cannot be used in other ways as well (Netland, 1991, p. 114). In other words, not 
everyone will understand religious belief in terms of propositional truths. However, Netland argues 
that propositional truth will remain “primary” for understanding religious language, and by exten-
sion religious claims. I will return to this issue in chapter 4. However, to preview what is to come, I 
will argue, pro Netland’s view, that religious truth can have at least three different meanings depen-
dent on how language is used, and contra Netland’s view, that we do not need to consider proposi-
tional truth to be primary for understanding religious claims. 
 On a different but related notion, it should be clear that belonging to a religion will also in-
volve more than mere belief. For instance, it will also require performances and actions, such as 
taking part in its rituals. In my previous chapter, I showed how such claims on performances and 
actions are part and partial of the worldview, i.e., belong to the praxeological or practical aspect of 
a worldview. However, most scholars of religion seem to be primarily concerned with propositional 
claims and beliefs, and they have good reasons for it. Firstly, they argue that believing in the home 
religion’s doctrines is a necessary condition for belonging to it, since a religious tradition will re-
quire explicit assent to its doctrinal beliefs.  Secondly, religious traditions will advocate perfor53 -
mances and courses of action based on its descriptive belief system. Netland writes that fundamen-
tal beliefs about the nature of the religious ultimate, as well as the human predicament, call for cer-
tain appropriate "patterns of behaviour” or “courses of action” (1991, p. 111). These fundamental 
beliefs provide the conceptual framework within which religious and ritual behaviour is to be un-
derstood. The way in which religious traditions advocate performances will be through prescriptive 
claims — for instance, claims about the proper conduct of human life (e.g., a Christian ought to 
give alms to the poor) — , rather than through descriptive claims.  
 Nevertheless, it seems perfectly possible that a person can belong to a religious institution, such as Christianity — 53
because of cultural indoctrination, social pressure, etc. — , but whose inner faith is different. In this case, the person 
would still belong to the Christian religions, but without necessarily believing in its claims.See Smith (1962) for the 
distinction of ‘inner faith’. 
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 Earlier in this chapter, I already showed how Vidal equates Apostel’s first five worldview 
categories with descriptive, normative, and practical claims. In a similar vein, William A. Christian, 
in his often quoted Oppositions of Religious Doctrines (1972), identifies three types of doctrines. 
He states that "religion teaches a pattern of life, not just a view of the world" (1972, p. 2). This al-
lows him to infer that doctrines are not just proposals for belief, but also proposals for courses of 
action and valuations. He argues that some doctrines will have the force of assertions when they 
state what the world is like. Other doctrines will have the force to recommend courses of action and 
will prescribe what one ought to do, inwardly and outwardly. Still other doctrines will have the 
force of proposing valuations and will judge that something or other is good or bad in a certain way 
(1972, p. 60). Harking back to Vidal’s model, we can equate assertions with descriptives claims 
(i.e., ontology, metaphysics, futurology), courses of action with practical claims (i.e, praxeology), 
and valuations with normative claims (i.e., axiology). 
 To be sure, such descriptions are by no means novel, and are also present in for instance 
Speech Act Theory. Authors such as J. l. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969) suggest that speech 
acts can carry different functions and provoke different effects.  For instance, the function of con54 -
stative (c.f., Austin) or assertive (c.f., Searle) claims will be to state what the world is like: they are 
statements or descriptions about the objective world (Searle, 1969, p. 495). The function of perfor-
mative (c.f., Austin) or directive (c.f., Searle) claims is to suggest or require some sort of perfor-
mance, and aim to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g., requests, commands and advice. 
An implication of these distinctions will be that different types of claims will be held against differ-
ent criteria, as I show in the next section, and develop further in chapter 3.  
2.3.3. The Problem of Religious Diversity 
The third and final observation is that the different religions seem to be making conflicting and in-
compatible claims.  The principle of non-contradiction states that two contradictory statements 55
cannot both be true at the same time.  Take two contradictory claims A and B: for instance, claim A 56
 I will return to Speech Act Theory in my next chapter on Habermas (chapter 3).54
 Incompatibility expresses a relationship between two contradictory propositions. To illustrate incompatibility we can 55
use the simile of a magnet. Two incompatible claims can be likened to two like magnetic poles: they will repel each 
other, making it impossible to be combined.
 Principium contradictionis; see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1005b, 15-1009a. The principle is one out of three funda56 -
mental principles or laws of thought. In propositional logic this gets expressed as ¬ (P ˄ ¬P). The second principle is the 
principle of identity (principium indentitatis) which teaches that an object is identical with itself. The third principle, the 
law of excluded middle (tertium non datur), is that a proposition is either true or false, with no middle position possible.
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says ‘It is raining’; claim B says ‘It is not raining’. If A happens to be the case (i.e., if A is true), 
then B must by logical necessity not be so (i.e., B is false). In other words, two claims are incom-
patible if both claims cannot be simultaneously true. This implies that two contradictory claims can 
each be true, but at different times, as in the case of, for example, the claims “It rains” and “It rains 
not”. However, more absolute claims such as logical and mathematical claims, and one could argue, 
religious claims, are unaffected by time, and hence would remain contradictory for eternity. John 
Hick (1983) characterises this issue as the problem of conflicting truth claims (CTC). Joseph Runzo 
concurs and writes that "the problem of religious pluralism [i.e., religious diversity] is a problem of 
conflicting truth-claims" (2008, pp. 542; also 2001). On this account, the problem of religious di-
versity is generated by the question which doctrinal claims are true, and which ones are false. How-
ever, William Christian offers a broader interpretation of cognitive conflict. He states:  
Two doctrines are opposed [i.e. incompatible] if they cannot be jointly accepted 
without absurdity (1972, p. 2; also quoted in Netland, 1991, p. 110).  
This plays out differently for each one of the different types of doctrines that I discussed. Firstly, to 
accept a descriptive doctrine is to take what is asserted as true. Christian notes that to accept an as-
sertion, or constative doctrine, one must be willing (a) to assert it oneself in appropriate circum-
stances, as well as (b) to act on it if an occasion for doing so should arise. Thus, two constative doc-
trines are in opposition if it would be absurd to take both what is said in one and what is said in the 
other as true. They are opposed if they are contrary to one another, or if they are contradictory of 
one another. If and only if one of the two oppositional claims is true, then logically the other claim 
must be false. Some examples of descriptive contradictions form the world religions would be:  
(1) God exists — a Christian view. 
(2) God does not exist — an atheist or naturalist view. 
(3) God begets — a Christian view. 
(4) God does not beget — a Muslim view. 
(5) The Soul reincarnates, i.e., atman — a Hindu view. 
(6) The Soul does not reincarnate, i.e., an-atman — a Buddhist view. 
Note that such doctrines are foundational to each of the represented belief systems. They create 
fault lines between worldviews, due to the fact that they are (a) foundational for the web of belief, 
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and (2) form contradictions across worldviews. However, as I will show in chapter four, there is still 
plenty of room for interpretation that allows us to avert inconsistency. 
 Secondly, to accept a performative doctrine is to perform what is recommended. From this 
follows that two performative doctrines are opposed, if it is not possible to undertake both courses 
of action without absurdity. Following Searle (1969), the criterion for a performative doctrine is 
whether it is felicitous or not felicitous. Searle writes that the felicitousness of such claims depends 
on "whether they are performed correctly, completely, and sincerely in accord with some antecedent 
set of conventions" (Searle, 1969, p. 406). The fact that one cannot undertake two opposing actions 
without absurdity says nothing about the felicitousness of the two courses of actions. The same is 
true for the criterion of truth: the fact that two claims contradict does not say anything about the 
truth of the matter. What it does state, is that, if one is true, the other one must be false.  
 While we can state for truth, “if one is true, the other one must be false,” we are not able to 
do the same for performative claims. In other words, the fact that one course of action is felicitous 
does not necessitate that a conflicting course of action is not felicitous. It is clear that many goals 
will be able to be accomplished by different kinds of courses of action. I can communicate this sen-
tence to you either through speech, or through writing. Or, I can travel to work either by taking the 
bus, or by walking. Both actions would be felicitous, i.e., take me to work. However, it would be 
“absurd” to suggest that I can do both at the same time: I have to make a decision between two fe-
licitous choices. Two opposing courses of actions can also have opposing goals. Both courses of 
action are felicitous if they achieve the set goal. I can either communicate something to you right 
here and now, or take the bus to work. Hence, the felicitousness is dependent on an antecedent set 
of goals. 
 Thirdly, to accept a proposal for a normative doctrine means making a valuation, that is to 
"regard something as good or bad in a certain way" (Christian, 1972, p. 62). Thus two proposals for 
valuations are opposed if the valuations are incompatible. For instance, it is not possible to regard 
something as both good in a certain way, and also bad in that way. However, it would not be absurd 
to regard something as good in one way, and as bad in another way. For instance, I personally think 
cars are good because they get me to places fast, but I think they are bad because they run on car-
bon-based fuels. In fact, I would actually prefer a car that would still take me to places fast, but that 
was not dependent on carbon-based fuels. Such a car would be better for me. Similarly, in the case 
of comparative valuations, Christian writes that "it would be absurd to rank x over y in a certain 
way, and also rank y over x in that way (1972, p. 62). One cannot take something as uniquely good 
in a certain way, and also take something else as uniquely good in that way. The crux of the matter 
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here lies in the modifier “in a certain way,” which represents a certain criterion. Thus, in my car ex-
ample, I used two different criteria: (a) speed, and (b) sustainability of fuel resources. From this fol-
lows that criteria will have a crucial role to play in the aporetic management of claims where we 
also have good reasons for opposing claims (see chapters 5 and 6). 
 We can further add that it is also always possible that two doctrines come together which 
belong to different types: for instance, a constative doctrine from one religion meets a performative 
doctrine from another religion. In such cases, both doctrines are opposed if it is not possible without 
absurdity to take both what the constative doctrine states as true, and to perform what the other doc-
trine recommends. Similarly, Christian states that it would be absurd for someone both (a) to say 
some course is impossible, and (b) to recommend undertaking that course of action. Thus, we can 
always add a constative to any performative claim, viz. when uttering a recommendation for action 
one can always formulate a constative claim, which claims it is possible to undertake the course of 
action. If not, one would not recommend the course of action.  
 Both William Christian (1972) and Paul Griffiths (2001) point out that not many religious 
claims will form exact contradictions. Griffiths states that it is more common to find approximate 
contradictions or contradictories (2001, p. 33). Approximate contradictions are claims that do not 
form exact contradictions at first sight, but which can easily be made to result in one. For instance, 
the (generic) Buddhist claim “Whatever exists is momentary,” and the Christian claim “Jesus Christ 
is the same yesterday and today and forever” (Hebrews 13:8) do not contradict straight away, but 
nevertheless we could construct an argument whose conclusion does yield an exact contradiction. 
 Griffiths also makes a distinction between contradictoriness and contrariety: he calls two 
religious claims contradictory if both cannot be true and one must be, and contrary if both cannot be 
true and neither need be (ibidem, p. xiv and pp. 32- 33).  We can exemplify this by taking a look at 57
how beliefs about the identity of Jesus of Nazareth conflict across traditions.  A Muslim will typi58 -
cally claim that Allah (or the Divine as Personal Being) cannot become incarnate. He will regard 
Jesus of Nazareth to be a prophet of Allah, and as such to be a mere man. According to Christian 
and Hindu beliefs, however, the Divine can and indeed has become incarnate. The Christian will 
claim that Jesus is the one and only incarnation of the Divine (or God), whereas the Hindu believer 
will reject the uniqueness of Jesus. Instead, he will favour multiple instances of divine incarnation. 
Thus, for a Hindu believer it is acceptable to say that Jesus is a divine being, but not that he is the 
 Similarly, some aporias will be merely a priori aporias, where philosophical analysis shows that they do not in fact 57
constitute an aporia. Others will be enduring.
 See Lipner (1976, p. 228) and Netland (1991, p. 113).58
 !38
one and only such being.  If we take the two claims “Jesus is a mere man” and “Jesus is a divine 59
being,” it seems reasonable to say that both cannot be true, but that one must be, since it could be 
said that he was at least a man. We can thus conclude contradictoriness. If we take the example of 
the two claims “Jesus is the one and only divine being,” and “Jesus is one of multiple divine 
beings," we can safely say that both cannot be true, but that neither need be. We thus conclude con-
trariety. 
 Furthermore, not only can we perceive religious claims to be incompatible, we can also say 
that they — and the belief systems to which they belong — are incommensurable or incomparable. 
Incommensurability denotes the lack of a common (Lat.: com-) measure (Lat.: mensura) to decide 
on the value of two competing claims or theories.  For instance, the Kuhn-Feyerabend thesis on 60
incommensurability states formally:  
Two theories are incommensurable, if they contain a basic common term whose 
meaning or use in one theory is incommensurable with its meaning or use in the oth-
er, i.e., if at least one basic term used in both theories has a totally different meaning 
in each (Wisdom, 1974, p. 299).   61
If we take the Christian concept of “God” as a criterion, then we can say that Buddhism is an atheis-
tic religion, which makes it incommensurable with Christianity.  The meaning of the term incom62 -
parability here comes close to the one of incommensurability, and I will regard both terms to be 
functionally equivalent. The comparison of worldview beliefs can be said to be based on partial or-
der relations. In mathematics, a partial order relation is a relation for which it is possible that two 
elements x and y are incapable of being compared. In contrast, for a linear order relation, on the 
other hand, it is always the case that x and y can be compared (i.e., x ≤ y or y ≤ x). Just and Weese 
write:  
 Note that none of this tells us anything about the actual truth-value of any of the contradictory claims.59
 See Rorty (1983). The concept of incommensurability was made popular by Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work The 60
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (first edition 1961).
 See Oberheim and Hornigen (2009).61
 It might be the case that some claims can be mace commensurate. Consider, for example, the case of AC/DC, or al62 -
ternating current and direct current. Both are incompatible but can be made commensurable by means of series of 
blocks that transform the AC current in to a steady stream of DC current.
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Two elements x and y are comparable by a partial order relation ≤ if x ≤ y or y ≤ x. A 
partial order (X, ≤) is called a linear order…if every two elements of X are compara-
ble by ≤ (1996, p. 18).  
Anticipating what is to come, this is specifically relevant for the process of assessment and justifi-
cation of claims in aporetic conflict. In such cases, the acceptance of a belief will depend on which 
beliefs are seen to provide not only good reasons, but also the "best" reasons. To assess whether a 
claim is good, we hold it against a criterion. To assess whether a claim is better, we hold both 
claims against the same criterion, as well as against themselves. The idea that justification can settle 
conflict is therefore premised on the idea that we can hold both claims and their justification against 
the same criteria, or the same type of criteria. However, some beliefs, each backed with good rea-
sons, will turn out to be incomparable in this regard (i.e., due to differences in how the claims are 
redeemed). 
 Lastly, David Basinger (2002) calls cognitive conflict of this type "epistemic peer conflict," 
viz. knowledge-based conflict about religious claims between peers. Basinger characterises peers as 
persons who can be considered to be (a) equally knowledgeable, and (b) sincere. Similarly, Robert 
McKim (2001) writes: 
It is not just the fact that there are diverse beliefs that is striking: it is the fact that 
wise people who think carefully and judiciously, who are intelligent, clever, honest, 
reflective, and serious, who avoid distortion, exaggeration, and confabulation, who 
admit ignorance when appropriate, and who have relied on what has seemed to them 
to be the relevant considerations in the course of acquiring their beliefs, hold these 
diverse beliefs (McKim, 2001, p. 129). 
However, the condition of being "knowledgeable" is vague and in need of further qualification. For 
instance, we can observe epistemic peer conflict on religious beliefs in three distinct settings. First-
ly, inter-religious conflict will exist between members of different and distinct religious traditions. 
Secondly, intra-religious conflict will occur between members belonging to the same religion, as in 
the case of Protestants and Roman Catholics. Thirdly, inter-system conflict will take place between 
a believer of a religious worldview, and a proponent of a non-religious worldview.  At first blush, 63
 The term inter-system conflict is Basinger’s.63
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what it means to be a peer would substantially differ in all three cases. In the case of Christian intra-
religious conflict, between Protestants and Catholics, we can consider both to be peers-as-Chris-
tians, who share certain paradigmatic knowledge.  However, if a Christian criticises or opposes 64
Buddhist claims in a case of inter-religious conflict, she would not be acting as a peer to the Bud-
dhist. The Christian believer does not have obvious access to the indigenous or emic methods of 
acquiring knowledge that would allow her to either assent to or criticise those particular claims with 
reasons good enough to be acceptable to the Buddhist. Of course, the Christian always has recourse 
to her own resources with which to criticise Buddhist claims. Thus, she can use the Christian 
framework (i.e., worldview) as a criterion. However, this would not count as an instance of peer 
criticism in the same way a fellow Buddhist would criticise his or her own tradition. Nevertheless, 
this is not what both McKim and Basinger have in mind when they define peers as equally knowl-
edge and sincere. Rather, appeal is being made to universal conditions that are true for all human 
beings.  
 The concept of what it means to be a peer is therefore dependent on the range of application. 
Furthermore, where inter-religious conflict ends and intra-religious conflict starts is foremost a 
question of definition. The distinction between the two terms is dependent on how we understand 
the concept of religion, as well as on how we understand the nature of particular religious traditions. 
For instance, we can make clear distinctions between the religious traditions of Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism. This allows us to classify any cognitive peer conflict between them as an instance of 
inter-religious conflict. However, in a change of perspective, all three religious traditions can be 
seen to be part of the Abrahamistic faiths. In the context of a comparative analysis between the 
Abrahamistic religious family and Buddhism, the differences between, for instance, Christianity 
and Islam, show up as relatively minor in comparison with the Buddhist belief system. While both 
cases are cases of inter-religious conflict, the distance between the Christian and the Muslim can be 
said to be smaller than the distance between the Christian and the Buddhist. However, this says 
nothing about the importance attached to differences in opinion, as often it is the one closest to us 
with whom we have the biggest conflicts. Finally, David Basinger argues that the distinction matters 
little: 
 And let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that they are both sincere and truthful, which is Basinger’s second condi64 -
tion. Compare this condition with Habermas’s validity claim of truthfulness (see infra). Similarly, I assume that 
Basinger’s first condition, knowledgeable, can be compared with Habermas’s validity claim of propositional truth.  
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As I see it, the same basic perspectives that apply to inter-system diversity (for ex-
ample, to differing perspectives on the most accurate basic theistic conception of 
God) apply just as clearly, and in exactly the same sense, to intra-system diversity 
(for example, to differing perspectives within Christianity over the extent of God's 
knowledge). Moreover… the appropriate response to these questions — for example, 
the appropriate response to what we are obligated, or not obligated, to do when con-
fronting diversity — is exactly the same for both types of diversity (Basinger, 2002, 
pp. 2-3). 
2.4. The Second-Order Problem of Epistemic Stances 
The problem of religious diversity can also be framed differently, namely in terms of epistemic 
stances. Alan Race, in his influential work Christians and Religious Pluralism (1984), wrote a 
summary of the different attitudes towards religious diversity that were present in various Christian 
authors, such as Hendrik Kraemer (1938), John Nicol Farquhar (1913), and William Hocking 
(1932).  On the basis of this — and inspired by the work of Farquhar — Race developed a so-65
called tripartite typology. This tripartite typology consisted of three different (religious) epistemic 
stances, to wit, exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. At opposite ends of the typology are exclu-
sivism and pluralism. While exclusivism expresses the idea that only one religious tradition is true 
— and that all others are false —, pluralism expresses the idea that all the major religious traditions 
represent true religions, that they are all more or less equally true, and offer equally valid paths to 
salvations. In the middle of the spectrum is inclusivism, which represents a commitment to claiming 
that one revelation or religion (sometimes in a special denominational form) is superior to others, 
even if those can be considered true as well.  
 Since its publication, Race’s typology has been accepted as a useful heuristic by a broad 
range of scholars. However, it has not been without critics either (Ariarajah, 1994; Blakeslee, 2010, 
p. 6). Several authors have suggested their own versions of the typology by (a) deleting or subsum-
ing types, (b) adding more types, or (c) rewording types. The upshot is that many different types 
abound with often different names for the same type of stance. Although I do not pretend to present 
a comprehensive overview, I will give a brief outline of some of the most referenced versions. 
 See Okholm and Phillips, 1996.65
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 In category (a), Gavin D’Costa (1996) argues that pluralism can be reduced to exclusivism, 
Owen C. Thomas (1994) argues that pluralism reduces to inclusivism, and David Basinger (2002) 
argues that inclusivism is a soft form of exclusivism. 
 In category (b), Perry Schmidt-Leukel (2005) proposes a reformed quadripartite typology 
including the further position of naturalism. David Basinger (2002) also includes naturalism as an 
epistemic stance. Richard Plantinga mentions a fourth category of universalism, which is a thesis on 
universal salvation for all (Knitter, 2005). However, in reply, Schmidt-Leukel argues that this type 
can be best  understood as a variant of pluralism (Schmidt-Leukel, 2005, p. 15). Seemingly upping 
the ante, Joseph Runzo (1988) distinguishes six possible responses, viz. atheism, exclusivism, in-
clusivism, subjectivism, pluralism, and relativism. However, on his account, atheism equates with 
naturalism, and the latter three are but versions of pluralism. Hence, his typology comes again down 
to the same four types. 
 In category (c), both Paul Knitter (2002) and Paul Hedges (2002, 2008, 2010) support a 
quadripartite typology, but they prefer to use other terms. Knitter distinguishes four "models," viz. a 
replacement, fulfilment, mutuality and acceptance model. Hedges uses the terms exclusivisms, in-
clusivisms, pluralisms, and particularities, but sees them from the perspective of radical discontinu-
ity, radical fulfilment, radical openness, and radical difference.  
 Of course some authors will classify as multiple types. Both Jacques Dupuis (1997) and 
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen (2003) argue for an alternative typology that consists of ecclesiocentrism, 
christocentrism, theocentrism, and realitycentrism (Kärkkäinen, 2003, p. 25). The first three cate-
gories correspond to exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The fourth category serves to repre-
sent the type of pluralism forwarded by John Hick, who replaces reference to God and gods by ref-
erence to an ultimate, transcendent reality.  
 In my next overview of the typology, I will make use of quadripartite typology presented by 
Schmidt-Leukel (2005).  Firstly, because Schmidt-Leukel has arguably been the typology’s 66
staunchest defender in recent years. Secondly, because it consists of one non-religious option added 
to the classic three religious options and therefore takes into account the notion of non-religious 
worldview. Each of these epistemic options will attempt to provide a solution to the first-order 
problem of conflicting worldview claims. Given that these options are mutually exclusive, the ty-
pology as such will present a problem of its own in terms of which one of these option is true, or 
most acceptable, and so on. 
 I will return to Schmidt-Leukel’s defence of the typology in my chapter seven.66
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 2.4.1. Naturalism 
A proponent of this approach (i.e., a naturalist) maintains that since there exists no divine reality –- 
since the referent in such claims is non-existent –- all such claims are false (Basinger, 2002, p. 3). If 
religious claims, referring to a transcendent reality (i.e., gods or supernatural beings), are false, the 
fact that they conflict and contradict each other becomes a non-issue, and the problem of cognitive 
conflict between the claims of the religious traditions disappears.   67
 The naturalist has a few strategies open to her. Firstly, she can take religious claims serious-
ly, and accept them as propositions that refer to states of affairs in reality. For instance, when she is 
confronted with a statement such as “Jesus Christ is the Son of God” she will attempt to ascertain 
whether there is indeed a state of affairs to which the proposition refers (i.e., whether there is indeed 
a referent). If evidence is lacking, or not forth-coming, she will conclude that the claim has no posi-
tive warrant, and attribute the value of ‘false’ to the proposition in question. John Hick has pointed 
out that naturalism can also express a “positive appreciation of religion as a valuable aspect of hu-
man life” (Hick, 1993, p. 5). He calls this position "religious naturalism,” in contrast with non-reli-
gious naturalism). The religious naturalist accepts that the religious believer is speaking about 
something, i.e. is referring to aspects of the world, but without targeting the right referents: the reli-
gious believer is merely confused. This strategy then is one where meaning is assigned, but where 
the verdict is that the religious claims are false. Secondly, the naturalist can deny that religious 
claims have proper cognitive content, or that they have any propositional status. In effect, she states 
that all such claims are (propositionally) meaningless. Hence, we arrive at a similar result: given a 
complete lack of truth-value, it does not matter that the different claims contradict each other. 
Thirdly, an agnostic (i.e., somebody who professes not to know) could also hold that the proposition 
“God exists” is meaningful, but that we have no way of knowing of whether it is true or false, and 
that we therefore should refrain from making a judgment. This, then, is a third stance, positioned 
somewhere between the first two: although we can assign meaning, we cannot assign truth value. 
 At first blush, the first two strategies seem to be identical. However, saying that the referent 
does not exist (i.e., falseness or falsity) is not the same as saying that a claim has no propositional 
status (i.e., meaninglessness). In the first case, a (negative) truth-value is assigned: given that no 
proof can be provided to show that the referent exists, the claim is taken to be false. This stance is 
typical of the atheist who takes the lack of evidence for God (i.e., pro God) to be evidence that God 
does not exist (i.e., contra God). In the second case, because the claim is meaningless (i.e., because 
 Note that I use the term naturalism as a catch-all that could also include skepticism. Naturalism, as a theory, rejects 67
references to supernatural entities.
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we do not know which proposition the claim implies), we do not assign a truth-value. Nicholas 
Rescher also points to the difference between falseness and meaninglessness. While falseness is 
simple enough as a basis for dismissing claims, meaninglessness is more complicated. Rescher dis-
tinguishes between three different forms of meaninglessness, namely (a) hermeneutical, (b) infor-
mative, and (c) semantical (2009, p. 97). Hermeneutically meaningless sentences are "literal non-
sense" and "unintelligible gibberish." As an example, he gives us the sentence "Yellow weighs 
wooden tentacles." This sentence is meaningless despite the fact that we can understand the indi-
vidual words. Taken together, the individual meaningful words create a meaningless sentence: no 
meaning whatsoever can be derived from the sentence, at least for the listener. Rescher’s second 
category of informative meaninglessness is "absurd and conveys no usable information" (ibid., 97). 
As an example, Rescher writes: "He drew a square circle." Here, while the separate terms are mean-
ingful, square and circle are opposing terms, and therefore their juxtaposition becomes meaningless. 
Sentences of this kind are generally caused by “category confusion and presupposition 
violation” (ibid., p. 98). Semantically meaningless are sentences such as "This sentence is 
false" (ibid., p. 97). According to Rescher these type of sentences are meaningless since "neither 
truth nor falsity can be ascribed to it" (ibid., 97). But surely this is a feature shared by all forms of 
meaninglessness. To describe semantically meaninglessness by referring to this feature is therefore 
not very informative.  “Is false” ascribes truth value to a proposition according to the structure “p is 
false.” Thus we get: “this sentence” is false. “This sentence” is not meaningless as such, since it 
refers to a particular sentence: “This sentence is false.” Hence we can write: “This sentence is false” 
is false. We then end up in an endless loop of opposing terms since a double negative creates a posi-
tive.  Although we do not here have an opposition of terms (like in square and circle) we do end up 68
with an opposition of some sort, namely an oscillation between the desire to ascribe truth and falsi-
ty. Many philosophers of religion will in fact stay away from the question of the truth or falsity of 
beliefs. For instance, David Basinger states that "while the actual existence of any form of divine 
reality remains a hotly contested issue within philosophical circles, this question [i.e., whether there 
is indeed a referent] is simply set aside in most current discussions of diversity” (2002, p. 3). In oth-
er words, philosophers will not attempt to prove or disprove particular claims; they simply accept, 
as a cultural fact, that believers take them to be true. 
 The next iteration would be: “(This sentence is false) is false” is false.68
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2.4.2. Exclusivism  
A proponent of this approach (i.e., an exclusivist) takes one religious tradition, i.e., their home reli-
gion, to be the sole provider of religious truths. An exclusivist holds (1) that the doctrines she be-
lieves in are true, and this is the reason why she believes them, and that (2) where the claims of oth-
er religions conflict with those of her home religion, the former are to be rejected as false. Kevin 
Meeker and Phillip L. Quinn write that the religious exclusivist is someone who believes that “one 
religion is mostly right and all the other religions go seriously wrong” (2000, p. 3). Joseph Runzo 
states that on this stance “only one world religion is correct, and all others are mistaken” (1988, p. 
346). Alvin Plantinga writes that the exclusivist holds that (a) "the tenets or some of the tenets of 
one religion—Christianity, let's say—are in fact true," as well as that "any propositions, including 
other religious beliefs, that are incompatible with those tenets are false" (2008, p. 518). Moreover, 
Plantinga adds, on an exclusivist position you continue to believe, despite learning about this diver-
sity, what you have all along believed (ibid., p. 518).  
 On this account, the religious exclusivist strictly applies the principle of non-contradiction, 
which states that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time (or in the same 
way). The strategy is therefore as follows: first, she presupposes that one can make accurate judg-
ments about the truth or falsity of the major religions; second, she believes to have sufficient reason 
to conclude the truth of a specific claim; third, she applies the logical inference that any opposing 
claims must be false. Bracketing the question how the religious exclusivist decides which one of 
two conflicting truth-claims is true (i.e., the question of what her reasons are for attributing truth-
value), and which is false, the problem of conflicting truth claims seems to have dissolved. Once the 
truth for or against a religious claim is shown in the court of rational adjudication, the issue is set-
tled. At first blush, then, the exclusivist has an easy task: all she needs to do is "prove" — i.e., show 
evidence — that her claims are true. She can then claim that all opposing claims are false. If this 
sounds too good to be true, it probably is. David Basinger agrees that “the exclusivist who faces 
epistemic peer conflict… should, as a general rule, first attempt to resolve the tension on evidential 
grounds” (Basinger, 2002, p. 12). However, he adds, “there seldom exists an objective evidential 
basis for resolving epistemic conflicts in the religious realm” (Basinger, 2002, p. 12). In other 
words, the religious exclusivist might think she has good reasons for her claims to be true. Howev-
er, according to Basinger, no real non-question-begging grounds — which do not simply assume 
what needs to be proven — seem to exist by which she could conclusively convince her religious 
and non-religious peers. Her grounds then become internal, functional grounds such as coherence 
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with other beliefs, or a phenomenological experience of the truth of a claim. In the face of religious 
diversity, this soon becomes problematic, for every religion can claim the same. 
 Basinger also points out that we can distinguish between two different uses of the term. In 
the first sense, a religious exclusivist is “anyone who claims that her perspective on a religious issue 
is true (and, thus, that any incompatible perspective is false)” (2002, p. 4). In other words, anyone 
who argues for the truth of a particular religious claim (and not for its opposite, for instance) can be 
considered to be an exclusivist in respect to that claim. In the second sense — the most common 
one -– a religious exclusivist is “someone who believes that one, and only one of the many incom-
patible basic theistic systems to which people have committed themselves contains the truth” (ibi-
dem, p. 5). It is only the latter position that Basinger considers part of the typology, and not the 
former. However, it is not completely clear how, in practice, we can keep the two positions apart. 
Often an exclusivist position on a single claim will entail exclusivism of the second type, if that 
claim is a doctrinal claim and central to a certain belief system. For instance, a Christian will typi-
cally believe (a) that God has revealed himself in the Bible, and (b) that Jesus Christ is both the sole 
incarnation of God, and our Lord and Saviour. From this exclusivist position on two single claims 
follows that only Christianity will offer saving knowledge of God, i.e. that only Christianity is both 
true and salvific. 
2.4.3. Inclusivism 
A proponent of this approach (i.e., an inclusivist) argues that one tradition provides the "full truth," 
and that claims made by other traditions are true in so far as they are compatible (i.e., do not con-
tradict) and coherent with the essential truths of the home tradition. The principle of non-contradic-
tion applies here as well, but with more willingness to grant truth to basic claims made by other re-
ligious traditions, insofar as they do not conflict with the former. The definition of inclusivism only 
seems be reliant on the principle of non-contradiction, and not on the further principle that the 
claims in question need to cohere with one another.  However, it seems intuitively clear that the 69
inclusivist will more easily accept statements that do cohere with her doctrinal claims. A Christian 
inclusivist can accept the Muslim claim that Jesus Christ is a prophet of God –- it is coherent with a 
Christian view — as long as he does not explicitly reject the divinity of Jesus (as this contradicts 
with the Christian’s doctrinal view). She might however have a harder time accepting Hindu claims, 
even if they do not explicitly contradict. 
 Non-contradiction (or consistency) need not imply coherence.69
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2.4.4. Pluralism  
Religious pluralism states that (at least some) religious traditions provide truth, or are on par with 
respect to truth, even if their claims contradict each other, and that no single religion is superior in 
this respect.  Meeker and Quinn explicate that pluralism is the view that “all the major religious 70
traditions –- the so-called world religions –- are in contact with the same ultimate religious 
reality” (2000, p. 3). A pluralist holds that “ultimately all world religions are correct, each offering a 
different salvific path and partial perspective vis-à-vis the one Ultimate Reality” (Runzo, 1988, p. 
347). They “thus offer different, but equally efficacious access, to the divine” (Basinger, 2002, p. 4). 
Pluralism differs from exclusivism in that it grants truth-value to different religious traditions, and it 
differs from inclusivism in that it does not regard one tradition as having superior truth. A pluralist, 
who grants truth-value to different religious systems, will necessarily be confronted with the prob-
lem of conflicting truth claims, and will have to address it in order to have a viable theory. Howev-
er, not all pluralist theories are created equally, and we can distinguish between different categories 
of pluralism. 
2.4.4.1. Weak vs. Strong Pluralism 
Firstly, there is a difference between a weak pluralist theory and a strong pluralist theory. Victoria 
Harrison writes about the latter: 
Theories that fall under this rubric consider all religions to have prima facie value in their 
own right. Each religion is regarded as a viable path to the religious goal. Moreover, each is 
thought to provide knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. According to religious 
pluralists, then, we would never, in principle, be in a position to identify any one religion 
(Harrison, 2007, p. 198). 
Scholars who present a weaker version, and who do not prima facie assume that all religions have 
value in their own right, be it in terms of knowledge or of an adequate salvific path, will have to 
present a criterion with which to decide between religions that have such value, and religions that 
do not. In other words, they believe that religions can be graded and compared according to a stan-
dard. Whether a pluralist will choose a strong or weak version will therefore depend in part  on 
whether he or she believes that religious traditions can be graded or not. Although grading religions 
 Many scholars have suggested (some form of) a pluralist theory such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Raimundo Panikkar 70
and, perhaps most notably, John Hick. For a more comprehensive list, see A. Kyongsuk Min, 1997, pp. 587-588. 
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has the advantage that it avoids relativism, there is also a danger here, as when a pluralist theorist 
uses a question-begging criterion, i.e., the pluralist selects only those religions that are, by his own 
definition, all on par while discarding the others. John Hick (2004), as I have shown, argues that we 
should see the religious traditions as responses to the Divine as a transcendent noumenal reality. If 
we do so, then we have an obvious problem in the fact that the traditions seem to make conflicting 
truth-claims, whilst each of them claims total allegiance to its own system (2000, p. 54). Hick tries 
to steer away from this problem by saying that we should not try to understand religious plurality 
“through these rival truth claims,” but rather “in terms of the claims of the various traditions to pro-
vide, or to be effective contexts of, salvation” (ibid., p. 54). His claim is that each of the different 
traditions provides a path of salvation and that together they do equally so. Hick then goes on to tell 
us which religions he has in mind by making a distinction between pre-axial religious traditions and 
post-axial traditions.  He writes, “whereas pre-axial religion was (and is) centrally concerned to 71
keep life going on an even keel, the post-axial traditions, originating or rooted in the “axial age” of 
the first millennium B.C.E. — principally Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam –- are 
centrally concerned with a radical transformation of the human situation.” (Hick, 2000, p. 55) Hav-
ing set apart only those religions that — by his definition — are “centrally concerned” with a radi-
cal transformation (i.e., his criterion), it then becomes much easier to show that the religious tradi-
tions are indeed all providing a path of salvation (which satisfies his pluralist requirement). In other 
words, he is already assuming what he is going to prove. Moreover, Hick’s criterion also has the 
effect of excluding what is arguably the biggest part of humanity’s religious history. His selection of 
religions can also be said to be biased in favour of the religions of the West (the three so-called 
Abrahamic faiths), and India (Hinduism, Buddhism). Religious systems that are left out are the con-
temporary indigenous religious systems of most of the other continents (i.e., tribal religions).  
 One might argue that a weak pluralist like Hick is, in a certain sense, more of an exclusivist 
than a pluralist. An exclusivist is only prepared to grant truth and salvific power to a specific set of 
beliefs, usually from one single tradition, and denies truth and salvific power to sets of belief that do 
not cohere with it. Similarly, Hick only grants salvific power to post-axial religions, as they are the 
only ones that fit his criterion. 
 The Axial Age is a term introduced by Karl Jaspers, who called it ‘Achsenzeit’, to denote the period between 800 and 71
200 BCE (Before Common Era). See Jaspers’s The Origin and Goal of History, 2014 (1953).
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2.4.4.2. Identist vs. Differentialist Pluralism 
Not all pluralist authors advocate or assume the existence of a single, ultimate reality with which all 
world religions are in touch. Some authors argue for different ultimates, and for different salvations, 
rather than for different versions of a single salvific path. Schmidt-Leukel refers to the latter as 
polycentric pluralists, and he mentions such proponents as John Cobb, David Griffin, Stephen Ka-
plan and Mark Heim (Schmidt-Leukel, 2008, p. 96f). David Griffin has made similar distinctions: 
he calls the former approach identist pluralism (i.e., pluralism in the style of John Hick), and the 
latter differentialist pluralism. Victoria Harrison, advocating an internal pluralist view, argues that, 
one this account, one need not to assume the existence of a single ultimate reality or a single reli-
gious goal: what constitutes ultimate reality, as well as religious salvation, is simply “conceptual-
scheme dependent” (Harrison, 2006; 2008). 
2.5. Conclusion 
As I wrote in the Introduction to this chapter, I set out to formulate two different problems of reli-
gious diversity. Firstly, I argued that we can identify this problem as epistemic peer conflict on first-
order worldview claims. I have shown that not just truth claims need to conflict, but that other types 
of claims, associated with Apostel’s worldview claims, can also conflict. Crucially, different types 
of claims will have different conditions for what makes them plausible or acceptable to us. I have 
also hinted at the role of criteria in deciding what is comparatively more acceptable. I will develop 
that concern in chapters 5 and 6. From this follows that conditions for acceptability (i.e., plausibil-
ity) are an important topic for worldview analysis as structural analysis, while the topic of criteria 
of acceptability will an important topic for worldview analysis as comparative analysis. Secondly, I 
have argued that we can also discuss the problem of religious diversity as a choice between epi-
stemic stances where each specific stance aims to offer a second-order solution to the first-order 
conflict. While this chapter was purely analytical, the remainder of my dissertation will be thera-
peutic, that is, offer solutions to both problems. Firstly, on the matter of the second-order stances, I 
will offer a specific solution that consists of what we can call a fifth stance, namely Orientational 
Pluralism. Secondly, on the matter of first-order conflict, I will not so much offer a solution to the 
problem as such, but rather strategies with which to solve such problems. This is due to the nature 
of the first-order problem, where each practical conflict between claims presents its own challenge. 
Given that my dissertation is meta-philosophical in nature, I will refrain from looking at particular 
case-studies.  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3. Habermas and Validity Claims 
3.1. Introduction 
In the present chapter I turn to the oeuvre of Jürgen Habermas and his work on validity claims. Par-
ticularly in his seminal work The Theory of Communicative Action (TOCA; 1984) Habermas aimed 
to explicate a novel theory of meaning based on a reconstruction of the general structures of speech 
acts, by showing how speech acts exhibit at least three different formal-pragmatic structures. Em-
ploying these structures as a palimpsest, Habermas subsequently build up a cognitive architecture, 
which culminated in an exposition of three different types of validity claims, viz., second-order 
claims that determine what counts as evidence for or against a particular first-order claim. 
3.2. Speech Act Theory 
Due to the wide range of influences on his work, I consider Jürgen Habermas to be a philosophical 
bricoleur par excellence. Of the many schools of thought that influenced his theory of communica-
tive action, Speech Act Theory deserves specific mention.  From the work of J. L. Austin (1962) 72
and John Searle (1969), Habermas borrowed the idea that the speech act (Ger.: Sprechhandlung) 
constitutes the elementary unit of linguistic communication. Searle wrote that a speech act is “not a 
symbol, word, or sentence,” but rather “the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain 
conditions (Searle, 1969, p. 16).  Central to this is the idea that every time we perform a locution73 -
ary act — i.e. the actual utterance and inherent meaning — we also simultaneously perform an illo-
cutionary act.  Speech acts, in their deeps structure, exhibit a “double structure”: they carry both 74
locutionary meaning (i.e., propositional content) and illocutionary force. Thus, every speech act 
consists of two sentences, viz., (1) a dominating or performative sentence with illocutionary force, 
 Another influence was American Pragmatism. Habermas was introduced to Pragmatism by Karl-Otto Apel (see 72
Cooke, 2011, p. 290), in particular to such authors as John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and others. 
For a comprehensive and authoritative survey of the field of Pragmatism, see A Companion to Pragmatism (Shook and 
Margolis, 2006). Note that it is Pragmatism that brought Habermas into the purview of Nicholas Rescher.
 Owen Eriksson, in his comparative article on speech act theory in Searle and Habermas, unfortunately refers to 73
Austin's second edition of How to do things with words, which was only published in 1976. By that time, however, 
Habermas had already published his theory on formal pragmatics. Moreover, Austin's research dates back to as early as 
the 1940's (see also Duranti, 1997, p. 219).
 This led Austin to conclude that in saying something we always also do something (Austin, 1962, p. 98). 74
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and (2) a dependent sentence with propositional content.  The performative sentence establishes (a) 75
the mode of communication between a speaker and a hearer, as well as (b) the pragmatic situation 
of the dependent sentence. The performative sentence refers to the power to bring about the type of 
relationship intended by the speaker: this is expressed as an illocutionary force. On the other hand, 
the dependent sentence — generally consisting of an identifying (i.e., referring) phrase and a predi-
cate phrase — establishes the connection of the sentence with the world, seen here specifically as 
the external world of objects and events.  This double structure is what determines ordinary com76 -
munication: both speaker and hearer communicate simultaneously at two different levels, viz., (a) 
the level of sensory experiences and states-of-affairs, and (b) the level of intersubjectivity. On the 
level of intersubjectivity, both parties establish a mutual relationship, which permits them to come 
to a mutual understanding with one another — Verständigung. This relationship is an intersubjec-
tive relationship precisely because it’s a relationship between meaning producing subjects. Howev-
er, this understanding is but a process on it’s way to the real purpose of communicative actions, that 
is, to reach agreement and consensus. On the level of objective “states of affairs,” both parties 
communicate about content from the objective world (SDUP, p. 157; Fultner, 2014, p. 58).  
  While the double structure suggests that two types of sentences will always be present in 
every speech act, these will usually only be present as deep or implicit structures. For instance, 
truth claims, normally associated with constative speech acts (i.e., speech acts which offer proposi-
tional content), are presupposed for all types of speech acts. We can however bring those deep 
structures to the surface by making them explicit. Thus, we can explicate constative speech acts, as 
well as performative speech acts. Since non-constative speech acts still have propositional content, 
this content can be made explicit by transforming the propositional content into an assertion. Thus, 
the dependent sentence of propositional content becomes a proposition on its own, which is capable 
 Habermas borrowed the term deep structure from American linguist Noam Chomsky. Chomsky's research (Aspects of 75
a Theory of Syntax, 1965) dealt with the deep structures of linguistic competence, that is with those set of rules that 
agents must use to use language competently. Andrew Edgar, writing on Habermas, states: "The “deep grammar” to 
which Chomsky refers may therefore be understood as a set of rules that competent speakers are able to follow, albeit 
without the capacity to bring to consciousness what those rules are" (2005, p. 140). Habermas is interested in the deep 
structures not just of linguistic competence, but also of communicative competence, where communication is seen to 
involve more than the correct use of language. On a biographical note, in 1966 Habermas became co-editor of a series 
of German translation of English works, which, notably, included Chomsky's Aspects, as well as Searle's Speech Acts 
(Specter, 2011, p. 88).
 Habermas differentiates between different types of worlds: an objective world, a subjective world, and finally an in76 -
tersubjective one. The objective world is object of the dependent locutionary sentence, while the intersubjective world 
is constituted by the illocutionary force of communication. The butt of some critiques (Steinhoff, 2009; Heath, 2013) 
will be that the intersubjective world can be referenced in terms of propositional content, thereby rendering it superflu-
ous.
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of explicitly claiming truth.  However, in interactive speech (e.g., promises, advise, prohibitions, 77
prescriptions) the speaker implies a different validity claim than truth. In the utterances: “I assert (to 
you) that p,” “I promise (you) that p,” “I command (you) that p,” the same propositional content p 
appears, but with a varying illocutionary force. In the case of “I promise (you) that p,” the speaker 
establishes a relationship with the hearer that is characteristic of a promise. For the speech act to be 
successful interactively, it must be in accordance with existing norms, implying at least “factual 
recognition of the claim that these norms legitimately exist" (SDUP, p. 158). In the same way that 
emphasis is laid on truth claims in cognitive language use, emphasis is laid here on the validity of 
the normative background of beliefs. Habermas writes: 
The illocutionary force of a speech act, which brings about an interpersonal relationship 
between consensually interacting participants, arises from the binding force of acknowl-
edged norms of action; to the extent that a speech act is part of consensual interaction it ac-
tualises an already established value-pattern. The validity of a normative background of in-
stitutions, roles, socioculturally accepted forms of life and so on, is always already presup-
posed. This is in no way limited only to institutional speech acts which…directly fulfil 
norms of action (SDUP, p. 158). 
The illocutionary force of a speech act establishes a relationship between subjects  — or between a 
subject and his community — that actualises existing value patterns and norms of action. Thus, in a 
similar way that we can explicate the locutionary content of a non-constative speech act, we can 
also explicate the illocutionary content of constative or declarative speech acts by referring to the 
normative background, that is, those value statements and norms of action. He adds: 
But even assertions, reports, explanations, etc. also give rise to interpersonal relationships 
which, in order to arise at all, must merge with established value-patterns; this means that 
they must accord to an existing normative background… So through the illocutionary force 
of speech acts, the normative validity claim — i.e. rightness or legitimacy — is just as uni-
versally built into the structures of speech as is the truth claim (SDUP, p. 158). 
 According to Habermas, the claim to truth is but one type of validity claim that is built into speech as an inherent 77
structural feature (SDUP, p. 158).
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The validity claim associated with normative or interactive speech is therefore not truth but right-
ness. While a truth claim is judged as true or false, a normative claim is judged as right or wrong. 
This differentiation in validity claims reserves the connotation of truth for use in propositional 
speech only. However, it is indeed possible, in pre-reflective or pre-philosophical language, to say 
that something is true when it is right: to say that a normative claim is true, is to say it is right. 
3.3. Relations to Reality 
We could argue that the term double structure is partly misleading. For instance, Austin identified 
not a double but a triple structure of locution, illocution, and perlocution. Hence what has been left 
out so far is the third aspect of perlocution: the psychological or subjective consequences of a 
speech act. Consequently, Habermas claims that it is not just illocutionary force and propositional 
content that are universally present in speech acts: equally present is a claim to subjective 
sincerity.  In other words, Habermas does not just posit the idea of a "double structure," but also 78
adds a third element. Following the work of Karl Bühler on Sprachtheorie (1934) — i.e., Speech 
Theory —, Habermas (1979, p. 41-44) claims that three different relations to reality accrue to sen-
tences (Ger.: Realitätsbezüge).  The act of uttering by the speaker situates the sentence in relation 79
to three types of reality: 
(1) the external reality; 
(2) the normative reality of society; 
(3) the inner reality of the speaker; 
Taken together, speech acts can carry three different types effects — locutionary, illocutionary, and 
perlocutionary — which relate the speech act to the external reality, the normative reality of our so-
ciety or community, and the inner reality of the speaker. I have previously argued that these three 
relationships are already inherent within our understanding of the worldview concept. In particular, 
they were are already present in Dilthey’s search for the Zusammenhang or connectedness between 
objective thought, interpretive understanding of others, and self-reflection. These three relationships 
are also expressed in John Valk’s definition of a worldview who writes that by means of a world-
view we come to “understand ourselves, others, and the world in which we live” (see supra). 
 As well as to the (grammatical) correctness of the linguistic structures so that what has been said can be understood or 78
comprehended by the hearer. This is a fourth validity claim, although Habermas usually keeps to the first three.
 See TOCA, p. 275.79
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3.4. Habermas’s Conceptual Architecture 
On the basis of this triple structure of relationships, Habermas sets up an elaborate conceptual archi-
tecture. I will understand this architecture as describing at least four different, but interrelated tri-
adic models, namely, an (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, (3) functional-linguistic, and (4) for-
mal-pragmatic model.  Since the same structure reoccurs within the different models, the three re80 -
lationships described supra will serve as a palimpsest for the whole of the conceptual architecture. 
3.4.1. The Ontological Model 
Habermas derives what I call an ontological model from the three types of relationships. This model 
is ontological since it deals with the question "what exists?”  Following the palimpsest, Habermas 81
(TOCA, p. 100) distinguishes between:  
(1) an objective world,  
(2) a social world 
(3) a subjective world.   82
The objective world (1) denotes the world of objects and events. This is the empirical or "outer" 
world, and can be simply referred to as “the” world. The social world (2) denotes the social life-
world of shared values, norms, roles, and rules. This refers to the totality of interpersonal relation-
ships that are currently accepted as legitimate or right, namely, “our” world. Finally, the subjective 
world (3) denotes the speaker’s own of intentional experiences, and refers to the totality of lived 
experiences to which the speaker S has private or privileged access: “my” world. Thus the speaker 
S, or subject, communicates in three different ways: she communicates (1) objective data, about 
states of affairs or events in the world, (2) from within the social norms of the lifeworld she finds 
herself in, and (3) in respect to her subjective intentions, and so on. The speaker can do so either 
implicitly, or explicitly. In the same vein as she can explicate propositional content about the objec-
 To be sure, these are my own distinctions, and Habermas never writes about them in this form. For instance, he might 80
well object to my use of the word ontological for his "world model" (see infra). I understand a model to be a pattern that 
demonstrates structure. Thus, an ontological model, for instance, demonstrates the ontological structure of the world.
 This question is intimately related to another question "what can I know?" Knowing that something exists is a re81 -
quirement for stating that something exist. I cannot say: x exists, but I do not know it exists. For a further discussion of 
ontology, and how it relates to knowledge and truth, see infra.
 I will understand the concept of ‘world’ here as delivering of a set of data (or ‘givens’). This avoids using the term 82
object indiscriminately.
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tive world, or refer to the normative background, she can also explicate her subjective context.  
Habermas’s theory of three worlds was inspired by a similar world theory offered by Karl Popper.  83
Popper, in his article Epistemology without a Knowing Subject (1967), introduces a view of the uni-
verse (i.e., the world) that consists of three different, but interacting sub-universes (1967, p. 143).  84
He writes: 
We may distinguish the following three worlds or universes: first the world of physical ob-
jects or physical states; secondly, the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, 
or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of 
thought, especially the scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art (1972, p. 106). 
Popper spends most of his time on defending the third world: World 3 (W3). W3 refers to the prod-
ucts of the human mind "such as languages; tales and stories and religious myths; scientific conjec-
tures or theories, and mathematical constructions; songs and symphonies; paintings and 
sculptures" (ibid., p. 106). Besides these cognitive products, W3 also includes physical objects such 
as "aeroplanes and airports and other feats of engineering," which are equally products of the hu-
man mind (i.e., aeroplanes are not natural or non-human objects).  
 Popper agrees that many objects that belong to W3 will also belong to World 1 (W1), the 
world of physical bodies. While an airplane starts as an idea or concept in World 2 — the real of 
personal experiences and ideas — it also effectively exists as a physical instance of such an idea. If 
we were to call W1 objective, and W2 subjective, then W3 (although a separate world for Popper) 
crosses lines with both. That is, objects from W3 transcend the mere subjective, and become either 
objective via physical incarnations, or quasi-objective (e.g., mathematical models). Popper gives the 
example of the Bible: W1 objects are the many different copies and editions of the one book that we 
call the Bible, which is a W3 object. In other words, the Bible as a W3 object does not exist in a 
 In the 1960's, both Popper and Habermas were involved in the so-called 'Positivismusstreit' (positivist dispute) and 83
were divided on the basis of irreconcilable differences. This turned on different interpretations of sociology, and as we 
will see, Habermas is mostly concerned with the sociological repercussions of Popper's three world theory. See also The 
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (Adorno, 1976). Jeremy Shearmur, former assistant to Popper, has argued that 
the differences between Popper and Habermas can be reconciled to some degree if we understand them as "shar[ing] a 
perspective drawn from the Kantian theme of objectivity as intersubjectivity" (1996, p. 165; italics mine).
 See also Popper's Objective Knowledge (1972). Arguably, his theory is perhaps best known from his Tanner lectures, 84
delivered at The University of Michigan on April 7, 1978, entitled “Three Worlds by Karl Popper - The Tanner Lecture 
on Human Values.”
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physical sense: only W1 bibles do. Thus, Popper concludes that most though not of all W3 objects 
will be embodied or physically realised via W1 physical objects (1972, p. 145). 
 Popper’s world theory can be seen as an attempt to bring the subjective world into the objec-
tive world. This is contrary to the view Habermas develops since he insists that he does not posit the 
subjective and social world as “partial regions of one objective world" (TOCA, p. 77): both con-
cepts of subjective and social worlds are merely "analogous" to the concept of an objective world. 
Habermas writes: 
The lived experiences that S expresses in expressive speech acts (prototypically avowals 
and revelations) should no more be understood as a particular class of entities (or inner 
episodes) than should the norms that, trough regulative speech acts (prototypically com-
mands and promises), legitimate an interpersonal relationship established between S and H 
(TOCA, p. 77). 
Habermas’s ontological theory is an attempt to salvage both a subjective world and an intersubjec-
tive world from the dominating force of objectification via teleological and strategic action. Thus, 
Habermas can be understood as being primarily concerned with methodology, and  with the preser-
vation of different types of methodology. As a sociologist, Habermas witnessed the gap between 
two different types of sociological research. The first type was based on the work of August Compte 
(1798-1857) and his positivist followers, who argued that social phenomena could be subjected to 
observable natural laws. This view adopted an external or objective perspective on the production 
of social order, seeing it as a quasi-natural process that could be observed in its empirical regulari-
ties, and that could be explained by means of “nomological or nomothetic hypotheses” (Cooke, 
2011, p. 289). The second type of sociological methodology was based on the work of Dilthey, who 
argued for an interpretive and hermeneutic approach to social phenomena. This view adopted an 
internal or subjective perspective on the production of social order, viewing it as a “meaningfully 
structured reality for social agents that should be interpreted in terms of intentional actions" (Cooke, 
2011, p. 289). Intention for Dilthey, understood as subjective meaning, was a “sociological primi-
tive” and an irreducible element of sociological analysis (ibid., p. 290).  
 From this follows that, since human action has an intentional or subjective component, it is 
therefore always possible to ask what the actors (or agents) intended or meant. We do not just have 
to rely on the observation of behaviour. Thus the sociological methodology shifted from being 
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nomological — or we could even say monological — to dialogical, that is, to dialogue between a 
speaker and a hearer whereby the hearer has the ability to listen to and question the speaker.  
 Here then is an important difference between the data of the different epistemic or object 
domains. On my view, a datum will be anything "given" in each of the different worlds. Thus, I re-
gard the different worlds in Habermas’s ontological model as (object) domains, i.e. areas of experi-
ence that provide us with data. The crux is that we can distinguish between different data, and we 
can do so by pointing them to the right domain. For instance, intersubjective data — belonging to 
an intersubjective object domain — should not be “mined” or accessed by means of objective 
methodologies, but rather through the intersubjective methodology of dialogue, aimed at mutual 
understanding. Objective data, on the other hand, can be gathered using scientific methods taken 
from the natural sciences. To the extent that social phenomena have objective aspects these methods 
are useful to arrive at quantitative data. However, as Dilthey’s hermeneutic approach shows, social 
actors cannot just be treated as objects: they are also subjects, or persons. Meaning as such is not 
present in the objective world, but only in the subjective world. However, a further feature is that it 
can be intersubjectively shared, between different subjects, through communicative actions that es-
tablish normative frameworks.  
 Besides being an heir to Dilthey’s project, Habermas’s ontology must also be seen as a re-
sponse to Kantian ontology. The latter was itself a product of a “turn to the subject,” going beyond 
Cartesian metaphysics, which provided a basal distinction between two differing realities, namely 
subject and object (Azeri, 2010, p. 269). This distinction, in essence, was an epistemological one: 
the subject is known from within, by the subject, while the objective world is known externally, 
through or by way of the subject. Objective knowledge on the Cartesian view was constituted by a 
correspondence between the objective world and a subjective representation of it. However, Kant 
admitted that subjective reality requires objective reality for being real, viz., that subjectivity is im-
possible without objectivity (Azeri, 2010, p. 269). However, he also understood that objectivity is 
equally constituted by the knowing self. This led Kant to some novel distinctions. Firstly, the dis-
tinction between a phenomenal aspect of outer reality, that is outer reality as it appears to an epis-
temological subject, and a noumenal reality, to be found outside the boundaries of subjective expe-
rience. Secondly, the distinction between an empirical self and transcendental self as "two distinct 
modes or forms of subject" (Azeri, p. 271). Habermas writes that, here, "the subject relates to itself 
at the same time as it knows its objects [and thusly] encounters itself in the double position of being 
both a single empirical entity in the world and as the transcendental subject facing the world as a 
whole" (Habermas, 1991, p. 218). That is, the transcendental subject relates to itself as the con-
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sciousness of the existence of the empirical self. The latter, perceiving the world of objects, be-
comes object to itself. Rather than merely adopting the two-fold subject-object classification, 
Habermas argued for a three-fold classification, viz., adding the relationship between subjects, es-
tablished by illocutionary acts, thereby transcending Kantian ontology. Thus, Habermas critically 
wrote: 
Between these two [sic] positionings of the subject there is no space left for the symbolical-
ly prestructured, linguistically constituted domains of culture, society and socialised indi-
viduals… What is constitutive [i.e., for reaching understanding about the world] is the rela-
tion of an ego to an alter ego, of simultaneous and equal origin. Between the two, the space 
opens up for an intersubjectively shared life world; communicating parties are situated 
within the horizons of this lifeworld when they refer to objects or states of affairs in the 
world (Habermas, 1991, p. 218). 
The upshot of this was, according to Barbara Fultern, the English translator of Habermas’s Truth 
and Justification (2003), that Kant’s necessary subjective conditions of objective experience were 
transformed and given the “quasi-transcendental” role of intersubjective conditions of linguistic in-
terpretation and communication (Habermas, 2003, p. xii). Thus Habermas's Kantian pragmatism 
offered an "intersubjectivist theoretical framework that avoid[ed] the pitfalls of both objectivism 
and subjectivism" (Habermas, ibid., p. viii). 
 This idea, that the subjective and social world are merely analogous to the objective world, 
has been criticised by Uwe Steinhoff, author of The Philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (2009).  85
Steinhoff argues that if the three worlds are indeed different worlds we could “assume that the ob-
jects of one world could hardly have an impact on objects of the other” (2009, p. 44). This is how-
ever counterfactual, and Steinhoff presents us with two such examples.  
 Firstly, with chemical drugs (i.e., objects) we can influence feelings and subjective states. 
Hence, the objective world impacts the subjective world. Secondly, the intersubjective world of 
norms can influence the objective world, as when, for example, the physical movement of cars is 
regulated by the norms of traffic rules. This leads Steinhoff to conclude that a "legal norm is just as 
much a part of the objective world as a stone and an emotional impulse" (ibid., p. 44).  
 Habermas similarly calls the validity claims of normative rightness and subjective truthfulness truth-analogous. This 85
idea as well has  been criticised by Joseph Heath (2001). 
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 Presumably, we can add to Steinhoff's critique some edifying examples of the other relation-
ships. For instance, my subjective feelings set the intention for particular changes to the objective 
world: e.g. I am angry with my neighbour and set out to kill him. Thus, the subjective world influ-
ences the objective world. Similarly, the objective world sets constraints to, for instance, what kind 
of traffic rules we can normatively decide upon.  
 Thus the argument runs that, if the objective world can influence the two other worlds, and 
they in turn can influence the objective world, then surely these three worlds should be seen as dif-
ferent sectors of the same world. Moreover, Steinhoff extends his critique by adding that we can 
equally state true or false propositions about the existence of personal feelings and social norms, as 
we can about physical objects. Given that Habermas defines the objective world as “the correlate of 
the totality of true propositions” (also quoted in Steinhoff, 2009, p. 44), this would imply that per-
sonal feelings and social norms equally belong to the objective world. 
 In response to Steinhoff, we do not need to argue that, because the data from the subjective 
and social world are different from those of the objective world — for instance, feelings are qualita-
tively different from the neurological processes that support them — they therefore must be solely 
non-objective. By insisting that those two worlds are analogous to the objective world, Habermas 
neither denies that they aren’t part of the objective world, nor affirms that there are indeed three ful-
ly independent and differing worlds. As I have made clear, Habermas does not at all deny that we 
can make propositional statements about all three worlds. One way out is that we could grant that, 
ontologically, there is only one world, but that epistemologically there are three different worlds. 
That is, when it comes to investigating that one objective reality there are in fact three distinct ways 
of doing so. These thruways are provided for by Habermas’s epistemological model. On such a 
view, Habermas’s epistemological model would take primacy over the ontological model (see 
infra). 
3.4.2. The Epistemological Model 
Habermas also derives from his palimpsest an epistemological model ("how can I know it”). Ac-
cording to this model, the subject engages with each of the three different “worlds” by means of 
three different basic attitudes, i.e., an objectivating attitude, a norm-conformative attitude, and an 
expressive attitude. I call this model epistemological because it describes how subjects relate to — 
and come to know — each of the different object domains (i.e., each of the three different types of 
“world"). For instance, Peter Checkland reminds us of the Kantian idea "that we have no access to 
what the world is, to ontology, [but] only to descriptions of the world (some of which may survive 
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severe tests), that is to say, to epistemology" (1983, p. 671; in part also quoted in Mingers, 2006, p. 
6). Thus, since epistemology drives ontology — in the sense that how we know sets the conditions 
for what we know —, Habermas's ontological model should be understood in light of the epistemo-
logical one.   86
 Firstly, the objectivating attitude is the attitude taken by a third-person observer. It allows us 
to speak of an "it" (and "its"). This epistemological attitude takes any datum, from any of the specif-
ic domains (i.e., subjective, intersubjective, and objective data), and turns it into an "it." For in-
stance, one can also take an objective attitude towards the social world. Habermas writes: 
To be sure, from the objectivating point of view of the sociologist-observer there “really” 
are normative expectations, practices, habits, institutions, and regulations of all sorts “in the 
world” in addition to physical things and mental states (McCarthy, Regh, et al., 2001, p. 
31). 
That is, seen from the third-person or analytical perspective of the sociologist, these data appear to 
be objective. He writes: 
In normatively regulated actions the actor, entering into an interpersonal [i.e., intersubjec-
tive] relation, takes up a relation to something in the social world. An actor's behaviour is 
subjectively "right" (in the sense of normative rightness) if he sincerely believes himself to 
be following an existing norm of action; his behaviour is objectively right if the norm in 
question is in fact regarded as justified among those to whom it applies (TOCA, p. 104). 
Secondly, the norm-conformative attitude is the attitude taken by a second-person subject, permit-
ting us to speak of a "you" (and a “we"). The illocutionary force behind the communication between 
subjects creates a normative background of a "culturally ingrained pre-understanding" against 
which speech acts are to be held (TOCA, p. 100). We should point out here that this shared back-
ground will have a certain "range." In other words, there will equally be a pre-understanding about 
 Peter Checkland reminds us "that we have no access to what the world is, to ontology, [but] only to descriptions of 86
the world (some of which may survive severe tests), that is to say, to epistemology" (1983, p. 671; in part also quoted in 
Mingers, 2006, p. 6). On the basis of this Kantian idea, Checkland concludes that we should “never say of something in 
the world that it is x, but rather that it may be described as x,” which he admits would be a tedious undertaking (ibidem, 
p. 671).
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the kind of community to which these rules apply. For instance, a Catholic Christian will understand 
how Catholic Christian rules apply to him and to his community of peers.  
 Finally, the expressive attitude is the attitude taken by a first-person subject, or simply "I," 
reporting on "subjective experiences" (TOCA, p. 99). Again, similar to the example of the objective 
attitude, we can take an expressive attitude towards the three different worlds.  
 To conclude, if indeed epistemology drives ontology, and if we can distinguish three radical-
ly different epistemologies for investigating ourselves, others, and the world, then it would not be 
farfetched to conclude that, in effect, we also end up with a tripartite ontology. As epistemological 
beings we have no other way to approach the world then through our inherent capacities: even if, 
objectively seen, there is only one world, this knowledge itself is only based on one out of three 
functions of the human being. 
  
3.4.3. The Formal-Pragmatic Model 
Applying the three basic attitudes to the three worlds — i.e. combining the epistemological model 
with the ontological one — Habermas ends up with nine so-called formal-pragmatic relations 
(TOCA, p. 237). I will therefore call this model formal-pragmatic. 
Table 2: The Formal-Pragmatic Model. 
To easily represent these nine relationships, I suggest we make use of a formal shorthand: a formula 
S R O, where S represents the subject or speaker, R establishes the relation with reality, and O de-
notes the object domain or world. Applying the shorthand, we can differentiate between three types 
of relationship (R), namely a cognitive relationship (cog), a norm-confirmative relationship (norm), 
 Worlds 1. Objective 2. Social 3. Subjective 
Basic Atti-
tudes
1.Objectivating Cognitive-Instrumental Relation Cognitive-Strategic 
Relation




Moral-aesthetic relation to a non-
objectivated environment
Obligatory relation Censorious relation to 
self
3. Expressive Presentation of self Sensual-spontaneous 
relation to self
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and an expressive relationship (exp). We then derive the following notations: Rcog, Rnorm, and Rexp.  87
Similarly, we can make subdivisions in the object domains, such as Osub, Osoc, and Oobj, which rep-
resent the object domains of, respectively, the subjective world (sub), the social world (soc), and the 
objective world (obj). Our new notation allows for the following presentation of the formal-prag-
matic model: 
Table 3: The Formal-Pragmatic Model in shorthand. 
Habermas does not systematically examine each of the different formal-pragmatic relations in 
TOCA. Instead he writes: “I shall content myself with intuitive indications of characteristic forms 
of expression, which can serve as illustrations" (TOCA, p. 236).  88
S Rcog Oobj: The cognitive-instrumental relation is characterised by "assertions, instrumental actions, 
observations, etc” (TCA, p. 236). It is the result of an objective or third-person attitude towards the 
outer world. Hence, this will generate descriptive beliefs about the world. Such descriptions are also 
action-oriented: they allow us to take action in the world, and transform the world (hence instru-
mental). 
S Rcog Osoc: The cognitive-strategic relation is exemplified by "social actions" of the purposive-ra-
tional type. In other words, S treats the actors within the social system as other objects, in analogy 
to the objects of the objective world. From this follows that beliefs generated by this relationship 
will reflect this attitude. Although the cognitive-strategic relation is provided for by the epistemo-
logical model, and can be empirically verified, it is clear that this type of relationship denies the es-
sence of the intersubjective domain. While the objective world is best engaged through nomological 
Basic Attitudes Objective World Intersubjective World Subjective World
Cognitive S Rcog Oobj S Rcog Osoc S Rcog Osubj
Normative S Rnorm Oobj S Rnorm Osoc S Rnorm Osubj
Expressive S Rexp Oobj S Rexp Osoc S Rexp Osubj
 Alternatively, we could also use the shorthand 1-p for first-person claims, 2-p for second-person claims, and 3-p for 87
third-person claims. 
 I have listed these illustrations in Addendum A to my dissertation, and I shall not further discuss them here. 88
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or monological methods, the intersubjective world is best engaged through dialogical methods (see 
supra). 
S Rcog Osubj: An objectivistic relationship to one's self is "illustrated by certain theories; for instance, 
of empiricist psychology or utilitarian ethics” (ibid., p. 236). I would suggest — and I will not thor-
oughly belabour the point — that certain religious practices will foster an objective attitude towards 
one self in order to separate one's identity from self-absorbed egoic structures of consciousness. 
S Rnorm Oobj: Habermas writes: "The phenomena that exemplify a moral-practical, a 'fraternal' rela-
tionship with nature are the least clear, if one does not wish to have recourse to mystically inspired 
traditions or to taboos (such as vegetarian aversions), to the anthropomorphising treatment of ani-
mals, and so on” (ibid., p. 236). 
S Rnorm Osoc: The obligatory relation is illustrated by normatively regulated actions. 
S Rnorm Osubj: A censorious relationship to one's self can be illustrated by superego phenomena such 
as guilt feelings, as well as by defense reactions. 
S Rexp Oobj: An aesthetic relation to a non-objectivated environment is exemplified by works of art, 
phenomena of style in general, but also by theories, for example, in which a morphological way of 
looking at nature finds expression. 
S Rexp Osoc: The relationship to the self is exemplified by social actions of the dramaturgical or self-
presenting type. 
S Rexp Osubj: A sensuous-spontaneous relationship to one's self can be found in "affective expres-
sions, libidinal stirrings, creative performances, etc.” 
3.4.4. The Communicative Model 
Habermas also argues that speech itself, i.e., language as a communicative medium, serves three 
different functions: i.e., a representative, expressive, and interactive function. He states that these tie 
in with “three principal lines of research,” which he considers crucial to his conception of universal 
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pragmatics.  The representative function of language (1) serves to represent states of affairs (or 89
something the speaker encounters in 'the' world). This type of research (i.e., objective research) at-
tempts “an analysis of the universal and necessary (that is, not context-specific and variable) condi-
tions for making statements about “the” world” (McCarthy, 1985, p. 281). The ability or compe-
tence to use language representatively is seen as a precondition for the developmental ability to dis-
tinguish between a public world (Ger.: Sein: being, that which really is), and a private world (Ger.: 
Schein; illusion, that which merely seems to be). The latter ability –- and the distinction therein –- is 
therefore fundamental to the definition of any speech situation (McCarthy, ibid., p. 281). From this 
we can infer that a close relationship exists between the developmental capacities of the human be-
ing, and the functions of speech: linguistic competence is a prerequisite for cognitive capacity.  
 The expressive function (2) serves to express the intentions (or subjective experiences) of 
the speaker and subject. This type of research involves “an analysis of the universal and necessary 
conditions for expressing the intentional experiences of one’s “own” world, of transparently repre-
senting one’s on subjectivity”. Here, (what I call) expressive competence, or the competence to use 
language expressively, is seen as “a precondition of the ability to make a second distinction that is 
fundamental to the definition of any speech situation: the distinction between the individuated self 
(Ger.: Wesen; essence) and the various utterances, expressions and actions in which it appears 
(Ger.: Erscheinung; appearance)” (McCarthy, ibid., p. 281).  90
 The interactive function (3) serves to establish relations (of mutual understanding) with an 
addressee. Lastly, this type of research involves “an analysis of the universal and necessary condi-
tion for linguistically establishing the interpersonal relations that constitute “our” world, a shared 
life-world based on the reciprocity of expectations” (McCarthy, ibid., p. 281). Similarly, (what I 
call) interactive competence, or the competence to use language interactively, is seen as “a precon-
dition of the ability to mark a third distinction fundamental to the definition of any speech situation: 
the distinction between what is (Sein) and what ought to be (Sollen)” (McCarthy, ibid.). 
 It is clear that these pragmatic functions of speech reflect the different relations to reality, 
and, by extension, the formal-pragmatic relations discussed earlier. According to Habermas, these 
 Note that the three functions correspond to our by now familiar categories of subjective, objective, and intersubjective 89
functions.
 Arguably, the capacity to make this distinction, and then express it through speech, is also a cognitive function, sug90 -
gesting that also the second function of speech is premised on cognitive capacities. We can infer from this that commu-
nicative action, in general, is cognitively involved. This warrants a distinction between experience proper, and the ex-
pression of an experience. We can however go both ways: we can either give primacy to non-reflected experience, or 
argue that all experience that makes a difference is also always reflected experience. A linguistically oriented theory 
would undoubtedly favour the latter interpretation.
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three functions intersect and are focused in linguistic expressions. Hence the idea that the three 
functions are simultaneously present in speech acts. He writes: 
Three rays of meaning intersect and are focused in linguistic expressions. What the speaker 
wants to say with the expression is connected with what is literally said in it, as well as with 
the action that what is said should be understood as. There arises a threefold relationship 
between the meaning of a linguistic expression and what is intended or meant (Gemeinten) 
by it, what is said in it, and the way it is used in the speech act. Normally, the linguistic 
meaning is not exhausted by any one of these three relations (Habermas, 1992, p. 58). 
Habermas further notes that each of the pragmatic functions of speech have been intuited by three 
different theories that have dominated the discourse on meaning in the past: namely, (a) intentional-
istic semantics, (b) formal semantics, and the (c) use-theory of meaning. However, he credits Bühler 
for bringing these three intuitions together in a threefold functional scheme (ibid., p. 57). Thus, 
Habermas writes: 
Each of the three competing theories of meaning takes up exactly one aspect of the process 
of achieving mutual understanding of an utterance. They seek to explicate the meaning of a 
linguistic expression either from the perspective of what is meant (as intended meaning), or 
from the perspective of what is said (literal meaning), or from the perspective of use (as ut-
terance meaning) (Habermas, 1992, p. 64). 
Each theory claimed that it could explain the comprehensibility of linguistic expressions through 
just one of these relations, which is why, in Habermas view, they were inherently flawed. In other 
words, the problem was not so much with what each theory presented, as each contained a kernel of 
truth, but rather with their separate insistences that their truth was the whole truth. For this reason, 
Habermas designed his theory of meaning to take into account a more complete or integral picture.  
3.5. Validity Claims 
Habermas’s cognitive architecture finds it culmination in his concept of validity claims. He states 
that in uttering a sentence we necessarily issue certain claims concerning the validity of what we are 
saying. These validity claims can be explicated in terms of the precious models:  
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(1) we make claims about the truth of what we say in relation to the objective world (i.e., objective 
truth); 
(2) we make claims about the legitimacy of our speech acts in relation to the shared values and 
norms of our social life world (i.e., normative or intersubjective rightness);  
(3) we make claims about our sincerity concerning our own intentions and feelings (i.e., subjective 
truthfulness).  
(4) in addition — but not exhaustively so — we make claims that what we say is comprehensible 
(i.e., that we are uttering a grammatically well-formed sentence).  
Thus in uttering a sentence, the speaker claims that what he states is true (or, if no statement is 
made, that the existential presuppositions of his utterance’s propositional content are fulfilled); that 
his manifest expression of intentions is truthful (or veracious; Ger.: wahrhaftig); and that his utter-
ance (or speech act) itself is right or appropriate (Ger.: richtig/angemessen) in relation to a recog-
nised normative context (or that the normative context it satisfies is itself legitimate). Thus, every 
speech act, at least implicitly, claims validity of four different types: (1) truth, (2) truthfulness, (3) 
rightness, and (4) comprehensibility. Of these four, the claim to comprehensibility is the only one 
that is “language-immanent,” as the other claims place the speaker’s utterance in relation to “extra-
linguistic orders of reality,” i.e. different worlds or object domains (McCarthy, 1984, pp. 
280-282).   91
 Making validity claims “amounts to incurring a commitment to provide reasons for the ac-
ceptability of the utterance” (Heath, 1998, p. 23). For Habermas, it is the giving of reasons — i.e., 
reasons-for and reasons-against — that ultimately characterises the rationality of our speech acts: it 
is the central condition for reaching (mutual) understanding that is free of coercion. McCarthy also 
explains that the key the notion of mutual understanding is this possibility of “using reasons or 
grounds to gain intersubjective recognition for criticisable validity claims” (McCarthy, 1984, p. xx; 
italics his). In short, we understand a speech act if we know what makes it acceptable (Honneth, 
1992). This demand for reasons — or the normative or intersubjective claim of rationality — is at 
the core of Habermas’s so-called “post-metaphysical project.” This project aims to replace the cen-
trality of ontological claims with the demand for reasons.  
 McCarthy reminds us that propositional content need not actually be asserted in every speech act. In non-constative 91
speech acts, propositional content is merely “mentioned”. With this unasserted proposition, the speaker still claims that 
existential presuppositions are fulfilled. If need be, we can subsequently transform an unasserted or mentioned proposi-
tion into an asserted proposition by making it the propositional content of a (follow-up) constative speech act. 
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 Communicative rationality is only possible if the communicating actors are able to make 
distinctions between those three validity claims.  Understanding of the speech act requires from the 92
hearer that he or she has knowledge of “the type of reasons that could be offered in support of 
it” (Heath, ibid., p. 23). Each of the different validity claims can be contested (i.e., in epistemic peer 
conflict), and subsequently defended, by giving good reasons in argumentation. Each dimension 
comes with its own modes of investigation, which present “possibilities of hypothetically examin-
ing the truth of statements, the rightness of actions and norms, or the authenticity of 
expressions” (McCarthy, 1984, xiii). Thus the hearer-as-critic can reject a claim (or speech act) 
from the speaker by taking issue with at least one of these validity claims, and issuing a ‘no’. This 
‘no’ from the critic expresses the claim that the original utterance is not in agreement with either 
“our world of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations, or with the world of existing states of 
affairs, or with the speaker’s own world of subjective” (Habermas, TOCA, p. 308; italics his). The 
critic can then qualify his or her ‘no’ by saying that the utterance is, respectively, wrong (i.e., nor-
matively wrong), untrue, or insincere. Similarly, the speaker can try to defend his speech act by giv-
ing reasons that confirm his ‘yes’, and confirm that the claim is either right, true, or sincere. Thus 
Habermas writes: 
With their illocutionary acts, speaker and hearer raise validity claims and solicit their 
recognition. But this recognition need not follow irrationally, because the validity claims 
have a cognitive character and can be tested.… In the final analysis, the speaker can have 
an illocutionary effect on the hearer (and vice versa) because the speech-act-typical obliga-
tions are tied to cognitively testable validity claims that is, because the reciprocal bonds 
have a rational basis. The engaged speaker normally connects the specific sense in which he 
wants to take up an interpersonal relation with a thematically stresses validity claim 
(Habermas, 1979, p. 63). 
Habermas mentions that the validity claims have a “cognitive character,” and that they can therefore 
be tested. From this follows, that not just the propositional content of an utterance can be tested, but 
that we can also test whether the speaker is speaking truthfully, or whether what her she says fits the 
 Habermas distinguishes between more than these three validity claims; however, he consistently singles out these 92
three validity claims as the necessary conditions for communicatively achieved agreement, i.e. for communicative ac-
tion. Habermas states: “Communicatively achieved agreement is measured against exactly three criticisable validity 
claims” (TOCA, p. 308). Thus, in strategic action, we do not find communicative rationality, but rather “instrumental 
rationality” (ibid., p. 14). 
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normative context. That is, we can test both since both exhibit a cognitive character. If this is cor-
rect, then each of the different claims can be redeemed using our cognitive and objectifying capaci-
ty (or third person perspective), and we can make secondary propositions that claim truth. This 
would allow me to state: “It is true that I speak truthfully when I state p.” In this case, the truth 
claim is not attached to the proposition that p, but to the claim that I speak truthfully.  
 However, crucially, the sincerity of my claims can only be measured against conditions of 
subjective truthfulness, and not against the conditions of objective truth. Otherwise we are incurring 
a performative contradiction. In other words, whether or not an utterance fulfils its representational 
function will be measured against truth conditions; whether or not a speech act fulfils its expressive 
function will be measured against conditions of subjective truthfulness; whether or not a speech act 
fulfils its interactive function will be measured against normative rightness. If indeed those  condi-
tions are fulfilled, then the inherent validity claims of the speech act will be redeemed. If the condi-
tions for all three validity claims are fulfilled we end up with what I will call a trifecta. The concept 
of a trifecta implies trivially a triadic structure, but more importantly the idea that all three elements 
are necessarily present.  Thus, for Habermas, the ideal speech act is a trifecta. He adds that mutual 93
understanding — the prerequisite for mutual agreement and consensus — is impossible if the par-
ticipants to the debate continuously confuse the three validity claims. In his view, the world reli-
gions typically fall prey to this trap, and blend together these three aspects in their metaphysical 
worldviews (TOCA, p. 202f). With Habermas we can conclude that the coordination of worldview 
claims will therefore depend on understanding this tripartite nature of speech acts.  
3.6. Conclusion 
For my conclusion to this chapter, I will reflect on the previous chapters from the point of view of 
the above analysis of Habermas’s models. Thus I stated previously that religious traditions offer 
worldviews, and that such worldviews consist of answers to seven types of philosophical questions 
(Chapter 1). These answers form different types of claims — i.e., descriptive, normative, and prac-
tical claims — , which can be understood as different types of speech acts. Each type of speech act 
will (a) have conditions for acceptability, as well as (b) form incompatibles when mutual acceptance 
of claims within that type leads to absurdity. Habermas showed that inherent within speech acts are 
in fact three different types of relationships to three different worlds. These relationships are ex-
pressed in speech through three different functions which express nine formal-pragmatic relations. 
 Or multiples of three, when combined with two or three other models.93
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Finally, we understand a speech act — or a worldview claim in the context I have presented — if we 
know what makes it acceptable. Each of the different types of relationships will raise a particular 
validity claim: truth, truthfulness, and rightness. From this follows that worldview claims, in solar 
as they can be categorised as descriptive, normative and practical claims, will raise different validi-
ty claims. While descriptive claims claim truth, and are objective, normative claims claim rightness 
and are intersubjective.  
 If this view is correct so far, then we have two issues left: (1) how do we understand practi-
cal claims (i.e., courses of action) on this account, and (2) how do we understand subjective claims. 
In order to be able to answer these questions we need to have another look at Habermas’s formal-
pragmatic model. 
Table 4: The Formal-Pragmatic Model (Revisited). 
Concerning practical claims, or courses of action in the objective realm, Habermas writes that an 
objective attitude to the objective world generates descriptions that are also action-oriented: they 
allow us to take action in the world, and transform the world (hence instrumental). However, cour-
ses of action are not descriptive but prescriptive, i.e., pertain to the prescriptive relationship of the 
subject to the world. From this we can conclude two things. Firstly, what redeems such claims is 
whether they effect the objective world as stated. The validity claim here is not the same as objec-
tive truth, but is rather something like felicitousness. Secondly, courses of action can also raise a 
normative validity claim. If a course of action suggests that we should drive on the left then this 
prescriptive course of action would only be right, i.e., fulfil its claim of rightness, within the context 
of for instance British accepted traffic rules, but not within the context of European accepted rules. 
 Worlds 1. Objective 2. Social 3. Subjective 
Basic Atti-
tudes
1.Objectivating Cognitive-Instrumental Relation Cognitive-Strategic 
Relation




Moral-aesthetic relation to a non-
objectivated environment
Obligatory relation Censorious relation to 
self
3. Expressive Presentation of self Sensual-spontaneous 
relation to self
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In the latter context such course of action would be wrong. This is therefore an expression of the 
norm-confirmative attitude to the objective world.  
 Subjective claims, reporting on the subjective world, are beholden to the validity claim of 
truthfulness, and are expressed through the expressive attitude. The expressive attitude can be found 
within our various definitions of worldview. Firstly, Apostel expresses the idea that the “world” of a 
worldview is the broadest environment that is “cognitively, practically and emotionally 
relevant” (Apostel, 1994, p. 8; see supra). While emotional relevance is an expression of sincerity 
and authenticity, i.e., understood as resonance with the self, it is not immediate clear how this is ex-
pressed in a worldview. Cognitive and practical relevance are easily understood in terms of descrip-
tive and practical claims. The expressive attitude suggests that I express the subjective contents of 
my mind: such expressive claims are acceptable if they do indeed express my subjective content. 
Secondly, Smart argues that a worldview has seven dimensions, one of which is the experiential and 
emotional dimension. He writes: 
And it is obvious that the emotions and experiences of men and women are the food on 
which the other dimensions of religion feed: ritual without feeling is cold, doctrines without 
awe or compassion are dry, and myths which do not move hearers are feeble (Smart, 1998, 
p. 14)
Thus, the assumption here is that the emotional or experiential dimension feeds all other dimensions 
— and Smart mentions here the ritual (i.e., pragmatic), doctrinal, and mythical dimension. The ex-
periential  dimension determines how a subject  interprets  all  other dimensions,  and appropriates 
them. In other words, it is the subject who experiences each and every object domain. 
For instance, take the proposition “The rose is red.” As a proposition it makes a reference to 
something out there in the objective world: there is a rose, and its colour is red.  The propositional 94
content is justified by methods that check whether there is indeed a rose, and that the rose is red. 
These methods involve interacting with the objective world, and serve to fulfil the validity claim of 
truth. Particularly, these methodologies do not require communication as such, that is, dialogue with 
other people. However, the giving of reasons for this claim will be an intersubjective act as this will 
require an addressee or listener, and therefore another subject. Similarly, the terms rose and red are 
intersubjectively agreed upon conventions, and such conventions are not of the objective world per 
se. That there is a rose is a feature of the objective world, but that the rose is a rose is a feature of 
 I.e., in the sense that the rose reflects a certain light spectrum.94
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the intersubjective world, and of communicative understanding inherent in all language: we come to 
understand that the rose is a rose by communicating and interacting with others. The interpretation 
of a rose as a rose, and red as red, depends on a meaning-giving subject. The convention, on the 
other hand, depends on mutual understanding within a community of subjects. Therefore, to come 
to “know” that there is a red rose requires an objective methodology as well as an intersubjective 
methodology. We need to be educated — through conventions and linguistic norms — of what it 
means to see a red rose. This understanding then retreats to the background and becomes a back-
ground understanding: we do not have to bring this up again, unless communication misfires, when 
for example different worldviews meet each other.   95
 Still, nothing here, however, expresses how I feel about the rose, or what type of images, 
symbols, and so on, the rose will evoke within my subjective consciousness. Such feelings and im-
ages might be completely idiosyncratic, and evoke feelings of fear, hatred, sense of loss, and so on. 
Therefore, how descriptive claims are interpreted by the individual depends on her own subjective 
experiences. This is different from a norm-conformative attitude where normative claims describe 
what kind of subjective experiences should be evoked in the individual. Such normative claims are 
independent of what the individual in fact experiences. The crucial aspect of subjective experience 
is, however, that it can only be accessed through self-analysis, self-reporting, and so on. Similarly, 
we can only access the intersubjective world through dialogue, and we can only access the objec-
tive world through observation. I will call these means epistemic methodologies or competences. 
They allow us to “mine” or examine the different worlds for data: we mine for subjective data 
through self-analysis, we mine for intersubjective data through dialogue with others, and we mine 
the objective world through observation. On this view, the subject can entertain three epistemic re-
lationships to herself, that is, a subjective, intersubjective, and objective relationship. In other 
words, she can look at the content of her heart and mind, she can communicate with others, and she 
can observe the objective world. The subject can also maintain two epistemic relationships to oth-
ers, through dialogue and observation, but she loses self-analysis as a tool for mining data. Finally, 
she can entertain an objective relationship with the objective world through observation, but she 
loses access to self-analysis and dialogue as tools for mining data. Thus, the subject wields epis-
temic powers, but such powers diminish in the direction from self, to others, to the environment. 
Therefore, on this basis we can create a further model, which I will call the Natural Model of Epis-
temic Methodologies (see Table 5). Although this model is different from Habermas’s model of 
formal-pragmatic relationship, presented in Table 3, it does not however diminish it. In Habermas’s 
 Private languages are no exception: they are built upon conventions with oneself.95
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model there is no forced link between a certain relationship to reality, and its respective world do-
main: epistemology is separate from ontology. Although it does not make sense to mine the objec-
tive domain through self-analysis, we can however report on how we feel about the objective envi-
ronment, i.e., our idiosyncratic being-in-the-world, or about the intersubjective world. 
Table 5: The Natural Model of Epistemic Methodologies. 
The term Natural Model expresses the idea that the epistemic relationships represented here are 
natural relationships. Thus, there is a natural relationship between the expressive attitude and the 
subjective object domain. On this view, the objective and subjective world are in fact contained 
within the subjective world of the subject (i.e., are internal to), and it is this fact that allows the sub-
ject to have an expressive relationship with the objective and social world. However, it is also for-
mally possible to have supernatural relationships, which will fill in the blanks in the above model. 
The natural epistemic powers are a consequence of how the self is positioned in relationship to the 
three different worlds. The subject does not have direct access to other minds or to the world, what 
we could call the noumenal aspect of both others and the world. However, particularly in religious 
language, it has been reported that the self can merge with others, or with the environment. In such 
cases, the subject would acquire subjective access to the noumenal reality of the social and objec-
tive environment.  Similarly, the subject with supernatural epistemic powers would be able to es96 -
tablish communion, understood in terms of a dialogical relationship, with objective reality. I call 
these powers supernatural since they do not follow naturally from our epistemic capacities. How-
ever, I do not interpret these powers as ontological powers: rather my use of the term supernatural 
should be seen as a dialectic to the term natural. 
Basic Attitudes Objective World Intersubjective World Subjective World
Cognitive S Rcog Oobj S Rcog Osoc S Rcog Osubj
Normative — S Rnorm Osoc S Rnorm Osubj
Expressive — — S Rexp Osubj
 In such cases the relationship R transforms into a relationship of equality, expressed by =, so that we get S = O. 96
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4. George Lindbeck and The Nature of Doctrine 
4.1. Introduction 
In the current chapter, I will argue that the tripartite typology of validity claims is isomorphic to a 
theory of religious meaning developed by George Lindbeck. In The Nature of Doctrine (TND, 
1984), published in the same year as Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, Lindbeck de-
veloped a tripartite typology of different ways of understanding religious doctrines. While Haber-
mas integrated different approaches within social theory, Lindbeck formulated his typology on the 
basis of how religious doctrines were historically understood by a diversity of religious scholars and 
schools of thought. By arguing that Lindbeck’s typology is analogous, i.e., shares characteristics 
with Habermas’s cognitive architecture, in particular his communicative model and his concept of 
criticisable validity claims, I provide the means for applying the insights of the previous chapter to 
religious doctrines.  
 In particular, I will argue how the different validity claims relate to three different types of 
“religious claims,” that is, propositional, expressive, and normative claims. As Habermas has 
shown, these need not be distinct entities as such, since the trifecta of validity claims represents the 
deep structure of ordinary language, i.e., they are always already present in every speech act. Thus, 
while in my first few chapters I showed how religious worldviews consist of a variety of different 
types of doctrines — interrelated in a more or less coherent web of meaning — here I argue that 
“religious speech” always already exhibits three different functions. To do so, I will not only rely on 
Lindbeck’s understanding, but also show how representations of these three functions can be found 
within the literature on religious diversity, such as in the work of Julius Lipner, Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, John Hick, and Harold Netland. 
4.2. Lindbeck’s Tripartite Typology 
With The Nature of Doctrine (1984, 2009; TND), George Lindbeck set out to create a theory that 
could explain the possibility of doctrinal reconciliation between different partners in Christian ecu-
menical or intra-faith dialogue, without them having to change their doctrines in order to do so.  97
Since its publication, TND has been hailed as “one of the most influential works of academic theory 
to appear in English in the last fifty years" (Marshal in TND, p. vii). As a testimony to this, Lind-
beck has since been credited with introducing a new form of theology (i.e., post-liberal theology), 
as well as with establishing, together with Hans Frei and David Kelsey, a new theological move-
 Lindbeck specifically refers here to Christian dialogues between Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theolo97 -
gians. 
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ment known as the Yale school. In fact, Bruce Marshall reflects that Lindbeck's work seemed to 
promise a way forward for the whole of Christian theology, namely Catholic and Protestant alike 
(Marshall, ibid., p. viii). However, this is not to say that it did not also meet with ample criticism 
and conceptual resistance. But perhaps this equally testifies to its theological, and undoubtedly 
broader academic importance.  
 In TND, Lindbeck starts out by observing that participants to ecumenical dialogues have 
reported to be in "basic agreement" on a variety of topics, while at the same time continuing to hold 
to their historic and (once-divisive) convictions (TND, p. 1).  He writes that, seemingly, they felt 98
“compelled by the evidence, sometimes against their earlier inclinations, to conclude that positions 
that were once really opposed [were] now in fact reconcilable, even though these positions [re-
mained] in a significant sense identical to what they were before” (TND, p. 1).   99
 At first sight, this renewed position seems self-contradictory. However, Lindbeck objects 
and suggests that a proper response is not to deny the reality on the grounds that it seems impossi-
ble, but rather to seek to explain its possibility (TND, p. 1). The latter is precisely what he attempts 
to accomplish, namely to provide a convincing conceptual model that accounts for the possibility 
and purported fact of “doctrinal reconciliation without change.” Lindbeck goes about this by first 
examining how theologians and philosophers of religions, following the theological precept of fides 
quaerens intellectum, or faith seeking understanding, have hitherto understood both religion as well 
as religious doctrine. Classifying these into types, he distinguishes between: 
(1) a propositional-cognitive type,  
(2) an experiential-expressive type, and  
(3) a cultural-linguistic type.  
4.2.1. The Propositional-Cognitive Type 
Firstly, the propositional-cognitive type of theological theory “emphasizes the cognitive aspects of 
religion and stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or 
truth claims about objective realities” (TND, p. 2). On this view, religion is a matter of knowing 
 He references numerous sources that catalogued such dialogue proceedings (see Lindbeck, 2009, p. 12, note 1). He 98
also refers to an independent evaluation of some of these dialogues contained in “The Bilateral Consultations Between 
the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and Other Christian Communions: A Theological Review and Critique 
by the Study Committee Commissioned by the Board of Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of 
America” (1972), Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Association of America (1972), pp. 179-232.
 It should be clear that "remaining in a significant sense identical" is not saying the same as "without change."99
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truths about religious content — what Lindbeck calls the Divine — that can be expressed through 
clear and comprehensible statements (i.e., truth claims). The presupposition underlying this per-
spective is that there is a neat and correct fit between the concepts in our heads and the things out 
there. Lindbeck describes this as holding onto an "adequation" theory of truth, where truth amounts 
to adequation of an object with cognition (Knitter, 2005). He suggests that, historically, this ap-
proach has been taken on board by modern Anglo-American analytic philosophers who are occu-
pied with the "cognitive or informational meaningfulness of religious utterances” (TND, p. 2). On 
this outlook, religion has been conceived as similar to philosophy or even science. If this is correct, 
then it would follow that analytic philosophers of religion are most interested in applying the propo-
sitional-cognitive approach to address the problem of religious diversity. The propositional-cogni-
tive type of religion is isomorphic with the representative function of language, and with first-order 
worldview claims of the type of constatives and declaratives. This type of doctrine delivers clear 
ontological answers to worldview questions that can be expressed through truth claims. As Haber-
mas has shown, constative or representative speech is part and parcel of the deep structure of every 
speech act. This deep structure is embodied via the validity claim of propositional truth. 
4.2.2. The Experiential-Expressive Type 
Secondly, on an experiential-expressive view of doctrine and religion, a religious believer knows 
"the Divine" mainly through what she experiences, feels, or senses inside herself. Adherents to this 
view can still hold to the adequation theory of truth, Lindbeck believes, but when they do, they do 
so only for material objects, and not for matters of the Divine. He writes:  
[This view] interprets doctrines as non-informative and non-discursive symbols of inner 
feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations, [and] highlights the resemblances of religions 
to aesthetic enterprises (TND, p. 2). 
We can assume that, when Lindbeck writes that doctrines are “non-informative,” he means that they 
are non-propositional, and that when he writes that they are “non-discursive,” he means that they 
are “non-norm-conformative" (i.e., before they are intersubjectively shared). Lindbeck adds that 
historically this perspective has been adopted by liberal theologies which were influenced by conti-
nental developments that originated with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). This second view 
on religious doctrine equates with claims that fulfil the expressive function of language. Jeffrey 
Alexander (1991) summarises: 
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The third distinct mode of action is expressive, referring both to emotional and aesthetic 
statements. The claim put forward here is not truth, but ‘truthfulness’, sincerity and authen-
ticity in a subjective sense. The discourse that thematises this claim Habermas sometimes 
calls therapeutic and at other times aesthetics (Alexander, 1991, p. 54).  100
Such claims are measured against conditions of subjective truthfulness and authenticity. If these 
conditions of truthfulness and authenticity are met, the claim will have successfully fulfilled its 
function to express religious truth.  101
4.2.3. The Cultural-Linguistic Type 
Thirdly, on the cultural-linguistic view, religious claims and beliefs are conceived as "different id-
ioms for construing reality, expressing experience, and ordering life” (TND, pp. 33-34). Lindbeck 
writes: 
[This type] emphasise[s] neither the cognitive nor the experiential-expressive aspects of re-
ligion; rather, emphasis is placed on those aspects in which religions resemble languages 
together with their correlative forms of life, and are thus similar to cultures (insofar as these 
are understood semiotically as reality and value systems –- that is, as idioms for the con-
structing of reality and the living of life (TND, p. 4). 
In other words, religious doctrines are neither interpreted as expressive symbols, nor as truth claims, 
but rather as “communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action” (TND, p. 4). The 
cultural-linguistic type of religious doctrine expresses the interactive function of speech acts.  102
This means that claims will be measured against normative rightness, i.e., what the partners in dia-
logue consider to be normatively right. For a religious believer, the primary community of peers 
will be the home religion to which he or she belongs, both as an institution and as a religious faith. 
 For Habermas, the three validity claims are analogous to Plato’s the Good, True and Beautiful. Hence the expressive 100
function of language represents the Beautiful (i.e., aesthetics). Similarly, Habermas associates the expressive function 
with the work of Freud (i.e., therapeutic). 
 The reasons and evidence given for such claims will, by necessity, be self-referential, that is, refer back to the sub101 -
ject.
 See Habermas’s communicative model, supra.102
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If the conditions for normative rightness are met, then the inherent validity claim of religious doc-
trines of this type will be fulfilled. 
 Besides three pure types, Lindbeck also recognises the existence of hybrid theories. He 
mentions only one such hybrid, namely theories that regard both the propositional and the expres-
sive dimensions as religiously significant. Lindbeck mentions the work of Karl Rahner and Bernard 
Lonergan as examples. Lindbeck never names the hybrid himself. However, it seems intuitively 
proper to call it something like cognitive-experiential, or propositional-expressive. Although Lind-
beck mentions only one hybrid, logically four are possible, i.e., three hybrid pairs, with one hybrid 
triple consisting of the trifecta or integral of all three types taken together.  
 The existence of hybrids is analogous to the fact that speech acts raise several validity 
claims simultaneously, either implicitly, as is usually the case, or explicitly. As Habermas has point-
ed out, the de facto state of speech acts is that they can be situated simultaneously towards three dif-
ferent worlds, namely the world of objective states if affairs, our world of interpersonal relation-
ships, and my world of uniquely individual experiences. Thus, religious claims can be interpreted 
according to different types of religious language. This implies that the doctrines in question raise 
validity claims inherent within those types.  
 To do away with cumbersome language I suggest the use of a shorthand similar to the one 
used in chapter 3 when I discussed Habermas’s formal-pragmatic relationships. For instance, I sug-
gest the codes cog, exp, and norm to represent cognitive, expressive and normative language. With 
this code, we can categorise the hybrid pairs as cog-exp, cog-norm, and norm-exp, and the hybrid 
triple as cog-exp-norm — or simply int to denote the integral of the three. This allows us to rewrite 
the relationship S R O in terms of S Rcog O, S Rexp, S Rnorm O, and so on for each of the different 
types. Given that in normal speech, the validity claims are only present as deep structures, we can 
bring explicitly bring them to the surface. One way of doing so, particularly useful for written lan-
guage, is to tag claims to signify the kind of validity claim we are making. For instance, we could 
take the shortcodes and add them to opening tags <> and closing tags </> to denote the beginning 
and end of a specific epistemic element. Take the generic religious claim “Spirit is Real.” When we 
are stating “Spirit is real,” we could either be saying: 
<cog>Spirit is real.</cog> 
<norm>Spirit is real.</norm> 
<exp>Spirit is real.</exp> 
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Similarly, we can tag the same sentence also in accordance with the different hybrids, and we can 
express the trifecta or integral as <int>Spirit is real.</int>. If we were to replace this example “Spir-
it is real” by “Spirit exists”, then the term “exists” would acquire a different meaning according to 
the experiential domain that generates the datum. In the objective object domain, Spirit would “ex-
ist” as an objective datum. Similarly, in the normative domain, Spirit “exists” as a normative datum 
or given. 
4.3. Doctrinal Reconciliation Without Capitulation 
Lindbeck admits that the multi-dimensional strategy of understanding religious doctrines, consisting 
of hybrids, has certain advantages. However, he proffers that the first two types of theological theo-
ries, and by extension its cognitive-experiential hybrid child, were designed when the "contempo-
rary ecumenical problematic was not a relevant concern” (TND, p. 2). Hence, they all suffer from a 
significant impairment, that is to say, “[i]n all of these perspectives it is difficult to envision the pos-
sibility of doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation” (TND, p. 2). The way out, he argues, is to 
adopt the cultural-linguistic approach. In other words, Lindbeck finds all types of religious under-
standing, including the hybrid types, insufficient for his purposes of achieving doctrinal reconcilia-
tion without change, that is, with exception of his preferential selection of the cultural-linguistic 
type. On the other hand, Habermas’ ideal speech act is one that fulfils the conditions for all three 
validity claims, simultaneously, rather than just the one validity claim of normative rightness. How-
ever, even for Habermas, it is the normative function of speech that allows for both mutual under-
standing, and mutual agreement. 
4.3.1. The Propositionalist 
Lindbeck writes that on the propositionalist approach if a doctrine is once true, it is always true. 
Hence, its denial, as in the case of contradictories, will therefore by necessity be false at all times. 
Mutual agreement (i.e., consensus) can only be reached if one of the parties abandons their claims, 
and relinquishes their position. Either they remove claims outright, or modify them by giving up 
part of the original meaning expressed by those claims in question. Lindbeck concludes that DC/C, 
on this account, is impossible, "because there is no significant sense in which the meaning of a doc-
trine can change while remaining the same" (TND, p. 2-3). However, Lindbeck underestimates how 
on a propositionalist approach truth is not given as such, but must be earned, and must be redeemed. 
Our attempts to derive knowledge, that is true and justified claims, are far from perfect. Therefore, 
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the current state of our knowledge only represents our best attempts to arrive at truth. Dialogue be-
tween epistemic pears is a way to coordinate our propositions about the world, and look for incon-
sistencies that will show us possible errors. A consensus based on one party changing their claims 
because new evidence has come to light is therefore neither unusual, nor undesirable. 
4.3.2. The Expressivist 
Experiential expressivists, for whom truth is a function of symbolic efficacy, compare religions and 
their doctrines in terms of how effectively they communicate and express their religious experi-
ences. As Lindbeck states, all religions are “by definition capable of functioning truly, [however] 
they can vary in their potential or actual degree of truth (i.e., efficacy)” (TND, p. 33). Distinguish-
ing doctrines from the meaning they carry, Lindbeck argues that on the experiential-expressivist ac-
count the meaning of a doctrine can vary while the doctrine itself stays the same. Conversely, doc-
trines can be modified without any alteration in meaning. He throws further light on this by refer-
ring to the case of transubstantiation.  Both transubstantiationist and non-transubstantiationist doc103 -
trines, Lindbeck argues, can express either (a) similar experiences of divine reality, (b) dissimilar 
experiences, or (c) no experience at all.  
The general principle is that insofar as doctrines function as non-discursive symbols, they 
are polyvalent in import and therefore subject to changes of meaning or even to a total loss 
of meaningfulness, to what Tillich calls their death. They are not crucial for religious 
agreement or disagreement, because they are constituted by harmony or conflict in underly-
ing feelings, attitudes, existential orientations or practices, rather than by what happens on 
the level of symbolic (including doctrinal) objectifications (TND, p. 3). 
In other words, subjective experiences show a wide variety in personal meaning, including no 
meaning at all, if the subject does not resonate with the doctrine in question, i.e.., when a doctrine 
does not evoke an experience. Lindbeck will reject the expressive approach in favour of an inter-
subjective coordination of meaning. That is, only when we come together as a group can we sta-
bilise meaning into a communally accepted worldview. However, coordination in meaning still im-
plies that the subjects in question, i.e., the members of the social group, are willing to adjust their 
responses to discursive doctrines. The social world, as one of the three worlds in Habermas’s world 
 Transubstantiation in Roman Catholic theology denotes the spiritual process of changing bread and wine into the 103
body and blood of Christ during the Eucharist.
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theory, is inter-subjective, that is, subjective: meaning is not out there in the objective world, but is 
to be found in individual consciousness. 
4.3.3. The Cognitive-Expressivist  
If indeed the two previous ways of understanding religious doctrines have their weaknesses, as 
Lindbeck believes, could these be overcome by combining both theories? In this case, we under-
stand doctrines through both aspects, namely, referring to propositional content and expressing reli-
gious sentiments. Lindbeck is not convinced, and he dismisses the hybrid theory with just a few 
lines:  
[A]lthough two-dimensional views are superior for ecumenical purposes in that they do not 
a priori exclude doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation as do simple propositionalism 
and simple symbolism, yet their explanations of how this is possible tend to be too awkward 
and complex to be easily intelligible or convincing (TND, p. 3). 
Lindbeck's dismissal, due to its brevity, is hardly convincing, as he does not further explicate in 
what way the authors he has in mind propose solutions that are “too awkward to convince.” How-
ever, in this hybrid model, doctrines are interpreted according to both the representative function of 
communication, claiming truth, and the expressive function, claiming sincerity and authenticity. 
Such an approach takes into account that the objective world is never just “given,” but is in fact in-
terpreted by conscious subjects who inject meaning into objectivity.  
4.3.4. The Normativist 
Lindbeck claims that a cultural-linguistic approach, which he also refers to as the regulative ap-
proach, has no difficulty explaining the possibility of DC/C: rules, unlike propositions or expressive 
symbols, retain an invariant meaning under changing conditions of compatibility and conflict. That 
is, they allow us to reconcile our beliefs with others while keeping the meaning of our claims con-
stant. Lindbeck gives the following example: the rules “Drive on the Left” and “Drive on the right” 
are unequivocal in meaning and unequivocally opposed, yet both may be binding: one in Britain 
and the other in the United States, or one when traffic is normal, and the other when a collision 
must be avoided. Thus oppositions between rules can in some instances be resolved, not by altering 
one or both of them, but by specifying when or where they apply, or by stipulating which of the 
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competing directives takes precedence. Similarly, both transubstantiation and at least some of the 
doctrines that appear to contradict it can be interpreted as embodying rules of sacramental thought 
and practice that may have been in unavoidable and perhaps irresolvable collision in certain histori-
cal contexts, but that can in other circumstances be harmonised by appropriate specifications of 
their respective domains, uses, and priorities. Lindbeck explains that we can understand the differ-
ent ideas on transubstantiation to apply to different domains, much like in the case of the traffic 
rules: one set of rules on transubstantiation will be binding within the Roman Catholic Church, 
while another set of rules will be binding for the Lutheran or Protestant.  
 Seemingly, on Lindbeck’s proposal, no real agreement or consensus takes place. Rather, 
both parties leave with their own interpretations intact, and agree not to disagree. Thus doctrinal 
reconciliation seems to be based on a differentiation of context. The propositionalist also has access 
to this strategy, when he or she argues that two differing descriptions apply to different contexts 
within the objective and non-discursive world. Neither would this solution be impossible to achieve 
on a subjectivist approach. Two different subjects could simply agree to interpret the sacrament in 
two different ways. Therefore, it seems we would not require Lindbeck’s linguistic type in order to 
justify this type of reconciliation. We can however ask whether Lindbeck himself does not expect 
his formula of DC/C to do more in the context of ecumenical dialogue. Bruce D. Marshall, in his 
Introduction to TND, seems to do so. He recounts: 
These dialogues [between Lutherans and Roman Catholics] consistently reported unexpect-
ed and often deep convergences on long-divisive matters… Yet these agreements have pro-
duced — with the exception of the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification –- 
few ecclesial results. Full communion still seems a long way off, in some ways farther than 
it did forty-five years ago, before the dialogues began. The bright hopes shared by Lindbeck 
and many others at the conclusion of Vatican II have so far gone mostly unrealised (Mar-
shall, TND, p. xxii). 
While Marshall doesn’t explain in what way Lindbeck’s bright hopes for DC/C have gone unre-
alised, it should not come as a surprise. If Lindbeck's work is indeed an attempt to aid the process of 
doctrinal reconciliation without change, then it would seem that his proposed strategy turns out to 
be too weak. Lindbeck also admits that his approach proposes no common framework (TND, p. 40), 
that is, leads to incommensurability between positions. He writes: 
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[T]he experiences that religions evoke or mould are as varied as the interpretive schemes 
they embody. Adherents of different religions do not diversely thematize the same experi-
ence, rather they have different experiences. Buddhist compassion, Christian love, 
and….French Revolutionary fraternité are not diverse modifications of a single fundamental 
human awareness, but are radically (i.e., from the root) distinct ways of experiencing and 
being oriented toward self, neighbour, and cosmos (Lindbeck, TND, p. 40; also quoted in 
Knitter, 2002, p. 181). 
Since the diversity of experiences creates an unbridgeable gap between religions, it also makes 
them untranslatable. The upshot is that religious claims and experiences can be understood — and 
are “true” — only within “the given texts or language systems of the particular religions” (Knitter, 
2002, p. 182). If Knitter is correct, it seems that on a regulative approach the hurdle to overcome is 
not so much the incompatibility of religious beliefs — due to the contradicting nature of their 
propositional content  — but rather their incommensurability. Two conflicting claims can both be 
“true,” but each claim will only be seen as true from within its own interpretive framework (i.e., 
worldview).  
 If indeed the cultural-linguistic approach is prone to incommensurability, might this also not 
be the case on the expressivist approach? Both approaches are subjective, where meaning depends 
not necessarily on what is “given” within the objective world as such, but on how subjects interpret 
their reality. While the expressivist approach acknowledges that meaning is generated subjectively, 
the normative approach acknowledges that subjective meaning can also be intersubjectively shared 
and experienced. For instance, my interpretation and experience of an artwork — let’s say Christ of 
St. John of the Cross by Spanish surrealist painter Salvador Dali — can be completely idiosyncratic. 
You, as a second person, have no way of knowing how I understand and see this artwork, unless I 
can somehow convey my understanding, and give you an experience of what it is like to see it 
through my eyes. The criticism of incommensurability is valid insofar as you and I do not share a 
mutual understanding of each other’s categories. Similarly, the Buddhist concept of ‘nirvana’ (i.e., 
the ‘blowing out’ of the fires of greed, hatred, and delusion accomplished in meditative states) is 
incommensurable with Christian concepts, as it does not represent a Christian experience: it is not 
constitutive of ‘reality’ in Christianity, whether understood in an internal subjective sense, or an ex-
ternal objective sense. As long as there is no corresponding experience in Christianity of what nir-
vana means, the Christian is unable to translate it into a Christian concept.  
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 This issue is particularly brought home by religious believers who have two home religions, 
so-called multiple religious belongers (MRB), who have to deal with it on a practical level. Each 
one of their religious paths will encourage to experience the truth (i.e., personal, lived truth) of their 
religious beliefs. For instance, the Buddhist path will encourage the believer to experience nirvana, 
and have a lived and existential understanding of it, whilst the Christian path will encourage the 
same believer to experience God’s love through Jesus Christ, Our Lord. Whilst this constitutes two 
separate experiences, and therefore does not warrant equating the two concepts, at least a bridge 
seems possible between the shores of meaning, as the dual belonger has experience of both. Thus, 
within the community of dual belongers new communally shared frameworks can develop, which 
can both communicate nirvana and God’s love, and where both concepts represent a true experi-
ence. For as long as the Christian has not entered the Buddhist path (or vice-versa) nirvana will 
never constitute a true experience, even if we grant that nirvana represents a true experience for the 
Buddhist. If this is true, then it follows that the linguistic approach cannot be divorced from the oth-
er approaches, in this case, a subjective understanding of doctrine. 
 In promoting his linguistic approach, Lindbeck also seems to be putting the cart before the 
horse. While Lindbeck wants to explain the possibility of DC/C, he does so by preferentially select-
ing how we should interpret religious language. The claim is that if one wants reconciliation one 
must interpret religious language according to the socially regulative function of language. This 
therefore excludes all religious language that functions propositionally or expressively. If two 
propositions that claim truth conflict, agreement is not to be achieved within this particular epis-
temic domain. Rather, one is forced to give up one’s propositional aims, and translate the claims in 
question to the intersubjective domain. It is clear that this will be unacceptable to all who do not 
follow Lindbeck’s proposal. However, as we have seen, to the objection that DC/C seemed implau-
sible, Lindbeck suggested that a proper response would be not to deny the reality on the grounds 
that it seems impossible, but rather to seek to explain its possibility. Thus, while Lindbeck correctly 
assesses that religious language can perform three different functions, rather than selecting one and 
dismissing all others including the integral, he should in fact follow his own advice and seek to ex-
plain how religious believers can maintain their preferred interpretation, and still achieve DC/C. 
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4.4. The Expressivist Position Revisited 
Having given an overview of Lindbeck’s tripartite typology, I will now revisit both the experiential-
expressive and cultural-linguistic stances by referring to a few authors working on religious diversi-
ty. 
4.4.1. Julius Lipner 
Julius Lipner, in his article Truth-Claims and Inter-religious Dialogue (1976), points out that the 
term “religious belief” is not an unequivocal concept. He argues that it often hides a misleading 
ambiguity. This ambiguity is based on the fact that we can distinguish between two different mean-
ings or usages of the term. Moreover, he argues that some authors as John Hick and D. Z. Phillips 
have failed to make these distinctions with "unfortunate consequences" to their respective theories. 
Firstly, Lipner writes that religious belief "very often means a certain propositional content asserted 
as being the case, that is, as factually true, not only for myself but for the other as well — and then 
it becomes a truth-claim" (Lipner, 1976, p. 217).  He writes:  104
From an epistemological point of view, "‘religious belief’ can stand for the propositional 
content, i.e. the meaning in G.E. Moore’s sense of the term" (Lipner, 1976, p. 217).  
On this account, religious belief can be understood as a proposition referring to a state of affairs. 
Such claims typically demand universal consent, and ought to be recognised by everybody.  Due 105
to this demand for universal consent, propositional truth forms the traditional battlefield on which 
dissolution of conflicting claims is or ought to be settled.  
 Secondly, Lipner argues that when a Christian believer states “It is my belief that we shall 
all rise again on the Last Day,” she states an express content of her mind, but without affirming that 
she asserts this belief to be a true one (i.e., one that is the case for everybody). Lipner adds that the 
believer, on this account, is merely concerned to state what she believes, without emphasising the 
interpersonal potential of the assertion, that is, without being concerned with the truth value of the 
propositional content. Lipner refers to this type of religious belief as the personalist dimension, i.e., 
 He writes: "Strictly speaking, I do not claim things to myself. I make claims in the face of exacted opposition. Thus 104
we say: ‘It is the religious belief of many Hindus that Krishna is the human avatara of the Deity’ which can be another 
way of saying ‘Many Hindus assert it to be the case that Krishna is God descended in human form’ with the implication 
that this is a state of affairs that ought to be recognized by everybody" (Lipner, 1976, pp 217-218).
 In other words, by third-persons (or, first-persons using a third-person perspective). 105
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being centred on the person. He also calls it reflexive, i.e., personalist claims reflect back to the be-
liever, rather than the objective world. He sums up: 
The emphasis here, it seems clear, is on religious beliefs not acting so much as truth-claims, 
viz. as assertions of fact valid for all, but as having meaning for me in my particular situa-
tion (Lipner, 1976, p.  218). 
On Lipner’s account of religious belief as personalist and reflexive, religious beliefs refer back to 
"my world” and offer first-person interior-individual content. Such subjective content does not need 
to explicitly assert third-person objective truth. When I express the content of my mind, I am stating 
what it is that I believe. In so doing, I do not expressly assert this belief to be a true one, i.e., affirm 
the correspondence of my concepts with objective reality, nor do I emphasise the interpersonal po-
tential of my assertion. However, William Christian reminds us that we normally take first-person 
statements of belief to convey implicit assertions of what is said to be believed (1972, p. 19). He 
writes:  
[W]hen a speaker says something of the form ‘I believe that p’ we do not normally suppose 
that he is merely reporting some inner experience or state in an informative way, as he might 
report a nightmare (Christian, 1972, p. 19).  
Nevertheless, Christian (1964) adds that “it is possible to adhere wholeheartedly to a suggestion 
without being absolutely certain about the truth of some proposition one derives from this sugges-
tion” (p. 246). In Lipner's "Last Day" example, we expect the believer to state (1) that there is, or 
will be, a Last Day, and (2) that it will be the case that, when this Last Day comes to pass, we shall 
all rise (i.e., presumably, from death). In fact, it was the same G. E. Moore referenced by Lipner 
who was the first to point out that accepting the following statements generates a paradox (Hintik-
ka, 1962, 19): 
(1) I believe that p. 
(2) It is not the case that p. 
If believing “that p” implies stating “that p,” then together with (2), we end up with a simple con-
tradiction. Of course, Lipner's example does not necessarily generate a Moorean contradiction as 
such. That is, for such a paradox to occur, the speaker needs to assign both a positive (1) and a neg-
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ative truth value (2) to the propositional content mentioned in the belief. Lipner's believer, however, 
is "unconcerned," that is, does not ascribe any truth value to the propositional content, whether pos-
itive or negative. The question is then whether we can legitimately ignore the validity claim of 
propositional truth.  
 To hark back to Habermas’s views, we can make the presence of two different validity 
claims clear by appealing to both of them exclusively through separate sentences. Thus, in Moore’s 
Paradox, claim (1) appeals to truthfulness: it is true, in the sense that I am being sincere, that I be-
lieve that p. Claim (2), however, appeals to truth: it is true that p is not the case. Therefore, while 
claim (1) succeeds on the subjective validity claim, it fails on the objective validity claim. The fact 
that (1) makes good on its own claim has no impact on whether it makes good on the validity claim 
of statement (2): if it did, wishful thinking would lead to true propositions about the objective 
world. Given that believing “that p” implies stating “that p,” this means that when it comes to be-
lief, it would seem that the validity claim of propositionally truth is always already raised, and if 
raised, it should make good on it.  
 However, it does not need to follow from this that, if a claim cannot be shown to be proposi-
tionally true, it should by necessity bring into doubt its validity claim of subjective authenticity. As I 
have argued in my previous chapter, the differences between validity claims is ultimately one of 
methodology. Assessing the contents of my mind, even if those contents refer back to the objective 
world, requires a first-person introspective methodology. Affirming the correspondence of my con-
cepts with objective reality, i.e., affirming the propositional content of my claims, requires a third-
person or objective methodology, the results of which are true for everyone. Similarly, acquiring 
interpersonal understanding, and interpersonal agreement, will require a second-person methodolo-
gy of dialogue between communicating partners: neither first-person nor third-person methodolo-
gies will be required, nor appropriate. I will discuss this issue more thoroughly in the next section 
on W. C. Smith’s view on personal faith. 
   
4.4.2. Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
Another account of the personalist type of religious belief can be found in Wilfred Cantwell Smith's 
work. In The Meaning and End of Religion (1962), W. C. Smith suggests that we can make a dis-
tinction between religion as the historical “cumulative tradition,” and the personal or “inner faith” 
of the religious believer. The cumulative tradition is built up over time and consists of the external 
aspects of a particular religion (such as rites, practices, beliefs, institutions, scriptures, etc.). The 
cumulative tradition is what lends religion “its peculiar identity” (Netland, 1991, p. 117). However, 
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what really matters, according to Smith, is not the religious tradition as such, but the personal and 
inner faith of the believer; this is where “the locus of truth” is to be found. In religion, Smith says, 
“one has not to do with religions [i.e. cumulative traditions], but with religious persons” (Smith, 
1962, p. 153). Donald Wiebe writes that such a “non-propositional position” comes very close to an 
“existentialist conception of religious truth, somewhat after the fashion of Kierkegaard” (Wiebe, 
1981, p. 212).  
 In Questions of Religious Truth (1967), Smith further writes that “religions are not in them-
selves true or false but that a religion may become true in the life of a man of faith who is related to 
God” (quoted in Hick, p. 143). Religious truth is not an absolute or static property, as in the case of 
propositions, but is a changing and “dynamic product of involvement” by the believer with what is 
said, and therefore requires “existential appropriation” (Netland, 1991, p. 119). For instance, Smith 
says of Christianity that it is “not true absolutely, impersonally, statically [i.e., as in the case of ob-
jective propositions]; rather it can become true, if and as you or I appropriate it to ourselves and in-
teriorise it, insofar as we live it out from day to day” (Smith, 1967, p. 68). Elsewhere he says: “No 
statement might be accepted as true that has not been inwardly appropriated by its author” (Smith, 
ibid., p. 35). Religious doctrines, on this account, are not true or false by themselves (i.e., objective-
ly so). Rather, they are “true” for individual persons, and only to the extent in which they existen-
tially appropriated the claims. 
 In Faith and Belief (1979), Smith draws our attention to the etymology of the word “to be-
lieve,” which can be traced back to Latin and Old English origins. To believe, throughout the Mid-
dle Ages, meant “to hold dear” or “to love.”  He writes: 106
The object of the verb [to believe] begins by being almost almost always a person; it ends 
by being almost always a proposition. That is, a shift has taken place from the verb’s desig-
nating an interpersonal relation to its naming a theoretical judgment: from an action of the 
self, in relation to others, to a condition of the mind, in relation to an abstraction (Smith, 
1979, p. 118; also quoted in Webb, 2009, p. 221).   107
Webb points out that, although the meaning of the word believe might indeed have changed, for re-
ligious believers it still carries the double meaning of truth and love  (2009, p. 221). He concludes 
 In fact, this is also present in Dutch, my own mother tongue, where “liefde" is the word for love.106
 I will come back to Smith, and these two notions of belief, in chapter 4.107
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that the mode in which belief takes place can vary according to the emphasis it puts on one or the 
other of those two aspects of believing. From this brief outline follows that the validity claim asso-
ciated with Smith's version of personal truth is truthfulness, sincerity and authenticity, which corre-
sponds to the expressive function. To be authentic implies that one has experienced what one says 
one has: I am authentically claiming that I have existentially appropriated the beliefs that I ascribe 
to. In other words, this type of religious claims expresses authentic first-person experience; it is the 
language of poetry where the world is experienced as personal, evocative, and mysterious.  
 John Hick paraphrases Smith, when he says that truth is not only “the correspondence of 
propositions with reality, but also, and even more importantly so far as religious truth is concerned, 
integrity and faithfulness in a person” (Hick, 1974, p. 143; italics mine). Hick further writes that he 
himself (i.e., Hick) is inclined to prefer a descriptive and metaphorical phrase for Smith’s concept 
of personal truth, such as “the moral truthfulness of a person’s life” (Hick, 1974, p. 144). Netland 
adds to this that religious truth, for Smith, “does not reflect correspondence with reality so much as 
it signifies integrity, sincerity, faithfulness, authenticity of life, and existentially appropriating cer-
tain beliefs in one’s life and conduct” (Netland, ibidem, p. 118; italics mine). 
 Thus we can infer from the previous observations that Smith attempts to establish a concep-
tual shift for religious language, away from the object domain of propositional truth, and towards 
the object domain of personal experience. And if so, then this will have consequences for Smith’s 
understanding of the problem of conflicting claims, something which also Harold Netland points 
out (1991, p. 120). Netland summarises that on this approach it becomes possible that all religions 
are true for those believers who happen to appropriate the beliefs and practices of the respective 
traditions (ibid., p. 120). As a pluralist, Smith holds the attitude that the different world religions 
have equal access to religious truth. We can see how the shift to personal truth allows him to sug-
gest that religious truth claims are only apparently conflicting. No real conflict needs to exist be-
tween claims, as each of the different religious traditions has equal potential capability to “become 
true” in the lives of their believers. Smith’s concept of personal truth therefore opens up the possi-
bility for a pluralist theory of religious truth, one that avoids the principle of contradiction, and that 
is based on “truth” as representative of an authentic life. However, this is only possible because the 
validity claim of objective truth has not been explicitly raised.  
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4.4.3. John Hicks’s Response 
John Hick is not convinced by Smith’s conclusions. He argues that Smith’s shift to personal truth 
does not get us off the hook when it comes to the problem of conflicting truth claims. Hick believes 
that religious claims can only become true in the lives of believers because they are already true in a 
more universal and objective sense. Hick writes: 
[A] religion, as a historical context consisting of religious beliefs and practices, can only 
become personalistically true in a man’s life because those beliefs were already true beliefs, 
pointing towards and not away from the divine reality, and because those practices were al-
ready appropriate rather than inappropriate as ways in which to worship and serve the divine 
reality (Hick, 1974 p. 146). 
Hick argues that even if claims can be said to be personally true, this is only because they have al-
ready been found true in the objective realm of so-called real referents. On this propositional view, 
claims to personal and lived truths, although fulfilling the conditions for sincerity, would have to be 
rejected unless they could be shown to be propositionally true. In Hicks’s own theory, Hick is 
committed to (a) seeing religious claims as propositions, and to (b) the pluralist idea of assigning 
truth-value across different religious systems. In order to do so, Hick needs to overcome the hurdle 
of conflicting truth claims (while preserving the logical principle of non-contradiction).  
 Instead of addressing the problem head on, that is, finding evidence and good reasons for or 
against religious propositions, Hick claims that the problem “may more profitably be approached 
from a different direction, in terms of the claims of the various traditions to provide, or to be effec-
tive contexts of, salvation” (Hick, 2000, pp. 54-55). On Hick's view, each one of the religions 
claims (1) to have knowledge of a transcendent reality (i.e., propositional knowledge), which (2) 
provides an effective context of salvation. Since (1) has consistently shown to be problematic, Hick 
decides to address (2) first, and doing so arrive at (1). If they can indeed be shown to be effective 
contexts of salvation, then presumably this is only the case because (1) contains ontological truth. If 
this argument succeeds, then Hick would have affirmed his initial commitments to propositional 
truths (a), as well as to a pluralistic view (b).  
 Thus, in his attempt to demonstrate (2), Hick argues that each of the different religions is 
centrally concerned with a transformation of human existence from self-centredness to being cen-
tred in divine Reality (what he calls ‘Real Reality’). If we look at what the fruits are of the different 
religions “we arrive at the modest and largely negative conclusion that, so far as we can tell, no one 
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of the great world religions is salvifically superior to the rest” (Hick, 2000, pp. 58). While this ar-
gument might satisfy Hick’s second concern of pluralism, it still does not address his first concern 
of the propositional content of claims. Hick cannot do much more than put forward the possibility 
(i.e., through a hypothesis) that each of the different claims truly corresponds to reality. In his own 
words: 
If salvation is taking place, and taking place to about the same extent, within the religious 
systems presided over by these various deities and absolutes, this suggests that they are dif-
ferent manifestations to humanity of a yet more ultimate ground of salvific transformation. 
Let us then consider the possibility that an infinite transcendent reality is being differently 
conceived, and therefore differently experienced, and therefore differently responded to 
from within our different religio-cultural ways of being human. This hypothesis makes sense 
of the fact that the salvific transformation seems to have been occurring in all the great tradi-
tions (Hick, 2000, pp. 58-59). 
However, in showing that the different religions all bear fruit, i.e., seem to be effective in establish-
ing transformation in equal measure, Hick has merely shown that the different religious belief sys-
tems can be pragmatically true for their believers. In other words, the different belief systems only 
bear fruits to the extent that the individual believers have existentially appropriated those beliefs 
within their own lives, so that they could become authentic experiences and be personally true. 
Hick’s conclusion that all religions bear fruit in equal measure, and represent contexts of salvation 
in equal measure forces him to restate his earlier assumption that a belief cannot be personally true 
and personally effective (what Lindbeck calls symbolic efficacy), if it was not first true in a more 
universal and objective sense. But that is exactly what he sets out to prove in the first place. I there-
fore suggest that Hick is left without any non-question-begging grounds for the idea that the differ-
ent religious claims are propositionally true responses to reality, and that his arguments on the fruits 
of religion merely serve to confirm Smith’s intuitions. His attempt to use the fruits of religious prac-
tice to redeem validity in the realm of propositional truth therefore fails. 
4.4.4. Harold Netland’s Response 
Harold Netland (1991) is, similarly to Hick, unconvinced by Smith’s appeal to lived experience. He 
summarises Smith’s view as follows: 
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Smith is not saying that that we cannot speak of truth in religion, that the term “truth” is in-
applicable in religion But he is asserting that religious truth is different from concepts of 
truth found in ordinary life or in the sciences. And emphatically rejects the idea that reli-
gious truth is propositional truth (Netland, 1991, p. 118).  
However, Donald Wiebe offers perhaps a more moderate interpretation of Smith’s position by 
pointing to a persistent ambiguity in Smith’s work. He demonstrates that while Smith attempts to 
give primacy to personal truth, he does not want to get rid of propositional truth altogether. He 
quotes Smith: 
The criteria by which this propositional truth is to be judged, the meaning it shall have are 
questions that we need not settle; we simply agree that this area of truth is at stake. My sug-
gestion is that there are other additional areas, involving additional criteria and meanings of 
a quite different sort that might profitably be brought into play (Smith, 1974, p. 34; also 
quoted in Wiebe, 1981, 212). 
From this follows that for Smith two sets of criteria apply to religious doctrines: criteria related to 
propositional truth, and to personal truth. Wiebe writes: 
At one point Smith seems to suggest that, in fact, ‘religious truth’ does not ultimately differ 
from truth as ‘rational correctness’ [i.e., as propositional truth] — that it does not have total-
ly different criteria of assessment but claims rather that religious truth concerns both ‘ratio-
nal correctness’ and ‘personal response’ (in the existentialist sense of ‘authenticity’) as a 
joint criterion (Wiebe, 1981, p. 213). 
These brief comments show that, although Smith aims to shift the primacy of understanding doc-
trine to personal truth, he is unable to distance himself from understanding doctrine also proposi-
tionally. While he values authenticity perhaps more than truth, Smith has to admit that both validity 
claims pertain to religious truth claims. Within Lindbeck’s typology, Smith would in fact occupy a 
hybrid position, namely a cognitive-expressive position. However, given that Smith is reluctant to 
permit propositional truth, typifying him as an expressionist would still be appropriate. 
 However, Netland further argues that Smith fails to recognise that there is an important 
sense in which “propositional truth is logically basic and is presupposed by all other uses of 
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truth” (Netland, ibidem, p. 129). Thus for Netland, propositional truth is more important than per-
sonal truth, even if we accept that there is such a thing as personal truth. While for Smith personal 
truth is primary, for Netland propositional truth is primary. Commenting on Smith’s concept of per-
sonal truth, Netland argues that at least three different interpretations are possible: 
(1) Personal truth can legitimately be applied to religion whereas propositional truth cannot. 
(2) Both personal truth and propositional truth can be applied to religion, but personal truth is 
somehow more basic and fundamental than propositional truth. 
(3) Both personal truth and propositional truth can be applied to religion, but propositional truth is 
more basic than personal truth. 
Since Netland believes that, epistemologically, the most basic notion of truth is propositional truth, 
he will reject (1) and (2). His argument runs as follows: if a proposition p is offered as something 
we should accept as true — and we assume that Smith has this intention —, then it is itself depen-
dent upon the notion of propositional truth. The reason for this is that p expresses a proposition that 
makes a claim about reality: that reality actually is as the proposition expressed by p asserts it to be. 
The sense in which p is presumed to be true is therefore not that of personal truth.  
 However, Smith's claim, that religious truth should be understood as personal truth ("Reli-
gious truth is personal truth"), can easily be understood as a claim that is itself propositional. Thus, 
the validity claim attached to Smith's own statement is different then the validity claim implied by 
the content of his statement. This difference does not generate a paradox, since two sentences can 
raise two different validity claims. As we have seen, the reverse is also true: one sentence can raise 
two validity claims. This is best shown by explicating the validity claims in question through sec-
ondary sentences. But how do we know which of those two validity claims is primary? Rather than 
aiming to deny that propositional truth is primary, I suggest arguing for a fourth option, one that 
Netland himself does not consider: 
(4) Both personal truth and propositional truth can be applied to religion, and neither is more basic 
than the other. 
The reason why neither personal truth or propositional truth is primary is due to the fact that differ-
ent validity claims can be attached to sentences. On this account, propositional truth is not and can-
not be foundational for the validity claim of either subjective truthfulness or intersubjective right-
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ness, due to the fact that the conditions that redeem truth are radically different from the conditions 
that redeem truthfulness or rightness. Propositional truth is therefore never a necessary condition for 
the authenticity or intersubjective appropriateness of claims.  
4.5. The Normativist Position Revisited 
We can understand religious belief on the expressivist approach to pertain to first-person subjective 
meaning. Extending this to include others, when two first-persons share the same religious belief, 
this belief is now not just my first-person belief, but one that we — as a first-person plural quasi-
entity  — share interpersonally. Thus my original claim acquires an illocutionary force which was 
not present when it was only me who held the belief. Given our shared cultural space, the question 
asked here is whether it is appropriate or right for me to hold this particular belief. I can be authen-
tic and truthful about my own interior belief, but unless my belief is also intersubjectively or cultur-
ally appropriate, you and I will not come to understand one another or be able to coordinate our ac-
tions, if need be. Thus a social or cultural worldview prescribes, through illocutionary force, what is 
considered to be appropriate belief and behaviour. Neither I, nor the others, are necessarily raising a 
claim to propositional truth when we affirm or deny intersubjectively held beliefs. Although a 
propositional claim is always still available within the same speech act, the particular validity claim 
raised here is (cultural) appropriateness or justness. This allows me to rephrase option (4) as fol-
lows: 
(4.1) Both personal truth, propositional truth, and normative truth can be applied to religion, and 
neither is more basic than the other. 
Of course, Netland could still argue that what the culture describes or prescribes, is dependent on 
propositional truth. This would then simply be an extension of the argument levelled against the ex-
pressivist. Again, it remains to be shown that our concepts are always dependent on objective reali-
ty. Rather, our cultural framework will offer a perspective on reality, which consists of shared 
meaning, and does not always necessitate a neat cognitive correspondence with the objective do-
main. At least, it is not self-evident that all religious assumptions have, or need to have, an objective 
referent, that is, be ontologically real.  
 For instance, the claim “Santa Claus exists” is a typical cultural belief held by children of a 
certain age. It has objective referents in the little Santa Claus dolls in the shops, or in the bearded 
gentlemen on whose laps the children sit. However, this does not mean that it is ontologically the 
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case that Santa Claus exists. The fact that, ontologically, Santa Claus does not seem to exist is the 
reason why children sooner or later grow up to deny Santa Claus all together.  
 A propositionalist will argue that a proposition is not dependent on it being true. Rather, a 
proposition is defined by its capacity to hold a truth value of either true or false. Thus, the proposi-
tionalist could argue that those children are merely holding false beliefs, and that they will come to 
understand this fact after a certain age. At that moment they will drop their false beliefs. Thus, the 
fact that the propositional claims fails, shows that a truth-value has been assigned.  
 However, a normativist could argue that, although ontologically Santa Claus does not exist, 
he does "exist" culturally, that is, within the cultural worldview. For something to be meaningful it 
does not need to exist in the objective world, as long as it "exists" either subjectively, or intersubjec-
tively.  If propositional truth is foundational, when a propositional claim collapses, the dependent 108
claims should collapse with it. However, the fact that Santa Claus does not ontologically exist does 
not necessarily prevent us from holding onto the claim. 
 The propositionalist could counter that, if cultural beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs) are proven 
to be propositionally false, it could be said to be insincere to keep believing in them, even if the 
false beliefs still continue to produce cultural (e.g., religious) results. However, this argument only 
has bite if one agrees on the primacy and selection of truth as a validity claim in the first place. If 
the discourse is truth-oriented, to keep affirming what has been shown as false, is indeed fallacious, 
irrational and to be rejected. However, as we have shown, discourses on normative rightness and 
subjective truthfulness, are not centred around the truth-falsity dyad, and cannot be based on the 
same concerns that govern propositional truth. Indeed, the crux of the matter is that we have differ-
ent measures of justification for each of the different types of claims. To return to my previous ex-
ample, I can believe that <subj>Spirit is real</>, but be not quite sure whether also <obj>Spirit is 
real</>. Although for me Spirit is a first-person experiential reality, I can grant that I have very little 
evidence to suggest that Spirit is also a third-person objective reality. Since the different domains 
are quasi-independent, it does not follow that, because I cannot claim <obj>Spirit is real</>, I 
should also forego the claim <subj>Spirit is real</>. An objective referent does not necessarily need 
to exist for me to be justified in claiming that “Spirit is Real,” since I have basic subjective evidence 
that <subj>Spirit is real</>. The authenticity of my experience cannot be accessed by any objective 
methodologies, but only through interior insight, and a truthful reporting of that experience. If, 
however, I am going to claim that <obj>Spirit is real</>, then I am indeed rationally beholden to the 
 In the first case, it is meaningful to me, in the second case it is meaningful to us.108
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demands of objective inquiry in order to offer convincing third-person proof that this is indeed the 
case. However, even if I do not have this kind of justification, it does not seem to be required that I 
should completely get rid of the claim <obj>Spirit is real</>. Since I already have subjective expe-
rience of Spirit, it might well turn out to be an objective reality as well. For now, however, I have no 
way to evidentiate this claim (i.e., provide evidence). Hence, instead of abandoning the claim, I 
bracket it, and file it away as being an unresolved claim. Of course, if convincing evidence would 
show up that in fact <obj>Spirit is not real</>, I might have to revisit my original claim, and assign 
it the value of “false.” Bracketing the claim, we quarantine the claim within a particular domain for 
the time being. For instance the claim [<obj>Spirit is Real</obj>] is quarantined in the objective 
domain. Hence, for the foreseeable future, it can no longer be selected as a representational speech 
act, and is therefore no longer vulnerable to objective criticism, until it is either decommissioned 
from quarantine, or removed altogether. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this chapter I made a rather simple but necessary point, namely that the functions 
of language identified by Habermas are equally present when it comes to religious language. Firstly, 
I presented and discussed Lindbeck’s tripartite typology. Secondly, I investigated how Lindbeck’s 
categories are also present in the writings of several authors who write on the topic of religious di-
versity. I also specifically argued that none of the three functions of religious language is necessari-
ly primary. That is, although I accept Lindbeck’s tripartite classification of religious language, I do 
not follow his advice that we should take the cultural-linguistic function to be primary. Neither do I 
follow Netland’s recommendation that propositional language is primary. Instead I argue that all 
three functions can be present in religious speech but that none is primary to the others. 
  
 !96
5. Nicholas Rescher and Aporetics 
5.1. Introduction 
In my Introduction I stated that one of the aims of my dissertation is to show how Aporetics can be 
aptly applied to the issue of religious diversity. In this chapter, I will introduce Rescher’s work on 
Aporetics.  I will start by defining the concept of an aporia and analyse its structure as consisting 109
of three necessary elements. Following Rescher, I will define the field of Aporetics as the rational 
deliberation of aporias by means of a plausibility analysis. In particular, I will show how an aporetic 
plausibility analysis requires criteria and standards of acceptability. Such criteria are necessary in 
order to judge claims and prepare the aporetic set for dissolution. However, the crux of the matter of 
such criteria will be that they themselves are rooted in epistemic values. Although those values are 
still thoroughly rational — we have good reasons for them —, they will also be preferential, and 
thus give rise to differences in orientation. 
5.2. The Structure of Aporias 
Taken from Ancient Greek, the term aporia (Greek: άπορία; plural: aporias, aporiai) literally means 
“no way out,” and denotes an impasse or blockage. However, in Plato’s Republic it also acquired 
the meaning of a logical puzzle, or a (cognitive) perplexity. As with many ideas mentioned by Plato, 
the term aporia has since then had a long history in Western philosophy.  
 To begin with, Aristotle — in his Book Beta of the Metaphysics —presented a list of fifteen 
fundamental puzzles that needed to be resolved in metaphysics. He likened aporiai to intellectual 
knots: "You cannot…untie a knot unless you know how it was tied, and perplexity reveals an intel-
lectual knot” (Aristotle, Book Beta, Ch. 1). The dissolution of aporiai was to be achieved by means 
of an “aporetic method” (Karuzis, 2010, p. 233).  
 In modern times, Emmanuel Kant — in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)— discussed a 
number of aporiai as “coordinated pairs of arguments” or antinomies that lead to mutually contra-
dictory conclusions (Siitonen and Airaksinen, 1988). Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) made exten-
sive use of aporiai in his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921). Hartmann viewed 
 Rescher has written on aporias for over four decades. As a very prolific writer — a characteristic he shares with Jür109 -
gen Habermas — Rescher has written numerous articles and monographs on the topic, a fair bit of which has been repe-
tition. I refer the reader to my Bibliography. Here, I will only mention his first main work on aporias, The Strife of Sys-
tems (1985), his monograph on Pluralism (1993), and his summative work on Aporetics (2006). A short summary of 
The Strife of Systems can be found in his article Aporetic Method in Philosophy (1987). Pluralism deals with the topic 
of dissensus, and the possible attitudes to diversity (or pluralism) within philosophy.  For a book review of Aporetics, 
see Vickers (2010). For secondary literature on Rescher and Aporetics, see Saarinen (2003), Almeder (2008), and 
Jacquette (2009).
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them as difficult foundational questions. The terms aporia and aporetic figure also featured heavily 
in the work of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) to which testifies his Aporias: Mourir —s’attendre aux 
“limites de la vérité” (1996). Derrida understood aporiai as the “blind spots” of a metaphysical ar-
gument (Allen, 2005; Anker, 2006).   110
 Arguably, Nicholas Rescher has made the most extensive use of the concept of aporia, at 
least in recent years. Rescher describes an aporia as “any cognitive situation in which the threat of 
inconsistency confronts us” (Rescher, 2009, p. 1).  More technically, he defines it as “a group of 111
contentions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent” (ibidem, 2001, p. 93).  112
Nevertheless, Rescher is not the only one who has recently revised the concept of aporia. Vlk and 
Ossimitz (2010) suggest that the “modern definition of the ancient philosophical term aporia has 
been coined by Gerhard Schwarz” (p. 647). According to Schwarz, an aporetic conflict is a situation 
that fulfils three criteria (Schwarz, 2010, p. 301): 
(1) two opposing claims or assertions (which is trivially true for every conflict);  113
(2) both sides are right;  
(3) both claims depend on each other, 
Rescher’s definition of an aporia seems only slightly different from Schwarz's version. Similarly, 
we can identify three salient points in Rescher's definition; an aporia represents: 
[1] a group of claims (which are)  
[2] individually plausible (but)  
[3] collectively inconsistent. 
 The term “aporetics” also shows up in Paul Ricoeur's Time and Narrative (2012). For an extensive overview of the 110
history of the term aporiai, see Arto Siitonen’s Problems of Aporetics (1989), as well as W. D. Ross’ Metaphysical Apor-
ia and Philosophical Heresy (1989).
 I will call anyone who is confronted with an aporia — and therefore has to find a way out of the inconsistency — an 111
aporetic decider. This implies that he or she has to make a decision of some sort: they cannot idly sit by in the face of 
an aporia. I will also use the term aporetician for someone who studies the field of aporetics, and has interests in the 
mechanics of conflict dissolution. The aporetic decider merely wants a solution for the problem at hand, and does not 
necessarily have broader interests.
 Rescher’s definition seems to have become the standard in the field, even to describe the original term aporia. See 112
the entry ‘aporia’ in Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2005).
 Vlk and Ossimitz use the term “positions” when they translate from the German. The actual text says "Behauptungen 113
oder Interessen"(Schwarz, 2010, p. 301). For Rescher, a “position” involves the selection of certain claims as a dissolu-
tion of the aporia.
 !98
5.2.1. Aporetic Clusters 
Rescher suggests that individually plausible claims will not present an aporetic problem unless they 
come together in an aporetic group or cluster. The claims must somehow join — and be in a rela-
tionship with one another — in order for us to be able to talk of an aporia. On Schwarz's account, 
claims also come together to form clusters but they do so minimally, i.e., an aporetic cluster con-
tains just two claims, constituting a simple contradiction or antinomy.  Rescher, on the other hand, 114
is more forthcoming in suggesting how claims join together, that is, by proviso of a thematic con-
text. The claims of an aporetic clusters are gathered around a theme; they constitute a thematic fam-
ily. In short, not just any claims join into a cluster, but rather thematically related claims.  So how 115
do themes arise?  
 Rescher responds that aporias surface in many different contexts of cognitive endeavour, but 
that they are “particularly prominent in philosophy” (1987, p. 283). Rescher understands philosophy 
as worldview-generating philosophy (see also chapter 1). He argues that human beings are rational 
inquirers who inquire into their environment by interacting with it and formulating questions. The 
products of such rational inquiry are "data" that can be categorised into (a) beliefs, (b) practical ex-
pectations, and (c) evaluations (1993, p. 65-67). The differential background of experiences will 
lead different inquirers to cognitive disagreement, or cognitive pluralism. Worldviews will exhibit a 
tendency to “hypertrophy.” In constructing a worldview we interpret what is distinct — the natural 
environment, the human environment (other human beings), and the internal environment within 
ourselves — , and the matter of fact is that there are always different ways of doing so. Thus, the 
total set of beliefs on the world plunges the community of all inquirers into inconsistency. The the-
matic dependency of aporetic claims is therefore to be expected on the basis of similar erotetic in-
quiries across worldviews. Since the same questions generate differing answers, these answers will 
be thematically linked.  
 William Christian, however, has pointed out — see supra — that even when we have the-
matically related claims, such claims might still not explicitly contradict each other. We can expect 
the likelihood of explicit contradiction to increase with greater geographical and cultural contact 
between different worldviews, as has been the case in the last few centuries. Moreover, there are 
often implicit contradictions between worldview claims that can be made explicit by, for instance, 
the comparative philosopher, or the philosopher of religion. Finally, the fact that religious aporias 
 Paradoxes are examples of aporias. See Rescher’s Paradoxes (2001a), and Chapter 6 in his Aporetics (2009).114
 E.g., claims on the status of Jesus Christ, the nature of the Soul, the existence of an Ultimate Reality, etc. 115
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— i.e., coordination problems between specifically religious word views —, will be pervasive is 
evidenced by the history of religious doctrinal conflicts, both internal and external, and to a lesser 
degree perhaps by the considerable contemporary philosophical literature on the problem of con-
flicting religious claims.  
5.2.2. Backed by Good Reasons 
Both Rescher [2] and Schwarz (2) agree that in an aporetic situation we have some good (i.e., prima 
facie at least) reasons to accept each one of the individual contentions. In other words, the different 
claims seem individually plausible (or acceptable and appealing). We could say that the available 
evidence speaks well for them. Yet, Schwarz (2) posits that we are not just in possession of good 
reasons for our claims, but that these claims are also right. Herein lays the problem as the principle 
of contradiction — one of the cornerstones of rational thought — states that two claims cannot be 
both true at the same time when they contradict each other. Vlk and Ossimitz take this to suggest 
that aporias are “outside of Western binary logic" (2010, p. 643). They write: 
[C]riterion (2) implies that they cannot be resolved either by logical reasoning (since they 
are impossible and not allowed in the world of logic) nor by judges or hierarchical organi-
zations (ibid., p. 647).  
This purported fact that aporias fall outside of "Western logic” seems a tall price to pay for what is 
arguably only little benefit. Prudence suggests that we should only consider boat-rocking strategies 
after we have exhausted all other and less costly venues for resolution first. Rescher, on the other 
hand, manages to avoid such far-going statements. He suggests that we — i.e., the belief holders 
who are forced to make aporetic decisions — treat the different positions and contentions not as 
true claims, but rather as plausible data (i.e., as proposals). These plausibilities are propositions 
that, while claiming truth, have not yet been fully established as true, and are therefore only truth 
candidates. For the moment, these putative truths are backed only by a rationally warranted expec-
tation that they may turn out to be true, if all goes well, and no countervailing considerations are 
operative. However, in the final analysis, these candidates may not be able to make good on their 
epistemic claims. Furthermore, while the approach that Vlk and Ossimitz suggest is “paraconsis-
tent" — where the rules of logic are changed to avoid inconsistent results (Vickers, 2010, p. 105) — 
Rescher firmly rejects "logic-driven" approaches in favour of a “content-driven” or “supra-logical” 
 !100
approach (2009, p. 88; see infra). Vickers summarises that on such an approach one decides how 
best to proceed "by considering the material content of the assumptions in question" (2010, p.106). 
5.2.3. An Inconsistent Set 
Rescher’s definition of an aporia stipulates that, taken together, the individual contentions and as-
sertions are mutually incompatible: the cluster is inconsistent. Schwarz makes the same point in (1), 
where he says that the positions oppose each other. The fact that certain claims conflict with others 
might give us reasons for caution, for, as we noted, considerations from logic (i.e., the principle of 
non-contradiction) suggest that at least some — if not all — of the claims involved will have to be 
false. That is, although we had good reasons to believe a claim to be true, the fact that others dis-
agree with us might mean that we were wrong. In this case we are exercising the epistemic value of 
prudence or caution. Thus, David Basinger (2000, 2002) argues that we should take a step back and 
reconsider our positions when differing claims come into purview.  
 However, this argument might not be universally convincing, as it is not self-evident — at 
least not to all — that the existence of differing claims should make us waiver, or move us to recon-
sider the claims that we ourselves have brought to the table: that is, either reconsider the available 
evidence for our beliefs, or reconsider their truth value (i.e., true or false) altogether. The reason 
why we rationally believe our claims is, presumably, that we have some experiential evidence for 
the fact of the matter of our beliefs. Moreover, it might also be the case that this experience — or its 
logical consequences — have been confirmed or validated by a community of equally experienced 
peers. Thus, for all we know, our claims are warranted. Admittedly, the experience of other people 
might have led them to other claims. Nevertheless, we ourselves might have nothing in our experi-
ence that could corroborate theirs, and neither might our own community of peers. Since we had 
good reasons for our beliefs in the first place, we could therefore just sit on our own claims, and 
posit them as true (as far as we know), even in light of epistemic peer conflict. 
 However, we can also bring other epistemic values to bear. For instance, Rescher argues that 
if we want to engross truth (i.e., enlarge our total knowledge), we must be willing to expand our 
horizons, and reconsider our claims. That is, even if we remain convinced of the truth of our claims, 
we should be willing to take the claims of our interlocutor on his or her own terms, and examine 
them on their truth values. After all, doing so we might learn something. Of course, considering 
novel claims does not need to imply that we abandon our own claims. One part of our mind can 
take our own claims to be true — as no definite proof has yet been delivered that they would be 
false —, while another part of our mind is willing to reconsider by investigating novel or even op-
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posing claims. In fact, this strategy is the only way we could ever readjust our conventional beliefs 
in favour of new beliefs.  
5.3. Aporetic Procedures 
As we have stated supra, the inconsistency of claims suggests that the different contentions cannot 
all be right, or true: at least some of them will have to be wrong, or false. Thus, if we accept some 
of the claims, logic will dictate that we deny those claims that are inconsistent with what we 
accept.  However, logic does not dictate which claims we should deny, or what strategy we should 116
use to deny them. To do so, we need an "extra-logical" or “supra-logical” approach to aporias. For 
this purpose, Rescher suggests we turn to aporetics as a theory of rational deliberation in the face of 
inconsistencies. In his recent monograph on aporetic theory — aptly named Aporetics (2009) - 
Rescher not only offers a descriptive explanation of what constitutes an aporia, but also how they 
can be rationally dissolved by means of an aporetic method or procedure. Rescher argues for a gen-
eral and uniform approach to the management of aporias, which he calls coherence tropism via 
plausibility analysis. This aporetic procedure consists of a rational appraisal of the comparative 
plausibility of claims, followed by a breaking of the aporetic chain at its weakest link (Rescher, 
2009, p. 3). Rescher makes three fundamental points in this regard, which we can sum up as fol-
lows: 
(1) the prime directive of cognitive rationality is to maintain and restore consistency;  
(2) the only rationally viable option for doing so is by rejecting (or modifying) claims and taking up 
a specific philosophical position;  
(3) weeding out claims is most successfully done via a plausibility analysis, where the least plausi-
ble claims are rejected. 
5.3.1. Consistency Restoration 
Principle (1) states that the definitive task (or goal) of aporetics is consistency restoration: we aim at 
restoring consistency by bringing back systemic order and coherence into the claims of the aporetic 
cluster (2009, p. 133). Rescher calls this the “prime directive” (2009, p. 3) or the “prime desidera-
tum” (ibid., p. 9). Given that the principle of consistency is one of the cornerstones — and  a princi-
 One of the enduring problems of aporetics will be that we have good reasons to accept all of the individual claims, 116
and that denying some claims will therefore come at a cost. As we will see, an exclusivist approach to aporetics will be 
willing to pay that cost, unlike a pluralist approach.
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pal epistemic value — of rational philosophy, it makes sense that consistency restoration should be 
one of the primary task of aporetics. Nevertheless, Rescher suggests that consistency restoration is 
not the only operative principle. To secure truths, we must accept something and we should not do 
so indiscriminately. We therefore require certain epistemic principles and criteria that can act as 
guidelines in our decision making. Such criteria allow us to sift out what is acceptable — or plausi-
ble in the sense of tenable — and what is not. Consistency and coherence, two prime concerns in 
worldview construction, are examples of such rules. Both often also come in tandem and we could 
argue that consistency is but a stricter and more formal form of coherence. Since to achieve coher-
ence the different components need to fit well within the system we could argue that inconsistency 
is but one type of example of how a component does not fit the larger whole.  
 Many other criteria will be at play (see also chapter 6). Rescher reasons that we do not just 
aim at accepting only truths, but also at accepting all truths –- i.e., we want to engross or enlarge 
truth. The endeavour towards more truth is hindered if all we want to do is secure truths, and avoid 
errors. Hence we require a spirit or epistemic value of pushing beyond what we already know, bold-
ly looking for further truths. Crucially, Rescher argues that in such a case there is “nothing regret-
table, and nothing irrational, about adopting epistemic policies that allow occasional errors –- and 
even inconsistencies –- to slip through the net, provided that the general quality of the catch is high 
enough" (2009, p. 10). He quips that error avoidance “can prove part of that best which is the ene-
my of the good” (ibid., p. 11). Rescher further writes:  
The point is that one can reasonably be in a position of deeming inconsistencies plausible 
when driven to it by the operation of (otherwise defensible) acceptance principles. The very 
drive towards completeness –- itself a key parameter of systematic adequacy –- can and 
does so operate as to enjoin at least temporary and provisional inconsistency toleration 
upon us (ibid., p. 12). 
However, pushing to catch bigger fish — to stick with the fishing analogy — can come at the cost 
of catching less smaller fish, namely those that are more secure. Hence, the epistemic value of try-
ing to catch bigger fish, namely a bigger catch of claims, competes with the epistemic value of se-
curing truths.  In short, although we need epistemic principles for the purpose of deciding on 117
claims, sometimes such epistemic principles can interfere with the operation of others (see also 
 This is however not an either-or situation, but a dialectical one.117
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chapter 6). One implication of this will be that aporiai can become pervasive beyond the mere dif-
ference in first-order claims. As I will show later on, even complete “superclasses” of epistemic cri-
teria — that is, large clusters of similar criteria — can cause such interference. A classic example is 
the insistence of science on mere objective principles, for instance in dialogue with religious world-
views. 
5.3.2. Philosophical Positioning 
Principle (2) states that, in order to escape an aporia, we have to choose between claims, and take 
up a specific philosophical position. Rescher notes that there are always several ways out of an apo-
ria, which can be accomplished by three different techniques: (1) suspension of judgment, (2) thesis 
rejection, and (3) thesis modification. 
5.3.2.1. Suspension of Judgment 
The first way out is not to choose: we simply walk away from the aporia. It must be said that, tech-
nically, this is not a way out of the inconsistency, but merely avoidance of the problem. We abandon 
the particular project or issue, and walk away from the entire aporetic cluster. We opt for a suspen-
sion of judgment, as we choose not to choose between claims. Rescher points out that suspension of 
judgment has lesser intellectual appeal than trying to problem-solve the cluster, and finding out ex-
actly where the difficulty lies. Not choosing, he adds, would “curtail our information” (2009, p. 8) 
— if indeed we value the engrossing of truth —and “plunge us into vacuity” (2007, p. 23). Howev-
er, lesser intellectual appeal, we might add, does not need to imply that there is never any intellectu-
al satisfaction to be had from suspending judgment.  We might under certain conditions value sus118 -
pension of judgment more than impromptu adjudication, for instance in the case of futurological 
beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the future). Consider the belief: “It will rain in Glasgow on April 15th, 
2015”. This statement — trivially perhaps — leads to a contradiction if conjoined with a statement 
of the sort: “It will be sunny in Glasgow on April 15th, 2015.” In an attempt to force a resolution, 
and choose a particular stance, we could argue that on that day it will rain in Glasgow, perhaps 
based on an analysis of weather patterns for all April 15th's of the past hundred years, and plausibly 
expect it to do so. The voice of caution, however — and someone can always be found to voice it 
 One could argue that, because we do not choose or decide, that no intellectual satisfaction is in fact possible here, 118
since not choosing does not add to our knowledge. However, not choosing leaves intact the possibility that we might be 
able to decide one day, and expectation itself can carry a certain satisfaction. Similarly, postponement of satisfying a 
desire can sometimes bring a perhaps counter-intuitive kind of satisfaction.
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— might suggest that we postpone judgement on cases that deal with (distant) future events. We 
could reason that the variables involved in calculating the probability are too numerous to make an 
informed decision; until we know more, we should postpone judgement. If we do so, we prefer the 
epistemic value of security over and above the value of informativeness. To exercise caution is, in 
this case, prudent, and therein lays its rational appeal. Our epistemic value of prudence avoids more 
decisive aporetic techniques in favour of a suspension of judgment.  
 Quine and Ullian (1978) call such a suspension of judgment “non-belief,” in contrast to dis-
belief (i.e., the belief in the falsity of a claim). They argue that our adjustment of inconsistent sets 
may be either decisive or indecisive: “If it is decisive, each belief of the set is either kept or 
switched to disbelief. If it is indecisive some of the beliefs simply give way to non-belief; judgment 
on them is suspended” (1978, p. 19). Crucially, they add: “On the meager data before us, the most 
reasonable course would seem to be to rest with this indecisive outcome pending further 
findings” (ibid., p. 19). In other words, in cases of insufficient data, arguably more benefit can be 
had from taking the middle position between belief and disbelief then to squarely stand behind the 
option of disbelief. Instead of abandoning the claim, we “bracket” it, and file it away as being an 
unresolved claim. This is not dissimilar to a detective having separate file folders: one file folder for 
“closed” cases, which have been resolved, and where we had enough evidence to come to a decisive 
solution; another folder for “cold” cases, where we did not have enough evidence. As anyone 
watching detective shows knows, it is the nature of cold cases that they can always be reopened. If 
more evidence shows up, we can revisit our original claim, and assign it a truth value. The bracket-
ing of claims is specifically relevant for claims that have more than one function in the communica-
tive process. For instance, we can bracket a claim representing a certain communicative function 
(e.g., to express propositional truth), and we take it off the aporetic table. However, we then resub-
mit it to the aporetic table as representing another function (e.g., to express subjective or experien-
tial-expressive truth), which can be achieved by thesis modification (see infra). 
5.3.2.2. Thesis Abandonment 
The most obvious strategy of restoring consistency, Rescher suggests, is by weeding out claims: we 
remove certain claims to make room on the aporetic table for the ones that we want to keep. Thus, 
Rescher notes that any aporia can be resolved by simply abandoning some (or all) of the commit-
ments whose conjoining creates a contradiction (2009, p. 3). He calls this process thesis rejection or 
thesis abandonment. Given that this strategy excludes claims from the global set, we could also call 
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this thesis exclusion. As I will point out in the next chapter, the exclusivist epistemic stance to reli-
gious diversity will depend on thesis exclusion for its aporetic concerns. 
 Rescher argues that there is “no rationally viable alternative” (ibid., p. 4) to rejecting one or 
more of the theses involved since accepting all of them results in inconsistency. Because our cogni-
tive sympathies are overextended we must make curtailments. Something has to give; some of those 
incompatible contentions at issue must be abandoned. Aporias therefore constitute situations of a 
"forced choice" among alternative contentions (ibid., p. 4-6). For instance, the most simple example 
of an aporia is a contradiction, that is, an aporia with just two claims A and B. In order to get rid of 
the inconsistency we choose one claim A, and we reject the other claim B. Only two options are 
available here: either we choose A over B, or we choose B over A. However, an aporia with multi-
ple claims is not any different. We select our basic set of claims, and reject all others that are incon-
sistent with it. The only difference is that the amount of possible exits out of the aporia increases. 
Rescher illustrates this by means of an example that lists a group of contentions formulated by pre-
Socratic philosophers (2009, p. 94): 
(1) Reality is one: Real existence is homogenous. 
(2) Matter is real (self-subsistent). 
(3) Form is real (self-subsistent). 
(4) Matter and form are distinct (heterogenous). 
Propositions (2) to (4) entail that reality is heterogeneous. This entailment contradicts (1) and makes 
the cluster of claims aporetic — given that we have some substantiation for each claim. We now 
have a limited number of exits (i.e., four) out of the aporia, what I will call an aporetic quad: 
(a) denial of (1): we can reason from (2) to (4) to the denial of (1) 
(b) denial of (2): we can reason from (1), (3), and (4) to the denial of (2) 
(c) denial of (3): we can reason from (1), (2), and (4) to the denial of (3) 
(d) denial of (4): we can reason from (1) to (3) to the denial of (4) 
We can choose between four possible exits, and all are reasonable to take. If a position is reasonable 
to take, it is likely that someone will actually do so. Hence, the occurrence of different schools of 
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thought that historically took up each one of those exits.  If these schools are divided on some 119
specific topics, it might be the case that they are united on other topics. Thus we could envision a 
position where, in our search for consensus, only those claims are retained that are agreed upon by 
all parties at the table, and where all issues that are divisive are rejected. However, even in this case 
we are still using the strategy of thesis rejection, viz., we abandon those claims that are inconsistent. 
Doing so, we are not taking up a philosophical position on the divisive issues. For this reason, this 
strategy would still remain dissatisfactory for all parties involved. We can expect the degree of dis-
satisfaction to be proportionate to the perceived importance of the issues involved. A variation on 
this scenario would be an identist pluralist theory that aims to dig out the commonalities between 
worldviews by looking for the deep structures behind claims. Such a theory argues that what is of 
real importance is in fact those deep structures, rather than the surface structure of claims on which 
worldviews differ. 
 Finally, it is not the case that thesis rejection ipso facto leads to a dissensus between parties 
at the table. As an aporetic strategy it is neutral in this regard. For instance, we can have a change of 
heart and reject our claims in favour of alternative claims. Here, we are still using the same method 
of thesis rejection, but we have turned the tables. We now accept what we hitherto rejected, and this 
has now become our own doctrinal position. This type of consensus, however, is based on a capitu-
lation of one's own position, what George Lindbeck (1984) calls “doctrinal capitulation” (see infra). 
5.3.2.3. Thesis Modification 
Although Rescher states that we have no choice but to abandon certain propositions in order to 
restore inconsistency, he also adds that it is often possible to “embody a distinction that makes it 
possible to retain something of what is being abandoned” (Rescher, 2009, p.  121).  He explains: 
To restore consistency among incompatible beliefs calls for abandoning some of them as 
they stand. In general, however, philosophers do not provide for consistency restoration 
wholly by way of rejection. Rather, they have recourse to modification, replacing the aban-
doned belief with a duly qualified revision thereof. Since (by hypothesis) each thesis be-
longing to an aporetic cluster is individually attractive, simple rejection lets the case for the 
rejected thesis go unacknowledged. Only by modifying the thesis through a resort to dis-
 Historical examples of (a) are the pluralism of Anaxagoras, and the form/matter dualism of Aristotle; of (b),  the ide119 -
alism of the Eleatics (the school of thought founded by Parmenides), and Platonic idealism; of (c), materialism in the 
form of atomism; of (d), the dual-aspect theory of Pythagoreanism. See Rescher, 2009, p. 94.
 !107
tinctions can one manage to give proper recognition to the full range of considerations that 
initially led into aporetic difficulty (ibidem, p. 121). 
Rescher does make it clear that thesis modification is still a form of abandonment since we abandon 
the original formulation of the claim. Here, however, the original claim is not just abandoned 
wholesale but is replaced by a new and qualified version. To illustrate thesis modification, Rescher 
gives an example taken from the well-known Christian theological problem of evil: 
(1) The world was created by God   
(2) The world contains evil  
(3) A creator is responsible for all defects of his creation  
(4) God is not responsible for the evils of this world  
Since (1) God created the world, he is (3) responsible for all aspects of nature, which therefore in-
cludes (2) the occurrence of evil in the world. However, this is in contradiction with (4). Rescher 
suggests that we can introduce a distinction between (a) causal responsibility and (b) moral respon-
sibility. On this view, the causal responsibility of an agent does not by necessity entail a moral re-
sponsibility for the consequences of his acts. For causal responsibility, (3) is true but (4) false; for 
moral responsibility, (4) is true but (3) is false. Thus, we can retain theses (1) and (2), and modify 
(3) and (4) on the basis of each side of the distinction: 
(1) The world was created by God   
(2) The world contains evil  
(3.1) A creator is causally responsible for all defects of his creation. 
(4.1) God is not morally responsible for the evils of this world. 
The end result is that we have successfully restored consistency on the basis of a distinction. Once 
the distinction is introduced, no matter which way we turn in construing responsibility, the inconsis-
tency operative in the aporia is averted. However, this solution also comes at a cost since the origi-
nal formulation has been abandoned.  
 Rescher further suggests that the making of distinctions is a dialectical process: “a Hegelian 
ascent rising above the level of antagonistic positions to that of a ‘higher' conception, in which the 
opposites are reconciled” (1985, p. 294). In this Hegelian process we abandon the initial thesis and 
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move toward its counter-thesis by way of a “duly hedged synthesis” (ibid.). Rescher compares this 
higher-order ascent to a principle forwarded by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, which Rescher refers to as 
Ramsey's Maxim: 
 In such cases it is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two disputed views 
 but in some third possibility which has not yet been thought of, which we can only discover 
 by rejecting something assumed as obvious by both disputants (Ramsey, 1931, p. 115-116; 
 quoted in Rescher, 1985, p. 294). 
On Ramsey's view, distinctions provide for a higher synthesis of opposing views. However, even  a 
synthesis rejects something previously assumed. Since synthesis is based on a strategy of thesis re-
jection, and thesis modification is but a soft form of thesis rejection — splitting certain theses into 
acceptable and unacceptable parts —, any synthesis can be seen as taking up one philosophical (or 
worldview) position amongst others. That is, synthetic worldviews are equally vying for aporetic 
supremacy. On Vidal's account, as we have seen, synthesis is a third-order activity and the culmina-
tion of the philosophy of worldviews. Moreover, it consists of a "dialectical investigation" that is 
exploited "in a doctrinal way" (2012, p. 312). From this follows that synthesis produces a specific 
philosophical stance. Recher argues that the synthesis thesis (i.e., contradictions must result in a 
higher synthesis of opposing views) seems plausible, but that it also has shortcomings. He writes: 
For in most realistic cases the two disputed views — alongside with the "third possibility" 
itself — are simply part of an inconsistent n-ad of alternatives which cannot be gotten rid 
of, but simply breaks out again in a more sophisticated form even after the "third possibili-
ty" is introduced (1978, p. 222). 
In other words, synthesis does not necessarily get rid of aporetic clusters. Thus, Rescher concludes 
that although such distinctions avert immediate cognitive conflict, they seldom settle controverted 
issues in a definitive way since they “always leave a crucial evaluative issue hanging in the air: the 
issue of priority" (1985, p. 295). The issue of priority, then, is at the core of Rescher's aporetic 
method. 
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5.3.3. Plausibility Analysis 
To recapitulate, so far I have discussed that Rescher’s aporetic procedure consists of restoring con-
sistency to aporetic sets, either by weeding out claims or by modifying them. However, we still 
have to review how the aporetic decider is supposed to accomplish this. Although it is possible to 
take any way out of an aporia by removing what is inconsistent and taking up a certain (philosophi-
cal) position, we still need some sort of rational account to justify this process. Thus, principle (3) 
suggests that we require a "plausibility analysis.” This strategy allows us to break the inconsistent 
chain of claims by removing the comparatively least plausible data, i.e., the "weakest link.” Resch-
er (2009, p. 20) argues that thesis plausibility is grounded in (a) a thesis-warranting source (i.e., ev-
identiation), and/or (b) a thesis-warranting principle. The first horn states that we require some evi-
dence in order for a claim to be plausible. The second horn, Rescher suggests, is composed of such 
"inductive desiderata" as simplicity, uniformity (i.e., treating like cases alike), consistency, speci-
ficity, definiteness, determinativeness, naturalness, etc. These include not only formal, but also var-
ious material criteria, like closeness to common sense, explanatory adequacy, inherent plausibility, 
allocations of presumption, and burden of proof. The central idea behind the thesis-warranting prin-
ciple is that the more simple, uniform, specific, and definite a thesis appears to be, the more we can 
count it as plausible.  
 From this list of criteria, Rescher considers simplicity to act as a “crucial entry point for 
plausibility considerations” (2009, p. 20). However, it does not necessarily follow that (1) simplici-
ty is the only entry point, or that (2) simplicity is of prime importance. Firstly, Rescher understands 
the different principles as injunctions, i.e., procedural and regulative principles of presumption. In 
the case of simplicity, the injunction becomes: “Other things being anything like equal, give prece-
dence to simpler hypotheses vis-à-vis more complex ones” (2009, p. 20). In the same way, unifor-
mity, specificity, etc., can all serve as “plausibilistic guides” to reasoning (Jaquette, 2009, p. 34). 
Secondly, if simplicity is of prime importance then we need some sort of justification for why it is 
to be set apart from all others (i.e., uniformity, specificity, etc). This does not seem to be a straight-
forward undertaking, if only because the effects of such principles are hard to differentiate. For in-
stance, a uniform set of theses would be considered more simple than one that isn't. But is the set 
more plausible on the basis of its uniformity or on the basis of its simplicity? Therefore, Rescher’s 
thesis-warranting principles seem to be all functionally equal in providing us with entry points into 
which claims are most plausible. However, this does in turn need not imply that they also all have 
the same valuational weight.  
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 As stated, Rescher suggests that, in order to dissolve the aporia, we conduct a comparative 
analysis of the relative strengths of the various courses of positive argumentation, on the basis of 
the assumption is that this will lead us to “the weakest link” in the chain. This strategy of removing 
the weakest link, however, is not a novel suggestion. For instance, Quine and Ullian write:  
Now when a set of beliefs is inconsistent, at least one of the beliefs must be rejected as 
false; but a question may remain open as to which to reject. Evidence must then be as-
sessed, with a view to rejecting the least firmly supported of the conflicting beliefs (Quine 
& Ullian, 1978, p. 16).  
The least firmly supported of the conflicting beliefs, on their account, is the one "which has the 
weakest evidence" (Quine, 1978, p. 17). However, the assessment of evidence is not as such a self-
evident procedure. As Rescher points out, the “acceptability of the overall argumentation turns piv-
otally upon the conclusions to which it leads” (1978, p. 224; 1985, p. 93). In other words, how we 
evaluate the strength of the philosophical argument is at least in part dependent on the outcome of 
our aporetic efforts. What makes plausible data acceptable is whether a specific aporetic outcome is 
acceptable to us. 
 Both concepts of plausibility and acceptability feature heavily in Rescher's works, and often 
interchangeably so. If we follow the textbook definition of plausibility, a claim is plausible if it has 
a reasonable basis for belief and acceptance.  When we ask how plausible a claim is, we are ask120 -
ing how acceptable it is to us. From this follows that plausibility and acceptance are semantically 
related concepts.  
 However, both concepts also seem to fulfil separate functions in Rescher’s work. For in-
stance, Rescher distinguishes between the plausibility or acceptability of the antecedents (i.e.,the 
terminus a quo), and the plausibility or acceptability of the consequences (i.e., the terminus ad 
quem) (1985, p. 93; 2006, p. 128). Elsewhere, he distinguishes between the "acceptability of some 
of its [i.e, the aporia] particular theses" and "its overall acceptability" (1985, p. 98; between square 
brackets mine). This functional differentiation also reflects the fact that Rescher distinguishes be-
tween two different phases of justification: (1) a first phase of supportive or positive argumentation, 
and (2) a second phase of eliminative or negative argumentation. Both phases aim to answer two 
 The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy states: "A claim is plausible if it subjectively seems worthy of be120 -
lief even if we have not necessarily studied its objective ground. Plausibility is thus acceptable credibility, and its degree 
of credibility can depend in part on the authority that advocates it. A plausible claim can turn out to be false, and an im-
plausible claim can turn out to be true. People can disagree on what they find plausible" (Bunnin and Yu, 2004, p. 533).
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separate questions on the issue of plausibility: (1) what procedure is to be used in qualifying a 
proposition for data-hood, and (2) how do we eliminate overcommitment when too many truth can-
didates are on the table.  
5.3.3.1. Positive Argumentation 
The first phase of positive argumentation is designed to settle the plausibility of the aporetic com-
ponents and their qualification for data-hood. It asks the question which claims we should allow on 
the aporetic table. As stated earlier, Rescher understands the claims of aporetic sets as "plausible 
data,” implying that the acceptance of a proposition as a truth candidate is not outright acceptance at 
all, but a “provisional and conditional epistemic inclination towards it” (2009, p. 13). Nevertheless, 
Rescher writes that plausible data exert "some degree of cognitive pressure" (1985, p. 19): they 
have some epistemic merit, and some claim upon us. Classing a claim as a plausible datum still im-
plies a “committal position” with respect to it (2009, p. 14). Hence, it is this cognitive pressure —
the fact that we have some good reasons — that brings claims together into aporetic clusters.  
 One might object that worldview claims, which come together at the boundaries of world-
views, do not normally have such a status of truth candidacy, particularly when those claims are 
central doctrines of the worldviews in question. Therefore, in order for Rescher’s account to still 
apply the parties involved would have to revert the status of their claims from outright acceptance 
to provisional candidacy. This begs the question why and how the different parties would do so. In 
response, we could argue that aporias, in such cases, are artificial edifices that are temporarily con-
structed for the sake of dialogue, that is, for the sake of the possibility of furthering our knowledge. 
Thus, the notion of candidacy is introduced on neutral grounds, and the aporetic principles would 
apply within this construct. 
 Furthermore, since plausible data are not truths as such, Rescher grants that the use of his 
aporetic method will not in the end provide a guarantee of truth. What aporetics aims to accomplish 
is to optimise beliefs and “to maximise plausibility via considerations of systemic coherence in mat-
ters of question-resolution” (2009, p. 3). This aim is subject to the idea that the “most plausible 
prospect has a favourable assumption on its side” (ibid., p. 19). Thus we need a further account of 
which claims are "most" plausible — stated differently, which of our "good reasons" for the theses 
on the table turn out to be the best. 
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5.3.3.2. Negative Argumentation 
The second phase of negative argumentation aims to settle the acceptability or comparative plausi-
bility of claims: which of the plausible claims on the table should we keep and which should we 
remove? Paradoxically, this allows us to state that thesis plausibility as an eliminative practice does 
not involve arguing for the plausibility of claims, but rather for the acceptability of what are plausi-
ble data. Here, the defining question is whether the claims in question are acceptable, and not 
whether they are plausible, as this was prima facie established when the aporia as such emerged. On 
this account, acceptability equals plausibility of the consequences, since this determines "the rela-
tive acceptability of the various theses that are party to the conflict" (Rescher, 1985 , p. 96).  
 Rescher’s modus operandi of aporetic decision-making consists of the evaluation and ap-
praisal of the costs-and-benefits of the several alternatives on the table. This analysis is to be effect-
ed by means of “a weighing of the standing of the alternatives vis-à-vis various parameters of merit 
and demerit" (1978, p. 97). We use various epistemic criteria (i.e., parameters; see chapter 6) to de-
cide which theses have more or less merit. Although we have forwarded presumptive data that are 
individually plausible, we need some epistemic criteria for finding the most plausible data in order 
to eliminate claims. Rescher calls such criteria “situationally appropriate right-of-way considera-
tions” (2009, p. 133). These considerations assist us with aporetic management by means of a cost-
benefit analysis of removing inconsistency. Since different cognitive enterprises have different aims 
and objectives, different rules of prioritising will be in effect.  
 Crucially, the “right-of-way rules” that we apply have to fit the teleology of the epistemic 
domain, which Rescher describes as “the functionality of purpose that defines the goal structure of 
the particular cognitive realm at issue” (2009, p. 137). The criteria (and standards) are articulated in 
terms of an optimal cognitive harmonisation with our experience: a “conformity to the fundamental 
commitments at which one arrives on the basis of the general course of one’s experience" (2009, p. 
137). Thus, while the same fundamental aporetic goal prevails throughout al the variant situations, 
the proper ways and means by which this is to accomplished will be detailed by the “epistemic ob-
jectives that characterise the particular situation at hand” (2009, p. 139). From this follows that the 
“probative orientation” taken up towards the appraisal of theses and arguments is thoroughly axio-
logical in nature (2006, p.130). Each probative orientation expresses certain value predispositions 
that operate to mark solutions to aporias as acceptable to us from our given position. However, this 
"given position" comes at the outset of our aporetic deliberations, i.e. a priori, and before philo-
sophical reflection and systematisation. As Rescher writes: 
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[They come] from our culture, the "spirit of the times," the heritage of our teachers and 
their enemies, the course of our experiences, our own personality, even the stage of devel-
opment of inclination of a single individual. They are not stable or intersubjective but vari-
able and even to some extent person-relative (2006, p. 229). 
Rescher insists that such probative orientational disagreement (i.e., disagreement about epistemic 
values), as distinct from the doctrinal disagreement of our aporias, is not itself doctrinal (i.e., about 
material theses or contentions). He writes: 
It is regulative rather than constitutive; methodological rather than substantive. It relates to 
the procedural frame of reference, rather than to material that is emplaced within such a 
frame. It is a matter of the standards and criteria through which a solution to a question can 
be validated as acceptable (2006, p. 130). 
However, we can argue that the epistemic criteria are still part and parcel of our worldview, even if 
they are not expressed through specific theses. They still form the “framework” (i.e., the probative 
orientation) for our aporetic concerns, or, more generally, for our concerns vis-à-vis the acceptance 
of worldview beliefs. They frame what kind of claims we can accept in the first place, and are there-
fore present in the background. 
 Although Rescher seems to use the terms criteria and standards interchangeably, I posit that 
our understanding of Aporetics would benefit from a further clarification and differentiation. for 
instance, Stanley Louis Cavell considers criteria to be "specifications a given person or group sets 
up on the basis of which (by means of, in terms of which) to judge (assess, settle) whether some-
thing has a particular status or value" (1979, p. 9; between brackets his). Criteria are means by 
which "a given group judges or selects or assesses value or membership in some special 
status" (ibidem, p. 11). Similarly, the goal of aporetic settlement is to confer the status of the accep-
tance of candidates, and the status of having reached a satisfactory conclusion. However, while cri-
teria determine whether a datum is generally "of the right kind" (i.e., a relevant candidate), stan-
dards determine the "degree" (or grade) to which a candidate satisfies those criteria: they determine 
"the fit of the announced criteria in the individual case" (ibid., p. 11). Standards therefore function 
as practical tests as to whether a given datum fits the general criteria or not. While criteria set the 
general framework, standards are needed to subject each claim to an assessment. This interplay be-
tween criteria and standards, Cavell argues, may either be taken for granted, or highly articulated. In 
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some cases, he explains, criteria are explicitly granted and the emphasis falls wholly upon stan-
dards. As an example Cavell mentions diving competitions: 
The judge has a more or less clear area of discretion in the application of standards, but 
none whatever over the set of criteria he is obliged to apply. It is expected that judges will 
differ over how well the diver entered the water (such is the point of having judges), but not 
over whether excellence of entry into the water is a criterion of the excellence of a dive 
(Cavell, 1979, p. 12). 
In the above example, all of the judges (i.e., our aporetic decision makers) have agreed to follow the 
same criteria, to such a degree that the criteria are taken for granted. What different judges will dis-
agree about, when judging competitions, is not the set of criteria, but the application of standards, 
that is, to which degree the criteria are deemed to be fulfilled by the divers. Thus, aporetic decision 
makers can agree upon criteria of acceptability for aporetic claims, but differ on the standards, that 
is, the degree to which different claims are in fact acceptable on the basis of those criteria. Making 
the difference between criteria and standards explicit gives us further insight in how different 
aporetic deciders come to different positions. Not only the application of different epistemic criteria 
will lead one to take different outcomes out if an aporia, even when the same axiological framework 
is used differences might still occur in the final assessment of claims. 
 However, while this makes clear that we can have consensus in criteria and dissensus on 
standards, Cavell points out further differences between the two concepts. For instance, he adds that 
judges of law seem to differ from judges in competitive games such as diving competitions. Like 
judges in competitive games, judges of law are "incompetent to alter the criteria by which it decides 
the individual case" (1979, p. 12). However, a given case in law may raise controversy over just 
which established criteria it satisfies or escapes. In such cases, the judge must decide "the identity 
of the case in question, i.e., which established criteria, if any, apply to it" (ibid., p. 12). Although the 
criteria are decided by law, the judge still has a level of flexibility in that he or she must identify 
what kind of criteria apply in this case. Of course, if one does not agree with the judgement of the 
court judge, one can always make an appeal, and ask for a reassessment of the case by another court 
or another judge. Although this seems rather irrelevant when the aporetic decider is an individual, in 
the case of religious worldviews, the criteria for worldview assessment will often be provided by 
the group. Thus, differences can occur between or within communities where one differs not on the 
set of epistemic criteria, but on which criteria apply in which aporetic context. 
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 Finally, Cavell adds that the divers, in the competitive game example, are not primarily 
competing against one another, but rather, each is competing against the perfect dive. Similarly, the 
adversaries in court cases are not primarily in competition with one another; rather, they are in 
competition for, what Cavell calls, the favour of the law. We could call this the ideal principle be-
hind the relevant set of criteria. 
5.4. Critique/Response 
Stephen Boulter has forwarded a critique of Rescher’s method stating that the present method is in-
sufficient for aporia resolution. The crux of Rescher’s method is that (a) aporias are solved by 
means of a prioritisation of epistemic principles, and that (b) the choice of epistemic principles de-
pends on the domain of deliberation: 
All in all… the rationale for a particular mode of prioritisation lies in the specific goal and 
purpose of the domain of deliberation at hand. Just this essentially pragmatic consideration 
must be allowed to determine the correlative principle of prioritisation (Rescher, 2009, p. 
199; also quoted in Boulter, 2013b, p. 39). 
The butt of Boulter’s criticism is (b), which he finds lacking for two reasons: (1) frequently there is 
no single domain involved in the case of an aporia; (2) even if there was a single domain involved, 
merely identifying the goal or purpose of a domain does not allow one to adjudicate which claims 
are more plausible. On the basis of this, Boulter concludes: 
So, while Rescher has a very clear view of the nature of the philosophical dilemma, he has 
yet to provide a principled way of making the less plausible give way to greater plausibility 
because the pragmatic method never really addresses the issue of relative plausibility at all. 
(Boulter, 2013, p. 39). 
Boulter’s critique therefore implies that Rescher does not actually offer a pragmatic method for es-
tablishing relative plausibility, that is, comparative plausibility. In order to deal with this criticism, I 
will first analyse whether stating one’s epistemic goals is an insufficient strategy for determining 
the plausibility of theses in general, and then examine whether the same strategy will also be insuf-
ficient for determining comparative plausibility. If the outcome of my first analysis is positive — 
i.e., the strategy is insufficient for determining plausibility — this will also knock down the second 
 !116
leg. To defend Rescher’s approach I will present an example that involves different domains of de-
liberation, which is Boulter’s strongest case (see 1). 
 As Rescher has pointed out, our criteria need to fit the goals of the domain. Take the above 
example of a swimming competition. Let us assume there are three judges that operate within three 
different domains: (1) the first judge wants to know who swims fastest, (2) the second judge wants 
to know who swims most beautifully, and (3) the third judge wants to know who swims most syn-
chronously. The three judges represent three “domains of deliberation,” taken in fact from three ex-
isting types of swimming competitions: competitive swimming, diving competitions, and syn-
chronous swimming competitions. Each domain presents the judge with probative criteria and stan-
dards. The first judge will apply the criterion of speed. Not only can he or she determine visually 
who swims fastest, but the actual speed of the contestants can be determined by the use of 
chronometers (i.e., measuring time and therefore overall speed) and speedometers. The second 
judge, who wants to know who swims more beautifully, will rely perhaps on a variety of criteria, 
such as elegance, fluidity of motion, and so on. The third judge wants to know whom of the differ-
ent swimmers (or teams of swimmers) is most capable of swimming synchronously. He or she 
might use a variety of criteria such as timing, correctness of movement, etc, across the different 
swimmers. In each of those cases, knowing the goals of the domain in question (i.e., speed, beauty 
of execution, and synchronicity) determines the type of criteria that would allow us to judge. There-
fore, the judge who judges speed would be able to assess speed, and pick a winner. Similarly, we 
can assume that the judge who judges beauty of execution would be able to come to a decision as 
well, based on parameters and criteria relevant to that type of sport. Finally the judge who judges 
synchronicity would use criteria specific to the goal of the domain in question.  
 Therefore, it should be clear from this that, if a judge who judges speed were to judge any of 
the other competitions, he or she would be operating from a probative orientation that does not fit 
the context. This does not mean that his set of criteria, having to do with speed, would be necessari-
ly completely irrelevant to all other domains. It might be the case that speed also plays a role in 
judging beauty of execution, or synchronicity. But even if it were, it seems prima facie unlikely that 
it would be the primary criterion. Similarly, some of the criteria used to judge beauty of execution 
might also play a role in judging synchronous swimming competition: but here as well, on their 
own, these criteria seem insufficient for us to arrive at an assessment, since the criteria used would 
not completely fit the goal of the domain (i.e., the sport) in question. Knowing the goal of the do-
main therefore is crucial in helping us to decide which criteria are to be taken into account in mak-
ing assessments. Moreover, this is also an eliminative process: we choose some criteria over and 
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against others. Therefore, comparative plausibility is already built into — or suggested by — the 
domain in question. Knowing the epistemic domain allows us to establish the comparative plausi-
bility of criteria, which allows us to establish the comparative plausibility of claims. 
 In conclusion, it seems Boulter’s criticism lacks some bite. Of course, it might always be 
possible that — in some cases — stating one’s epistemic goals is an insufficient strategy. However, 
all I needed to do was to deny Boulter’s absolute claim that merely identifying the goal or purpose 
of a domain does not allow one to adjudicate which claims are more plausible. 
5.5. Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter I will point out how the above discussion satisfies three different goals for 
this chapter, namely, (1) to show how the problem of religious diversity constitutes an aporia, (2) to 
show how Aporetics satisfies the primary concerns of a Philosophy of Religions, and (3) to show 
how Aporetics presents us with a therapeutic tool for addressing such problems. 
 Having argued in chapter 2 how the problem of religious diversity represents a first-order 
problem of conflicting worldview claims, I am now able to state that such a problem is aporetic, 
i.e., constitutes an aporia, given that (a) worldview claims come together in both formal and infor-
mal settings of worldview comparison and dialogue, (b) such claims represent plausible data, but 
are (c) mutually inconsistent.  
 In this chapter, I have also showed how aporetics leads us to two separate issues: (a) the is-
sue of the plausibility of claims, and (b) the issue of the acceptability of claims. Both issues are in 
fact on the agenda of a Philosophy of Worldviews as set out by Ninian Smart (chapter 1). Firstly, 
Smart argues that one of the first desiderata of worldview theory is the analysis of worldviews. 
Smart sees it as one of the tasks of such an analysis to deliberate on the reasons for or against 
worldview claims. If so, then one of its tasks would in fact be to address the plausibility of world-
view claims. Secondly, in order to settle aporetic conflict, we also need a further analysis, viz., an 
investigation of what kind of criteria are being applied to our plausible data. In other words, how do 
we decide which claims are better, if they are equally justified? Such a concern is dependent on the 
analysis of criteria within the context of worldview analysis as comparative analysis. However, the 
question of what kind of criteria we have available is itself a desideratum for the Philosophy of 
Worldviews, namely, a higher-order one that requires a meta-analysis (see chapter 6). 
 Finally, on the basis of this chapter we can arrive at a tentative model for aporetic resolution 
consisting of four distinct steps:: 
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1. we can weed out inconsistent claims by the aporetic strategies of thesis rejection (i.e., thesis ex-
clusion) and thesis modification (i.e., thesis inclusion) — we make a surgical incision into the 
aporetic set, and restore consistency; 
2. finding out where and how to incise the aporetic set is achieved by means of a comparative 
plausibility analysis, focused on determining “the weakest link;” 
3. to find the weakest link, we apply a “probative orientation,” which consists of a number of epis-
temic right-of-way criteria;  
4. our choice of criteria is dependent on the goal(s) of the particular probative domain. 
In my next chapter, I will address Smart’s final and primary desideratum, namely an analysis of our 
right-of-way criteria. In particular, I will demonstrate how the three worlds defined by Habermas 
constitute three different “probative domains,” which will determine what kind of criteria we will 
have available for the resolution of our aporetic conflicts. 
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6. Worldview Criteria 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present an analysis and clarification of the criteria for determining the “truth” 
of claims, where truth is to be understood as the acceptability of claims. This concern is congruent 
with Rescher’s analysis of the primary factor in aporetic deliberations, viz., the need for right-of-
way criteria (see chapter 5). Thus, I will expand upon Rescher's notion of criteria of acceptability 
by specifying three “super-classes” of criteria — namely objective, subjective and intersubjective 
criteria. Following Heylighen (1993, 1997, 2000) and Vidal (2008, 2012), I will show how these 
super-classes of criteria act as parameters for the validity claims inherent in speech acts. Doing so, I 
will tie together three previous strands, namely Habermas’s notion of validity claims (chapter 3), 
Lindbeck’s analysis of religious language (chapter 4), and Rescher’s theory of Aporetics (chapter 
5). Firstly, I will introduce the work of Francis Heylighen (6.2.1), who argued for the notion of “se-
lection criteria” for worldviews, as well as further developments by Clément Vidal (6.2.2). Second-
ly, I will discuss the different classes of criteria in depth with a reference to Smart’s observations on 
similar issues (6.3-5). 
6.2. Criteria for Worldview Acquisition 
6.2.1. Francis Heylighen 
The Belgian cyberneticist and systems theorist Francis Heylighen has written several papers on 
"selector mechanisms" that can be found behind the acquisition of worldviews (Heylighen, 1993, 
1997, 2000). Heylighen argues that the acceptance of "knowledge" by a given worldview communi-
ty depends on several independent "selection criteria" (1997, p. 63).  On his view, only certain 121
beliefs constitute knowledge for a worldview community. The process of selection of acceptable 
beliefs is done via the implicit or explicit application of a number of criteria, which can be divided 
into three different classes: objective, subjective, and intersubjective (see Table 6). As an heir to 
Apostel’s worldview project, Heylighen writes within the fields of evolutionary epistemology and 
selection theory. The former — its name coined by Donald T. Campbell (1974) — represents a nat-
uralistic and scientific approach to epistemology. As the name already suggests, this discipline at-
 The term ‘acceptance of knowledge’ is slightly ambiguous in Heylighen’s phrasing. Surely, what Heylighen means 121
to say is the acceptance of propositions as knowledge by a community. I consider the community to play an essential 
part and an active role in the process of justifying claims (see supra). Heylighen’s wording ‘acceptance of knowledge’ 
would suggest or denote a more passive role. Since this would not be consistent with his work, I suspect this is merely 
an oversight. 
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tempts to address questions in the theory of knowledge from an evolutionary point of view (Bradie 
and Harms, 2012). 
Table 6: Heylighen’s Criteria. 
Evolutionary epistemology — which I will shorten to Evo-Epi  — emphasises the importance of 122
natural selection in two primary roles. In the first role, selection is the generator and maintainer of 
the reliability of our senses and cognitive mechanisms, as well as the “fit” between those mecha-
nisms and the world. In the second role, trial-and-error learning and the evolution of scientific theo-
ries are construed as selection processes (Bradie and Harms, 2012).  
 However, Heylighen opts for what he calls a more functional methodology. Combining Evo-
Epi with insights from cybernetics, he characterises this particular approach as evolutionary-cyber-
netic epistemology (ECE), which "puts more emphasis on the structure of cognitive systems, on the 
processes by which they are constructed, on the control they provide over the environment, and on 
the communication of knowledge” (Heylighen, 1997, p. 63). 
 Thus, within the context of ECE, Heylighen argues that we can identify three classes of se-
lector criteria implicit in the work of Campbell (1990, 1997).  Heylighen identifies these as objec123 -
tive, subjective, and intersubjective, which he considers to denote “superclasses," since they are 
open to further refinement into subclasses. In line with his ECE approach, Heylighen describes the 
selector criteria according to the role they play in the evolution of knowledge. Thus, objective crite-
Objective Criteria: Subjective Criteria: Intersubjective Criteria:
1.Invariance; 1.Individual Utility; 1. Publicity;
2. Distinctiveness; 2. Simplicity; 2. Expressivity;
3. Controllability; 3. Coherence; 3. Formality;
4. Novelty; 4. Collective Utility;
5. Conformity;
6. Authority;
 I was inspired by the example of Evo-Devo, short for evolutionary developmental biology. See Sean B. Carroll, End122 -
less Forms Most Beautiful, 2005. On a side note, the curious title of Carroll's book references a Charles Darwin quote.
 Campbell's 1990 article was also published as a book section in Nicholas Rescher's Evolution, Cognition, and Real123 -
ism (1990).
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ria aim for selection for fit to the outside object; subjective criteria deal with selection for accep-
tance by the individual subject; finally, intersubjective criteria aim for selection for sharing between 
subjects. From this we can glean three principal concepts, namely, (a) subjective acceptance, (b) 
intersubjective sharing, and (c) objective fitness. If Heylighen is right, then this allows us to con-
clude that a system of beliefs (i.e., a worldview) will be successful — that is, survive within cogni-
tive systems that are human beings— if it can be (a) subjectively accepted, (b) shared with peers, 
and (c) fits the objective world. On this account, the acceptability of claims will depend on three 
types of coherence, or what we can call “fitness” in terms of Heylighen’s evolutionary approach. In 
other words, a single logic operates behind all three concepts, namely, they all express "selection by 
fitness." In other words, beliefs will be selected on the basis of (a) objective fitness (it needs to fit 
the objective world), (b) subjective fitness (it needs to fit the individual), and (c) intersubjective fit-
ness (it needs to fit the community). In Darwinian evolutionary theory, fitness only pertains to the 
objective world, since the objective world is where living beings "exist." Ideas and beliefs, howev-
er, even if their referents exist in the objective world (Popper's World 1), "exist" in the minds of 
cognitive systems, that is human beings.  
 We can also express the same idea in reference to coherence theories and Habermas’s epis-
temological world theory. Within this framework we could state that our worldview beliefs ideally 
cohere with (a) the external world, (b) the internal world, and (c) the social world. Importantly, 
Heylighen and Campbell both agree that it is impossible to separate the different selectors fully 
since they all impinge on the evolution of knowledge. In other words, the overall probability that a 
belief will be selected (i.e., accepted by the individual or community) will be a "weighted sum" of 
the degrees to which each of the individual criteria are fulfilled. An idea or belief that scores high 
on one superclass, but low on another, will be less likely to survive selection (i.e., in our aporetic 
deliberations) than beliefs that score high on both counts. From this follows that ideas will be in 
competition with one another in order to survive, and make the selection. Certain ideas will win the 
competition in certain contexts but will lose in other contexts. Thus, each set of ideas is adapted to 
its particular niche, and is “fittest” only within that context. Similarly, within a single niche, some 
ideas will be fitter than others. No single criterion will be able to guarantee selection or provide jus-
tification for a belief’s validity. This leads Heylighen to conclude that the more criteria a belief sat-
isfies, and the higher the degree of satisfaction, the “fitter” the belief will be (1997, p. 64).   124
 And the more likely it will win the competition with rival beliefs, as for instance when beliefs compete for survival 124
in an aporetic context.
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 It should be clear from this that worldviews, and in particular institutionalised worldviews, 
are the result of previous “competitions.” That is, the claims within our worldview are already 
proven to be fittest. When worldviews come into contact with each other they enter a new competi-
tion: they are again under cognitive pressure for survival. If we were able to “score” every idea (i.e., 
to record how well they do), then it would seem logically possible that one idea, or group of ideas, 
is markedly "better" than any other idea. If we do so for religious worldviews, it would be possible 
that one religion scores better on all criteria, or better on more criteria than any other religion. Thus, 
given that there are a limited number of religions in the actual world, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that we could in fact find out whether one religion scores best, given that we can score them in the 
first place. We could then be led to believe that the rational choice is to accept the “best” perform-
ing religion, and get rid of the “lesser” performing religions. Such a strategy would be congruent 
with the epistemic positions of both the exclusivist and the inclusivist (see chapter 2). However, this 
strategy is also common amongst pluralists. If this strategy seems intuitively right, then this is due 
to the fact that acceptability of claims is based on our own preferential selection of epistemic crite-
ria. 
 Heylighen further suggests two general principles: (a) all the criteria will play a role in the 
selection of ideas; (b) the sum total of criteria will be unevenly distributed. If we compare Hey-
lighen's selection criteria to the trifecta or integral of validity claims, and assume their equivalence, 
then (a) follows from the integrated nature of each of the different validity claims within general 
speech acts. That is, since speech acts usually exhibit objective, subjective and intersubjective as-
pects, it will follow that all of the criteria will apply. Of course, this needs to be qualified. As we 
have seen, the worldview holder, who selects belief for worldview construction, takes a stance by 
preferentially selecting certain criteria above others. Hence, the sum total of criteria will be “un-
evenly distributed.” This will include the deliberate de-selection of certain criteria: that is, certain 
criteria will be ignored to make room for others. For one, this will be due to the fact that some crite-
ria will be mutually exclusive. If this is correct, then we can modify Heylighen's claim and stating 
that all criteria will potentially play a role. Whether they do so, in the end, depends on the valua-
tional orientation of the worldview holder.  
 Heylighen further adds that we can encounter cases were the principles mentioned above are 
deliberately thwarted. For instance, science as a social institution and as a method explicitly pro-
motes objective criteria. At the same time, it aims to neutralise those criteria that are likely to de-
tract from the objectivity of its enterprise (e.g., authority not backed by expertise, conformity for 
conformity’s sake, and utility for the pure sciences). What is more, Heylighen argues that the objec-
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tive criteria have come to be built into the scientific method itself — a phenomenon known as “vic-
arious selectors” — rather than as an outside force to which knowledge is subjected.  Heylighen 125
concludes that, since other forms of knowledge are not selected at this level, “they will evolve in a 
less efficient way and are therefore likely to be of lower quality” (Heylighen, 1997, p. 65-57). 
 Returning to Habermas, speech acts typically raise three different validity claims, and they 
usually do so implicitly or unconsciously. Once one becomes aware of the different validity claims 
— that is, the objective, subjective and intersubjective parameters that permit or limit what one can 
say trough language — one can explicitly raise certain validity claims. Since science is oriented to-
wards the objective world, its further progress is premised on becoming aware if its own methods, 
and thereby internalising objective criteria. Religious belief systems, although concerned with ob-
jective truth as well, have not (yet) followed science down this road. If religious worldviews come 
out of the assessment (i.e., science versus religion) as of inferior quality, then this assessment is 
based on the preferential primacy of objective criteria. However, as I have made clear in my discus-
sion on Lindbeck and the nature of religious language, religious worldviews have used the full tri-
fecta of validity claims to argue for religious claims. They, at times, have argued for propositional 
truth, as well as for subjective truthfulness and normative rightness. Religious worldviews, there-
fore, are not necessarily bound to objective parameters. However, if a religious worldview specifi-
cally aims to make claims that pertain to the objective world, it should be subject to the same objec-
tive criteria as “objective” worldviews. However, most religious traditions have held back from en-
tering such formal discourse — what Habermas would call empirical or theoretical discourse 
(Habermas, 1984). Religious believers have used several strategies for doing so. For instance, some 
religious believers have argued that religious claims are only seemingly about the objective, or nat-
ural world; instead, religious claims are about an altogether different world, namely a supernatural 
or transcendent reality (see Hick's definition of what constitutes a religion). However, we could ar-
gue that even if a supernatural world exists it still needs to impinge on our world in order for epis-
temic cognition to occur amongst human beings. Furthermore, presumably our epistemic abilities 
are a product of, and adapted to, what we have come to call the natural world. One therefore needs 
an answer on how our object-oriented cognitive capacities acquire knowledge of a super-objective 
realm. One way out for the religious believer would be to state that a different set of epistemic abili-
ties is involved when it comes to the cognition and apprehension of transcendent realities. Never-
theless, even if a different kind of epistemic cognition occurs, how are we to know that our cogni-
 A vicarious selector is “an interiorization of external selectors” (Heylighen, 1997, p. 67), or an “anticipatory selec125 -
tor” that will anticipate what the system needs.
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tion is appropriate, and that it leads to justified knowledge about the supernatural world? The reli-
gious believer, who claims to have a different set of epistemic abilities, will still have to convince 
his peers in this regard. However, not all religious believers will agree with a supernatural account 
of religion. Some religious believers will claim that both worlds (i.e., the natural and the Divine) are 
the same (i.e., on a monist interpretation of the absolute). In that case, we could reasonably expect 
the objective criteria to apply since any religious claim would directly apply to the objective world. 
6.2.2. Clément Vidal 
Clément Vidal, who I introduced in chapter 2, expands on Heylighen’s work on worldview criteria. 
He argues that a worldview can have at least three different “flavours,” or nuances (Vidal, 2012, p. 
314-315). The first flavour consists of a “world conception,” which he considers to be both sys-
temic and objective. Vidal writes that this concept is similar to Dilthey’s “world picture” (i.e., Welt-
bild), which “insists on remaining consistent with soft and hard scientific results” (Vidal, ibidem, p. 
314). The second flavour consists of a "life world" (Ger.: Lebenswelt), which is experienced, sub-
jective, and stresses the personal aspect of the worldview. The third flavour consists of a “world-
view,”  which is here seen in its social or intersubjective aspect. Vidal points out that for Dilthey, a 
worldview (i.e., Weltanschauung) was based on a Weltbild, “to form values, ideals and norms for 
actions for individuals and society” (Vidal, ibidem, p. 314). Vidal also distinguishes the same main 
superclasses of selection criteria for worldview knowledge as Heylighen does (2012, p. 315). He 
points out that objective criteria deal with “the object that knowledge refers to,” subjective criteria 
deal with “the subject who assimilates and remembers” worldview beliefs, and intersubjective crite-
ria deals with “the communication process used to transmit the knowledge between subjects.” From 
this follows that the objective superclass applies to the world conception, subjective criteria apply to 
the life world, and intersubjective criteria apply to the worldview. Although Vidal briefly mentions 
Habermas in support of his three flavour theory, he does not reflect on the latter's work beyond 
merely stating that, for Habermas, actors evaluate their speech acts against three worlds, namely the 
objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. 
 Vidal’s notion of flavours clearly makes sense if we interpret it as a modifier. For instance, 
we could replace it with the term “orientation,” and Vidal’s argument would still work: worldviews 
exhibit three orientations, namely an orientation to the world, to the subject, and to others. If I un-
derstand Vidal correctly, his goal is to identify specific aspects of a worldview in terms of the above 
three orientations. What constitutes “knowledge” for a subject (as a worldview holder) is a combi-
nation of (a) his or her own idiosyncratic beliefs, feelings, attitudes, (a) socially accepted conven-
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tions, and (3) objective knowledge (i.e., true and justified beliefs). Thus, on this line of thought, a 
worldview would be a combination of a subjective life world (i.e., Lebenswelt), an intersubjective 
worldview (i.e., Weltanschauung), and a world picture (i.e., Weltbild).  
 However, the fact that one of the aspects of a worldview is itself a worldview creates an un-
necessary ambiguity. Secondly, while the terms Weltbild and Weltanschauung both denote a view or 
picture, the term Lebenswelt denotes the world as it is experienced. I suggest that it would make 
more sense to replace it with the term life view (i.e., Lebensanschauung), where life represents the 
life world. 
 Further, Vidal argues that there will be no “true” worldview. For Vidal, worldviews are enti-
ties that evolve and are in constant flux. Moreover, he claims that it is “fundamental to constantly 
criticise and improve our worldviews” (2012, p. 317). He concludes: “There is therefore a funda-
mental relativity in our approach, in the sense that we can only compare [i.e. assess the individual 
strengths and weaknesses of] one worldview with one other” (2012, p. 317; between square brack-
ets mine). By this he means that there are "no absolute criteria [for truth], nor any intrinsic ‘good-
ness’ or ‘truthfulness’ of a worldview” (ibid., p. 317). Here then is an important point, namely to 
what degree the process of worldview construction is relativistic. As Rescher has shown, a certain 
relativity exists in how we come to accept claims. However, this is a rational relativism, that is, it is 
justified with good reasons, where rationality equates to the giving of reasons (which of course does 
not prevent justification from going wrong). The provision of reasons is an intersubjective demand: 
they serve our community of peers, who can then apply the same injunctions or paradigms that we 
went through in order to come to our beliefs, and thereby corroborate or contradict our findings. 
Stated differently, “good reasons” aim to convince our peers, and preferably all of them (i.e., every-
one). In this regard, subjective and objective beliefs are at opposite ends of a spectrum. In the case 
of objective beliefs we appeal to the global community of peers, which allows us to make universal 
statements. However, when it comes to the subject, we have no such peers — this being the reason 
why for Habermas there is no formal discourse for subjective claims. Our justifications are there-
fore basic, having to do with direct awareness of the self, to which our peers have none: they can 
only observe our behaviour (i.e, using a third-person methodology) and check whether it corre-
sponds to what we say in dialogue (i.e., using a second-person methodology). In other words, when 
it comes to the contents of my mind, I do not have to convince myself through the giving of rea-
sons. If indeed the giving of reasons is an intersubjective demand, then it follows that knowledge as 
justified true belief is itself the integral of three types of validity claims: truth depends on corre-
spondence with the objective world, justification depends on an intersubjective community, and be-
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lief (i.e., whether we personally belief something) depends on our own subjective attitude. Finally, 
intersubjective claims lie somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Here we also appeal to a com-
munity of epistemic peers in the giving of reasons, but not necessarily, although not excluded, to the 
global community. 
 To continue, Vidal’s concern is to construct or improve worldviews. As I have pointed out 
earlier (chapter 2), Vidal sees synthesis as the culmination of philosophy (i.e., a philosophy of 
worldviews), that is, to construct overarching worldviews. For this purpose he offers two guiding 
principles: (1) to maximise simultaneously all of the different criteria, and (2) to balance contrasting 
and conflicting criteria. Vidal proposes that this can be most easily done by assessing worldviews 
and using the list of criteria as a checklist for comparison (2012, p. 319). He warns, however, that 
we should not see this type of assessment as “an issue-resolving algorithm” (ibid., p. 329). Rather, 
the criteria are cognitive values, which influence the preference of one worldview over another. In 
other words, instead of worldview assessment being an objective and analytical affair, Vidal sees it 
as being left over to preference — i.e., to a subjective or intersubjective process. Thus, he writes:  
[T]wo thinkers adhering to the same criteria list might still reach different conclusions. In-
deed, depending on the weight given to each of these criteria, one might value one world-
view more than another (ibid., p. 317). 
However, as I have pointed out, we cannot simply assume that such preference is similar across the 
board as we have to take into account the epistemic range of our claims: objective claims will need 
to convince everyone, intersubjective claims will need to convince our community of peers. Of 
course, nothing prevents us from holding a completely idiosyncratic worldview. However, when 
such a worldview comes into touch with objective reality, reality will “resist.” If I believe that there 
is no wall in front of me, and I keep walking, then reality will resist not only my physical body, but 
also my beliefs. Similarly, our community of peers will “resist” both our objective beliefs as well as 
our intersubjective beliefs, if they do not cohere well. Concerning principle (2) — to balance con-
trasting and conflicting criteria — Vidal writes that the criteria for assessing worldviews can also 
generate tensions themselves and raise issues of compatibility. He mentions the contrast between 
subjective and objective criteria (see Table 7), and argues that preference for either of them gener-
ates two conflicting cultures. He concludes that dialogue between those two cultures “is often diffi-
cult, if not impossible” (ibid., p. 329). Vidal characterises the subjective culture as focused on nar-
rativity, while the objective one is focused on scientificity. He explains: “The one is seeking univer-
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sal principles applicable to everything and everyone while the other tries to understand and describe 
a particular inner experience” (ibid., p. 329). 
Table 7: Vidal’s Criteria. 
6.3. Objective Criteria 
6.3.1. Heylighen’s Criteria 
Concerning the objective criteria, Heylighen points out that we can only use indirect means to de-
termine whether a belief corresponds to an objective reality” (Heylighen, 1997, p. 65; cf. Campbell, 
1997). In terms of neural activation “there is no fundamental distinction between a perception and a 
hallucination” (Heylighen, 1997, p. 65; cf. von Foerster, 1981, and Maturana and Varela, 1987). 
However, according to attribution theory (cf. Kelley, 1967), people attribute causes of perceived 
effects to those phenomena that covary with the effects, that is to say, that are present when the ef-
fect is present. In other words, external effects will covary with external causes, but not with 
changes that only affect internal variables. From this idea, Heylighen derives a number of criteria 
for judging objective reality, namely (1) invariance, (2) distinctiveness, and (3) controllability.  
(1) Invariance is the idea that if the same external phenomenon is perceived in different ways, it 
should maintain a constant identity. From this follows, the larger the domain over which it remains 
invariant, the more “real” it will be (Heylighen; cf. Bonsack, 1977). Heylighen distinguishes be-
tween three types of invariance (ibid., p. 66; cf. Kelley, 1967): 
a. Invariance over modalities: if the same phenomenon is perceived through different senses (e.g. 
sight and touch), points of view, or means of observation, it is more likely to objectively exist. 
b. Invariance over time: a perception that appears or disappears suddenly is unlikely to be causes 
by a stable referent. 
Objective Criteria: Subjective Criteria: Intersubjective Criteria:
a. Objective consistency; d. Subjective consistency; g. Intersubjective consistency;
b. Scientificity; e. Personal utility; h. Collective utility;
c. Scope; f. Emotionality; i. Narrativity;
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c. Invariance over persons: a perception on which different observers agree is more likely to be 
real than one that is only perceived by just one person. 
(2) Distinctiveness is the idea that different referents produce different perceptions (cf. Kelley, 
1967). A perception that remains the same when the attention is directed elsewhere is likely to be 
produced by the perceptual system itself (e.g., a particle of dust in the eye). Heylighen points out 
that those perceptions which are “real” tend to be characterised by richness in contrast and detail (in 
contrast, imagined or dream perceptions typically are coarse-grained and fuzzy) and to exhibit 
“Gestalt qualities, such as regularity, closure and simplicity, producing a distinct, coherent pattern, 
rather than an unstructured collection of impressions” (ibidem, p. 66; cf. Stadler and Kruse, 1990). 
(3) Controllability is the idea that a phenomenon that reacts differentially to the different actions 
performed on it is more likely to be real. Heylighen admits that this criterion is to some degree de-
pendent on the observing subject.  
6.3.2. Vidal’s Criteria 
To these criteria, Vidal also adds three of his own, namely (a) objective consistency, (b) scientificity 
and (c) scope. 
(a) Objective consistency requires one to hold a consistent worldview with the use of logic and ra-
tionality as a general way to (a) understand, (b) value and (c) act in the world; this includes theoris-
ing, a problem-solving attitude and arguments devoid of anomalies and contradictions. Vidal con-
cludes that the answers to the different worldview questions are interdependent, and therefore 
should not contradict each other. In other words, Vidal sees objective consistency as a transversal 
criterion (i.e, applies everywhere) for each of the different worldview questions.  
 As we have seen, the main feature of aporetic conflict is inconsistency: in other words, 
aporetic clusters violate the criterion of objective consistency. Vidal writes that the result of such 
violations is an invalid or self-contradicting worldview, and that such a worldview is unacceptable 
(Vidal, 2012, p. 319). Thus, one of the prime directives of worldview construction is to defend its 
consistency at all times. However, it is not self-evident that an inconsistent worldview is unaccept-
able. For instance, should we do away with a complex worldview system if somewhere down the 
line a single inconsistency appears? The answer should be: of course not. Although consistency is a 
prime value, as Rescher also points out, it is not the only epistemic value in use. Furthermore, Vi-
 !129
dal’s comments do not take into account where in the web of belief the inconsistency is located. The 
first question to ask ourselves is how important the inconsistency is within the whole of our world-
view. In other words: how detrimental is it, and what would it cost us to either keep it or remove it? 
It might be that the cost of keeping the inconsistency is much easier to bear than the cost of doing 
away with it. Furthermore, keeping our worldview at all times completely consistent might require 
considerable cognitive energy. Typically, we are not always aware of all parts of our worldview: 
many assumptions and beliefs that we accept remain unconscious and implicit. Here as well, it 
would cost us significant cognitive energy to bring these parts to the surface, check them repeatedly 
for inconsistencies, and make our beliefs coherent. In other words, the epistemic objective of objec-
tive coherence comes into conflict with other values, such as cognitive energy conservation. How-
ever, both concerns are also related: too many inconsistencies in our worldview will drain our cog-
nitive energies as well. This does not mean that Vidal finds no value in inconsistencies. He writes: 
“On the other hand, contradiction, precisely because it allows anything to happen next, can be seen 
as a great opportunity to question deeply rooted assumptions, and to try out radically new hypothe-
ses as theories” (ibidem, p. 319).  
 Ninian Smart also mentions consistency as a first criterion (1995, p. 24), and writes that, 
other things being equal, the less tension there is the better. A rich system, covering different facets 
of human experience, will be liable to strong tension (ibid., p. 24). He adds: “Internal tension itself 
[i.e., inconsistency] may encourage formulae to stabilise it, but the stability of the formulae them-
selves may be in question" (p. 24). Mentioning the Christian example of the Triune God — an idea 
in tension with the belief that God is One —, he writes: "Fix up the tension in the god-man idea in 
one direction, and some such divergence as Nestorianism may emerge" (p. 24).  
 In other words, differing answers to fundamental questions will,  sometimes at least, have 
the power to establish completely new and divergent worldviews. As Nicholas Rescher has pointed 
out, this is typical of aporetic decision making, where deliberative decisions will have reverbera-
tions throughout the worldview, especially when doctrines or high-level claims are involved. Solve 
an aporia and its solutions will create other aporiai further down the line. 
(b) Scientificity refers to the degree of compatibility of a worldview with the results of all of the 
natural sciences. I will characterise scientificity as an external consistency criterion —  i.e., this cri-
terion aims at the accuracy of our concepts to represent the external world. Objective consistency is 
then an internal consistency criterion, i.e., representing logical and systemic consistency. Vidal ar-
gues that although philosophy is non-scientific, as it does not question the world with observational 
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and experimental methods, it should nevertheless adhere to the scientificity criterion in order to 
avoid “the unscientific pitfall” (2012, p. 320).  He adds that it is also possible for a worldview to 126
fall into the trap of scientism, when both unscientific and non-scientific knowledge are dismissed, 
and when excessive trust is placed in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques. Vidal 
points out that the modelling of our world, in terms of providing declarative statements about the 
world, is mostly a scientific matter and that worldviews should therefore “be updated according to 
scientific progress” (Vidal, ibid., p. 320).  
 Following Vidal's injunction, however, might not be as straightforward as it seems. Do we 
merely add a new set of scientific beliefs to the sets of propositions that we already have, or do we 
replace our existing propositions that are in conflict with the new set of scientific propositions? The 
first strategy is bound to lead to many inconsistencies, which is in conflict with the criterion of ob-
jective consistency. On the other hand, the second strategy is all but self-evident, and will be depen-
dent on the type of claim in question. For instance, consider the metaphysical claim: “Eros is the 
driving force of the Universe,” where eros denotes love. Updating our worldview with the scientific 
propositions of contemporary evolutionary theory, we conclude that there is a tendency to increased 
complexity in the universe, but no teleological force that drives it. Modifying this claim will how-
ever only be justified if we correctly estimated this claim to be an objective statement, for we are 
bound to the epistemic domain to which it belongs. Ninian Smart writes on the same issue: 
[I]t may turn out that a traditional religion is right about some matters of science. For in-
stance, traditional Buddhism believed in many world systems, or as we might now say, 
galaxies. This is a point in favour of that tradition, when one comes to see it over against 
the tiny little cosmological cage in which the Jewish and Christian imaginations were long 
confined (p. 24). 
In order to test this, we could replace the Buddhist term of many world systems with the more mod-
ern term of galaxies, check all connected claims to their scientific truth value, and compare them 
with the modern scientific claims. However, it seems unlikely that Buddhist claims would fair well 
in this regard. 
 Cf. Broad 1958, p. 103, for the distinction between non-scientific and unscientific.126
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(c) Scope is divided into three sections: 
i. Scope in agenda: a worldview is “better” when it has a large scope in its agenda, thus tackling a 
wider array of issues. According to Vidal, when scope in agenda is violated, “specific and narrow 
issues are considered, failing to see more urgent and fundamental issues” (Vidal, 2012, p. 321). This 
then leads to sectarianism and overspecialisation (cf. Bahm, 1953, p. 423).  
 However, we may add that in many cases doing more (i.e., having a large scope) would not 
be necessarily better than doing less (i.e., having a narrow scope). Focussing on a narrow task, with 
intent and depth, often leads to more and better results, as cognitive resources are always limited. 
Focusing on a “specific and narrow” issue should therefore not be seen as a negative (i.e. being 
worse). Moreover, neither should it be seen as antithetical (somehow) to “urgent and fundamental.” 
Focussing on “urgent and fundamental” issues would in fact benefit from narrowing the scope in 
order to be able to hone in on those aspects that are most urgent and most fundamental, to the ex-
clusion of anything else. For instance, a physicist will narrow her field of research to and within the 
domain of physics, with exclusion of the biological, the social, the psychological, the technological, 
and the philosophical domains, amongst others. Although none of these other domains are totally 
removed from her own domain of research, she will nevertheless gain more if she can focus her 
limited resources (e.g., time, money, methodological resources) on a specific problem within her 
own domain. Therefore, I propose that scope in agenda represents a continuum between, on the one 
hand, narrow scope, which is more suited for deep analysis, and broad scope, which is more suited 
for synthetic philosophy.  
 The argument also runs in the other direction: given that cognitive resources are limited, 
synthetic philosophy (i.e., broad scope) will necessarily have to work with broad strokes rather than 
with in-depth analysis. If synthetic philosophy had to do all of the deep structural analysis itself 
(i.e., second-order activities), rather than taking the results of deep analysis as its data, it would 
never get around doing any of the synthetical work (i.e., third-order activities). Given the existence 
of a continuum, what is needed for creating a balanced worldview is a back-and-forth reciprocating 
movement between analysis and synthesis. From this follows that a worldview will be comparative-
ly better if it includes both narrow and broad scope.  Vidal also admits to some problems with the 127
idea of a wide scope: the wider the agenda, the more difficult the systematic integration, and the 
 Possibly, Vidal’s bias towards wide or broad scope and synthetical philosophy follows from the fact that for him syn127 -
thesis is a third-order activity while analysis is second-order. Synthesis therefore stands at the apogee of his three-lev-
elled model.
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more difficult the division of labour. Of course, this follows from the idea of wide or broad scope 
itself: the more ground to cover, the more resources will be required (ibid., p. 321). 
ii. scope in levels’ breath: this refers to how many "aspects or levels" are being considered. Ideally, 
a worldview with a wide scope reaches over many if not all domains of human experience. When 
scope in levels’ breath is violated, philosophy is restricted to just one aspect, as when for instance a 
materialist assumes that everything can be reduced to the interplay of atoms. Hence, this criterion 
aims at avoiding reductionism of any kind. This criterion can also be abused, according to Vidal, 
when a worldview becomes too holistic and makes vague claims such as “everything is one 
field” (2012, p. 322). Seemingly, Vidal’s first type of error consists of identifying and distinguishing 
an aspect (or part) and confusing it for the whole of reality. For instance, a materialist rightly con-
cludes that atoms (or quanta, or strings) are fundamental building blocks of the universe (i.e., parts), 
but then concludes that everything (i.e., the whole) can be reduced to exactly those building blocks. 
The second type of error consists of not making part distinctions at all, and only seeing wholes. 
Thus, what at first sight seem to constitute two different errors can be seen to be two aspects of the 
same kind of mistake: namely, both views fail to accurately distinguish between parts and wholes. 
Or stated differently, they lack a hierarchical perspective. We can refer to these errors as, respective-
ly, a pars pro toto and a totum pro parte error. 
iii. scope in levels' depth: a worldview with a wide scope extends across not only to a wide diversi-
ty of levels, it also extends across the extreme possibilities of each level. According to Vidal (2012, 
p. 323), if the space level is violated in its depth, the worldview applies only to a very limited geo-
graphical area. Similarly, when the time scope is violated in its depth, the worldview applies only to 
a very particular era.  
6.4. Subjective Criteria 
6.4.1. Heylighen’s Criteria 
For beliefs to be accepted and retained, it will not be sufficient that they respond to distinct, invari-
ant and controllable phenomena; rather, subjective factors will be in play as well. Heylighen distin-
guishes between (4) individual utility, (5) simplicity, (6) coherence, and (7) novelty. 
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(4) Individual utility is the idea that people will only do the effort to learn or retain an idea, or ac-
cept a belief, that can help them to reach their goals. Thus, ideas that lack such subjective or indi-
vidual utility, even if they are true, might be less likely absorbed within the worldview. 
(5) Simplicity implies that the more complex an idea is, the higher the burden will be on the cogni-
tive system. Hence, Heylighen concludes, “knowledge should be easy to learn” (1997, p. 67). He 
adds that simplicity is a subjective criterion because "it depends on the concepts and associations 
that are already known" (ibid., p. 67). As we have seen, simplicity was also a prime desideratum for 
Rescher. 
(6) Coherence: whether a cognitive system will assimilate a particular idea will depend on the con-
cepts and associations that are already known. Ideas and beliefs will only be subjectively appropri-
ated if they fit in with the background beliefs that the individual already holds. Heylighen defines 
coherence as “mutual connection, support and consistency” (1997, p. 67). He does not regard con-
sistency as a separate (subjective) criterion, but he does state that our “preference for consistency 
follows from the theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that people tend to reject the ideas 
that contradict what they already believe” (ibidem, p. 67). Heylighen sees this in an evolutionary 
context where “a fit individual must be able to make clear-cut decisions” (ibid., p. 67). 
 An important corollary of the coherence criterion seems to be that it will promote conser-
vatism (i.e., a conservative attitude). We can expect that an exclusivist epistemic approach to reli-
gious diversity will be accompanied (see chapter 2), or even motivated, by such a conservative atti-
tude. The exclusivist believer is subjectively justified to hold on to his or her own beliefs based on 
this criterion. He is thus likely to select this criterion as a primary way-of-right consideration when 
addressing aporetic conflict. It is clear that Heylighen’s subjective coherence criterion will also 
have an equivalent in terms of intersubjective criteria. Thus, he mentions conformity as one of the 
intersubjective criteria, where conformity is the desire to accept what the group already believes 
(see infra). 
(7) Novelty: new, unusual or unexpected ideas tend to attract the attention, and thus arouse the cog-
nitive energy, which will facilitate their assimilation. According to Heylighen, this shows itself in 
the human emotion of curiosity — an evolutionary adaptation that helps the individual cope with 
unusual situations (1997, p. 67).  
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 Given that we associate coherence with a conservative attitude, we can associate novelty 
with a progressive attitude. An inclusivist attitude towards religious diversity would be congruent 
with both coherence and novelty. The inclusivist is still conservative enough to prefer his own set of 
beliefs, but is also open to novel ideas that have a certain degree of coherence with what is already 
believed by the individual. However, we can expect some of these criteria to run interference for 
each other. For instance, confronted with a spider-like doctrinal claim, which spurns webs of belief, 
a worldview holder, despite valuing novelty, might instead prefer to use simplicity as a criterion. In 
such a case, the costs associated with complex solutions is weighed against the novelty factor. 
 The distinction between coherence (with tradition) and novelty is also a prime criterion for 
Ninian Smart. Smart writes that tension might exist at the interface “between the received beliefs 
and values of a traditional worldview and the discovered truths and emerging values of contempo-
rary society" (p. 24). As an example, he mentions the tension between contemporary evolutionary 
theory and conservative interpretations of the Bible. While this advice is useful, it also unnecessari-
ly inserts a time frame, which is surprising given that Smart is a historian of religion. However, we 
can also interpret contemporary as simply meaning the time frame in question. In other words, at 
any given moment, traditional values can clash with emerging or novel beliefs and values, and 
when this happens, more often than not, the emerging beliefs and values are framed within the con-
text of the previous worldview. For example, Joanna Jurewicz's now classic article Playing With 
Fire (2000) demonstrates how the Buddha's exposition of the law of dependent origination 
(pratīyasamutpāda) should be understood in the context of Vedic thought. With his formulation of 
the law of independent origination, the Buddha explicitly rejected the doctrine of ātman, and doing 
so undermined the whole of Vedic cosmogony.  The emergence of Buddhism did not happen in 128
vacuo, and the same can de demonstrated for the other world religions. It is also clear that the ad-
vent of Buddhism did not replace Vedic thought. In other words, not everybody will have been con-
vinced by this novel direction. What we understand as traditionalism is thus the tendency to stay 
with the previous beliefs in light of alternatives. 
 Smart further adds that, because our knowledge of the natural world changes, "the adapata-
bility of a worldview becomes a sign of truth or acceptability" (p. 25). In other words, for Smart, 
adaptability of the worldview is a feature (i.e., a vicarious selector) of the scientific worldview. In 
contrast to scientific worldviews, religious worldviews will often stress the unchangeable nature of 
their core doctrines. From this follows that the primary distinction between religious traditions and 
 In other words, the pratītyasamutpāda was a deliberate polemic argument designed against Vedic thought. It was de128 -
signed to clash with the contemporarily accepted view.
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science is not necessarily the fact that science is devoted to making truth claims about the objective 
world, but rather that it’s operating principle is that every claim can be called into doubt in light of 
new discoveries. 
6.4.2. Vidal's Criteria 
Vidal adds three criteria to the list of subjective criteria, namely, (d) subjective consistency, (e) per-
sonal utility, and (f) emotionality. 
(d) Subjective consistency requires the worldview to fit the broader knowledge, or common experi-
ence individuals already have. If an idea does not connect to existing knowledge, it simply cannot 
be learnt. Consistency requires that none of the claims is inconsistent. In other words, consistency 
requires the absence of inconsistency. However, this does not tell us much in terms of whether the 
claims fit the broader worldview very well. For instance, they could only fit minimally.  Coherence, 
as a criterion, on the other hand more clearly expresses the idea of fit. Heylighen, for instance, does 
not mention consistency as a subjective criterion, but mentions coherence instead. For Heylighen, 
coherence is the idea that ideas will only be subjectively appropriated if they fit in with the back-
ground beliefs that the individual already holds (see supra). 
(e) Personal utility: A worldview satisfying this criterion provides goals, values or at least some 
preference heuristic. It requires having a well functioning implicit or explicit theory of values. 
Abusing this criterion, Vidal writes, leads to individualism: everything becomes centred on the in-
dividual's gain in pleasures and decrease in pains. We want the pleasures to be not only personal, 
but also sharable with individuals and larger systems. That is why we also need to take into account 
a larger scope. Vidal also refers to this criterion as “personal satisfaction” or “happiness” (2012, p. 
324). Presumably, the difference in language can be attributed to a difference in perspective, where 
‘personal utility’ is a structuralist concept based on an objectifying stance, whilst ‘happiness’ is a 
more hermeneutical concept, based on a subjective stance. In other words, given that we are using 
an objective stance to catalogue subjective criteria, it makes sense to inquire into subjective equiva-
lents as well. 
(f) Emotionality: Vidal does not give a straightforward definition of this criterion. However, there 
are a few hints as to how we should interpret this criterion. Vidal says that when this criterion is vi-
olated: "[F]ew emotions are involved (or only negative and low-energy emotions such as depres-
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sion). No motivation is found to accept or act according to" (2012 p. 325). Vidal also adds that we 
can abuse emotionality in expressing a worldview, when our worldview starts suffering from a lack 
of an argumentative and logical approach, and violates objective consistency. He admits that emo-
tions, and hence their functional role for worldviews “still remain poorly recognised and discussed 
in many human interactions,” and that we are therefore “missing a major aspect of our 
cognition” (ibid., p. 325). In conclusion, he argues that we need a framework and tools to deal with 
them. 
6.5. Intersubjective Criteria 
6.5.1. Heylighen's Criteria 
Lastly, Heylighen points out that the process of transmission and diffusion of ideas (or memes; cf. 
Heylighen, 1992) from others plays an essential part in their selection. The following intersubjec-
tive criteria play a role: (8) publicity, (9) expressivity, (10) formality, (11) collective utility, (12) 
conformity, and, finally, (13) authority. 
(8) Publicity is the effort the subject carrying the idea invests in making it known to others (Hey-
lighen, 1997, p. 67). In other words, a worldview holder might have idiosyncratic ideas which she 
prefers to keep for herself. These ideas are then purely subjective as they do not exceed the realm of 
the individual. On the other hand, she might prefer for her ideas to be known to others, for instance, 
her parochial group (e.g., parish), the further tradition or society (i.e., church), or simply everyone. 
If one's goal is a public one, then ideas which are easier to be made public will be preferred to ones 
that are harder. The criterion of publicity will therefore go hand in hand with a criterion of intersub-
jective coherence (i.e., subjective ideas cohering with intersubjective or communal ideas). 
(9) Expressivity is the idea that all memes need a communication medium in order to be transmit-
ted; ideas that are easy to express will be communicated more easily. Thus, the medium will co-se-
lect ideas, as each medium will be more suited than others will. Heylighen writes that, for instance, 
the development of physical theories is dependent on mathematics as a medium (1997, p. 67). Al-
though nothing prevents religions to use formal language, religious memes are often communicated 
through the medium of myths or stories (Smart, 1969; Rennie, 1999). Ninian Smart calls this di-
mension of religious though the narrative or mythological dimension (Smart, 1989, p. 12). As we 
will see, Vidal specifically adds narrativity as a criterion (see infra). 
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(10) Formality is the degree that ideas are context-independent, and are more likely to be interpret-
ed uniformly. An idea is expressed formally if it lacks equivocation. The more formal the idea, the 
more likely it is to be communicated accurately (Heylighen, 1997, p. 68). 
(11) Collective utility differs from individual utility in the sense that some forms of collective utility 
will be useless to the individual (e.g. traffic fines). From an evolutionary perspective, collective 
ideas will be selected on the group level, as groups having those ideas will be more fit than groups 
lacking them. Thus, Heylighen argues that supernatural cosmologies, characteristic of archaic civili-
sations, have been selected on the basis of such collective utility (ibid., p. 68; Campbell, 1997). Of 
course, we should add that such an account is functionalist: most people will be unaware of its role. 
(12) Conformity is the selective pressure that suppresses individually selfish deviations from collec-
tive beliefs. All other things being equal, it is evolutionary optimal for subjects to adopt the majority 
belief of those people that try to convert them (cf. Boyd and Richerson, 1985).  
(13) Authority is the idea that the backing of a recognised expert will contribute to the acceptance of 
a particular idea. Individuals within a complex society will tend to specialise in a particular domain. 
As they are successful doing so, through a positive feed-back mechanism, they will see more such 
work delegated to them, thus developing even greater expertise and authority (cf. Gaines, 1994). It 
should be clear that the power of authority has always plaid a role in the dissemination of religious 
worldviews. 
6.5.2. Vidal's Criteria 
Finally, Vidal also adds the criteria of (g) intersubjective consistency, (h) collective utility, and (i) 
narrativity. 
(g) Intersubjective consistency: This criterion calls for the minimisation of conflicts between indi-
viduals. According to Vidal, moral philosophy, economics, ethics, politics and jurisprudence are 
mainly concerned with this criterion. When intersubjective consistency is violated, conflicts occur 
and communication is difficult. When the criterion is abused by avoiding conflict, on the other 
hand, it will promote traditional ways of thinking and acting. 
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(h) Collective utility: This criterion is the collective extension of the individual utility criterion (see 
supra). 
(i) Narrativity calls for presenting the worldview through the medium of stories. Vidal defines a sto-
ry as “a connected series of actions that follow from one to the next” (2012, p. 328).  Vidal adds 129
that narrativity and emotionality go hand in hand, “because both have a double subjective and inter-
subjective aspect” (ibid., p. 328). Subjectively, narrativity makes a worldview more emotional, mo-
tivating and easy to assimilate; intersubjectively, it makes that messages are easier to convey. When 
narrativity is violated, we face theoretical material that is emotionally insipid, hard to learn and to 
remember.  Science and philosophy will explicitly avoid narrativity as they focus on seeking gen130 -
eralities: “Science aims at finding universal laws, supposed to be certain, independent of time, con-
texts or individual subjects; whereas stories narrate a sequence of actions at a particular time, in a 
particular context and with an uncertain outcome” (Vidal, ibid., p. 328).  131
6.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, I understand the different superclasses of criteria as parameters for the fulfilment of 
the validity claims of specific beliefs, where a parameter constitutes (a) a measurable factor that de-
fines a system, or (b) sets the conditions of its operation. From this follows that such parameters can 
play both a role in establishing the initial plausibility of worldview claims, as well as in establishing 
their final acceptability. Parameters will set constraints as to what we are “allowed” to accept or be-
lieve. As I have shown, in the Aporetics of worldview claims (chapter 5), only specific claims will 
come together to form aporetic sets. From this we could reasonably conclude that to solve such spe-
cific aporetic conflicts we can suffice by giving reasons for or against those claims and thus settle 
the conflict. However, as I have argued, this is rarely a sufficient strategy. One reason for this is that 
the final acceptability of claims does not merely rest on justification for our claims — which is a 
necessary but insufficient condition — but also on relationships of implication with other beliefs 
within the web of belief, where one cannot give up one claim without giving up others. Another rea-
sons is that we still need right-of-way criteria to establish exits out of our first-order aporias based 
 This would be one instance of Heylighen’s criterion of expressivity.129
 Vidal mentions the example of mathematics which is often painful to learn for children because it violates the crite130 -
rion of narrativity.
 A similar project took place in the context of Bible exegesis and the hermeneutics of Scripture where myths were 131
analysed with the purpose of deriving formal content. Rudolf Bultmann (1958) even suggested that the tasks of the con-
temporary theologian should be to “demythologise Scripture” (Sherratt, 2005).
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on a rational but preferential orientation. This is in line with Heylighen’s argument that such crite-
ria will be “unevenly distributed” for different worlviews. Thus, I will summarise: 
A. Whether any given claim fulfils its representational function will be measured on the basis of 
objective parameters, such as distinctiveness, controllability, objective coherence, etc. The more of 
these parameters are fulfilled, the more likely it is that the particular claim will be able to redeem its 
associate validity claim of objective truth.  In other words, redemption of the validity claim will 132
determine the acceptability of the claim, understood here in terms of truth. Once redeemed, the 
claim will become or remain part of the worldview as an objective claim per se, or as an objectively 
charged claim, leaving room for other validity claims. 
B. Whether any given claim fulfils its expressive function (i.e., its subjectivity) will be measured on 
the basis of subjective parameters, such as utility, novelty, consistency, emotionality, etc. The more 
of these parameters are fulfilled, the more likely it is that the particular claim will be able to redeem 
its associate validity claim of subjective authenticity. In other words, redemption of the validity 
claim will determine the acceptability of the claim, understood here in terms of authenticity. Once 
redeemed, the claim will become or remain part of the worldview as a subjective claim per se, or as 
a subjectively charged claim, leaving room for other validity claims.   133
  
C. Whether any given claim fulfils its interactive function will be measured on the basis of intersub-
jective parameters, such as publicity, expressivity, formality, collective utility, conformity, and so 
on. The more of these parameters are fulfilled, the more likely it is that the particular claim will be 
able to redeem its associate validity claim of intersubjective justness. In other words, redemption of 
the validity claim will determine the acceptability of the claim, understood here in terms of norma-
tive rightness. Once redeemed, the claim will become or remain part of the worldview as a intersub-
jective claim per se, or as an intersubjectively charged claim, leaving room for other validity 
claims. 
 Note that such a process is not an absolute guarantor of truth.132
 Thus, to be an authentic and expressive person is to accept claims that fit one's own subjective life world. As Hey133 -
lighen’s evolutionary-cybernetic approach shows, what will be important to individuals are such principles as personal 
utility, novelty, consistency, emotional resonance, etc. 
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7. Orientational Pluralism 
7.1. Introduction 
In chapter 2, I presented a brief analysis of the problem of religious diversity, constituted by two 
different problems, namely a first-order problem of conflicting claims, and a second-order problem 
of different stances towards religious diversity. Subsequently, I argued that the first-order problem 
was constituted by different answers to leading worldview questions, such as: what exists, what 
should we do, what should we value, and so on. In chapter five, I argued that such a problem was 
aporetic, i.e., constituted an aporia based on a definition provided by Nicholas Rescher (2009).  
 In this chapter, I will analyse the second-order problem of epistemic stances and similarly 
define it as an aporia. Given that this problem is limited in scope, i.e., there are only four answers to 
one leading question, I will also propose a solution to this aporetic puzzle.  In particular, I will 134
analyse Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s presentation of the quadripartite typology in terms of Aporetics 
(Schmidt-Leukel, 2005). In response to Schmidt-Leukel’s preferred position of pluralism, I will 
present a fifth possibility, suggested by Nicholas Rescher, namely Orientational Pluralism. I will 
define this epistemic stance as a third-order stance consisting of a combination of locative exclu-
sivism and supra-locative pluralism. Such an Orientational Pluralism is grounded in the idea that 
pluralist theories, rather than being supra-locative second-order theories, are in fact locative solu-
tions similar to exclusivism. Therefore, a solution out of this problem is to insist on a locative theo-
ry as exclusivism does — which relies on the aporetic procedures I have outlined previously —, but 
mitigated by a supra-locative pluralism. From this follows that Orientational Pluralism will have 
access to three different locative stances: exclusivism, inclusivism, and (locative) pluralism. Finally, 
I will demonstrate how Mark Heim, a self-professed Orientational Pluralist, chooses to be a Christ-
ian inclusivist in developing a Christian Trinitarian solution to the problem of religious diversity. 
However, such an orientation results from Heim’s own rational preferentialism, and should not be 
seen as a forced consequence of his Orientational Pluralism. 
7.2. The Second-Order Aporia 
Nicholas Rescher, in his Pluralism (1993), argues that when it comes to assessing the truth of sub-
stantively informative claims, inquirers must proceed on the basis of a “perspective.” That is, they 
must take up a cognitive stance, or a point of view, from which the issues at hand can be judged. 
However, he adds, the empirical basis of our factual knowledge leads us to a variety of alternative 
 As I have stated earlier, concerning the first-order aporia, I sufficed by merely addressing the strategies for aporetic 134
dissolution.
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cognitive positions in answering “the Big Questions about the world” (1993, p. 76). Thus, from this 
follows that it is "to be expected that people equipped with different courses of experience should 
judge differently with respect to issues that are not in themselves totally cut and dried" (ibid, p. 77). 
Faced with such cognitive pluralism, we can then ask the question as to what our knowledge-gener-
ating attitude should be to such pluralism. Rescher lists four reactions, to wit: (1) scepticism, (2) 
syncretism, (3) indifferentist relativism, and (4) perspectival rationalism or contextualism (1993, p. 
80).  Firstly, Rescher formulates a so-called “leading question,” viz., how should we approach 135
such diversity? He then lists four possible responses to this question: 
(1) accept none: reject all, ours included;  
(2) accept one: retain ours;  
(3) accept several: conjoin others with ours;  
(4) 'rise above the conflict': say 'a plague on all your houses' to the available alternatives and look 
elsewhere-to the 'ideal observer', to the 'wise man' of the Stoics, to the 'ideally rational agent' of 
the economists, or some such (in these circumstances unavailable) idealisation (Rescher, 1993, 
p. 101) 
We can now state that these four answers constitute an aporia by comparing it with Rescher’s defin-
ition presented earlier (chapter 5). Firstly, the different answers are thematically related. This is due 
to the fact that they are answers to the same leading question for this set. Secondly, we have good 
reasons for each of these positions. That is, arguments can be given for each position that would 
make them seem individually attractive. Thirdly, the total set of theses is inconsistent; the individual 
theses are mutually exclusive. On the basis of this we conclude that the set is aporetic. We can also 
conclude that it constitutes a second-order aporia, given that the epistemic positions are in fact ex-
its out of an aporia constituted by the different answers to the first-order worldview questions.  
 The next step in the aporetic process is to look for possible exits out of this aporia by remov-
ing the weakest link. Rescher suggests that four possible reactions exist to cognitive pluralism, 
namely (1) scepticism, (2) syncretism, (3) indifferentist relativism, and (4) perspectival rationalism 
or contextualism. If this indeed the case, then these reactions be seen as exits to the aporia. 
 Interestingly, Rescher’s presentation is very similar to our presentation of the second-order problem of epistemic 135
stances. However, nowhere does Rescher refer to Alan Race’s tripartite typology, or mentions any of the other authors 
working in the field of religious diversity. However, the obvious similarities between the two typologies will allow me 
to analyse Schmidt-Leukel’s presentation of the standard typology in terms of Aporetics.
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(i) Scepticism: accept (1), reject (2) — (4). The sceptic accepts none of the first-order positions on 
the basis that no single position is justified, since the alternatives "simply cancel one another 
out" (1993, p. 80). Rescher considers this not to be a viable strategy as it does not provide us with a 
positive or informative answer to the leading question. He argues that we do not gain anything in-
formative from not choosing. 
(ii) Syncretism: accept (3), deny (1) to (2) as well as (4). Syncretism stands in stark contrast with 
the skeptic’s position. While the skeptic argues that we should accept none of the alternatives, the 
syncretist argues that we should accept all alternatives. On this view, all of the seemingly discor-
dant positions are justified, and we must, for this reason, conjoin or juxtapose them.  136
(iii) Indifferentist Relativism: accept (2), deny (1), (3), (4). The indifferentist relativist takes up the 
position that only one alternative should be accepted out of the many. However, the relativist argues 
that we cannot do so on the basis of rationally cogent grounds. The acceptance of a single alterna-
tive emerges from considerations that themselves lack any rational basis: they are a matter of taste, 
of personal inclination, or social tradition, etc.  
(iv) Perspectival Rationalism: on the basis of (2), the perspectival rationalist, or contextualist, ac-
cepts only one alternative, similar to the relativist. Unlike the latter, his acceptance does have a ba-
sis of rational cogency, albeit this basis "may differ perspectively from group to group, era to era, 
and school to school" (ibid., p. 80).  137
Firstly, using the basic aporetic strategy of thesis rejection, four positions are possible out of the 
aporia, one of which is based on accepting (4). However, Rescher drops this exit on the argument 
that it is "utopian and unrealistic," since we have "no way to get there from here" (1993, p. 102). 
However, he does not further elaborate on this position beyond this single sentence. With the same 
strategy of thesis rejection, only one option based on (2) is possible. Given that he presents us with 
two variations, Rescher must make use of the alternative strategy of thesis modification. He does so 
 The issue of syncretism has garnered quite a bit of attention in recent years in Religious Studies, specifically 136
amongst Christian scholars. One such issue involves how to define syncretism (Droogers, 1987; Gort, Vroom et al., 
1987). Ferdinando defines syncretism as "substitution or modification of central elements of Christianity [i.e., a given 
religion] by beliefs or practices introduced from elsewhere" (1995, p. 272; between square brackets mine).
 In The Strife of Systems (1985), Rescher calls this stance orientational pluralism. See also Rescher, 1978.137
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by modifying claim (2) by way of reference to a rationality cogent justification. Thus, he begets a 
(iii) non-rational relativism and a (iv) rational relativism, which he names perspectival rationalism 
or contextualism. Non-rational relativism is the butt of an extended critique by Rescher leading him 
to reject it in favour of rational relativism. He points out, inter alia, that non-rational relativism is 
self-inconsistent: since it claims that we have no good reasons for arriving at a specific position 
over and against others, it will equally have no good reasons for defending its own position.  
 Secondly, in terms of the quadripartite typology of epistemic stances towards religious di-
versity, skepticism falls under the rubric of naturalism, which, as I have argued, was a catch-all con-
cept for any stance that reject all religious claims (for whatever reason). A syncretist position falls 
under the rubric of pluralism, however, it is most easily associated with polycentric pluralism, 
where religious traditions are understood as separate strategies to achieve separate goals. Both In-
differentist Relativism and Perspectival Rationalism — also called Rational Preferentialism — are 
exclusivist in nature, but with the former being relativistic. 
 In Chapter Six of Pluralism (1993), Rescher presents us with another double aporia in an-
swer to two distinct leading questions (1993, p. 100):  
Q1: How should we evaluate each of the alternative positions on our cognitive, evaluative and prac-
tical questions? This divides into two separate issues: should we (a) dismiss those that differ from 
the one we ourselves favour, or (b) see all the alternatives as deserving of consideration and some 
positive response? 
Q2: How are we to evaluate the posture of those who adopt these differing positions (or world-
views)? This divides into two issues: should we (a) acknowledge that they are, or may be, proceed-
ing in a way that is appropriate and legitimate given their situation and circumstances, or (b) not?  
Although he does not explain, the reason for these distinctions can be found in Rescher's aporetic 
procedure, particularly in the dual structure of justification. As we have seen, Rescher distinguishes 
between the initial plausibility of claims and the eventual acceptability of claims. Thus, making the 
above two questions more explicit, Rescher derives the following leading questions which can be 
used for an aporetic  set-up  (1993, p. 98): 
Q1: In general, how many of the alternatives with respect to a controverted matter are plausible in 
the sense of deserving sympathetic consideration and deliberation?  
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Q2: Within the range of such viable alternatives, how many are acceptable in the sense of deserving 
endorsement and adoption?  
From these two questions we can derive two subsequent aporia, hinging on the distinction between 
initial plausibility and eventual acceptability. Taking the first leading question, we can state: 
(1) No alternatives are plausible, including ours. 
(2) Only one alternative is plausible, that is, ours. 
(3) Two or more alternatives are plausible. 
It is clear that the individual theses are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive: no more op-
tions can be found. This leads us to three possible exits on the basis of basic thesis exclusion.   138
(i) nihilism: accept (1), and deny (2) and (3); 
(ii) monism: accept (2), and deny (1) and (3); 
(iii)pluralism: accept (3), and deny (1) and (2); 
The aporia also repeats itself when we attempt to answer the second question, this time on the issue 
of acceptability: 
(1’) No alternatives are acceptable, including ours. 
(2’) Only one alternative is acceptable, that is, ours. 
(3’) Two or more alternatives are acceptable. 
Again, we have three exits out on the basis of thesis rejection.  
(i) scepticism: accept (1), and deny (2) and (3); 
(ii) monism: accept (2), and deny (1) and (3); 
(iii)pluralism: accept (3), and deny (1) and (2); 
 I have taken the headings from a table found in the same chapter (1993, p. 99, table 6.2).138
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Rescher summarises the different theses and epistemic positions by means of the following chart 
(1993, p. 99, table 6.2).  139
Table 9: Range Resultant Doctrinal Positions. 
The left and middle column represent the two aporias with their various theses (i.e., theses 1-3). The 
column on the right represents the possible exits out of the aporias in the form of what I have called 
"epistemic stances." Due to the interaction between Rescher's two leading questions, both aporias 
are tied in with one another. Thus, the second aporia, based on the acceptability of claims, is stacked 
on top of the first one. As a consequence, we have a doubling up of positions: nihilism-scepticism, 
monism-preferentialism, pluralism-syncretism. Each pair follows the same logic. 
 From this chart we can now derive Rescher's preferred stance. In relation to the first column, 
on the initial plausibility of claims, Rescher prefers pluralism. In relation to the second column, on 
final acceptability, Rescher chooses rationalistic preferentialism (i.e., exclusivism). Thus, Rescher's 
answer to the above questions will generate what he calls an Orientational Pluralism.  
 As such, Orientational Pluralism, is a combination of two different positions, namely: (a) 
being fully committed to the correctness of one's own position (i.e., exclusivism), while (b) ac-
knowledging that others are fully entitled and rationally justified (given their "situation") in holding 
the views that they do (i.e., pluralism). While (b) is in response to the question which alternatives 
we find plausible — and the answer is all of them —, (a) is in response to the question which ones 
Range of answers
Question 1                  Question 2
Resultant Doctrinal Position
0 0 Nihilism
1 1 Monism (absolutism)
2 or more Pluralism
0   Scepticism
1   Preferentialism
    Doctrinalism (rationalistic)
    Relativism (irrationalistic)
2 or more   Syncretism
 The chart represented here is my own reproduction of Rescher's chart, rather than an exact copy.139
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of those we find acceptable, i.e., just one. Thus, the original aporia is dissolved on the basis of a dis-
tinction or modification hinging on the difference between plausibility (i.e, worthy of consideration) 
and acceptability (i.e., worthy of adoption). We take up a specific position despite the fact that mul-
tiple positions are plausible. 
7.3. Orientational Pluralism 
7.3.1. Varieties of Pluralism 
To repeat, Orientational Pluralism is a pluralist theory which combines preferentialism (i.e., monism 
or exclusivism) with pluralism. It is therefore an alternative to other pluralist stances. Rescher 
writes that pluralism, as "the doctrine that any substantial question admits of a variety of plausible 
but mutually conflicting responses, is (itself) susceptible to a plurality of versions and construc-
tions” (1993, p. 79). This implies that the epistemic doctrine of pluralism engenders an aporia of its 
own. We can call this aporia a third-order aporia since it takes as its datum one exit to the second-
order aporia. In other words, once we take up the position of pluralism, we are confronted with a 
new aporia, namely one that consists of conflicting doctrines on the epistemic position of pluralism. 
Rescher identifies three such stances, namely (1) syncretism, (2) eclecticism and (3) synthesism, 
and analyses them as insufficient strategies, to be rejected in favour of an Orientational Pluralism.  
 Firstly, the syncretist option is to view all the alternatives positively, and to conjoin them in 
"an attempt to 'rise above the quarrel' of conflicting doctrines, refusing to 'take sides' by taking all 
the sides at once" (Rescher, 1993, p. 90). Confronted with contradictory beliefs, the syncretist does 
not take the usual exit out of the aporetic inconsistency by duly choosing between alternatives, but 
instead embraces all alternatives. The syncretist's view is not that of a pluralism of alternative posi-
tions, but rather of a "grand superposition" that conjoins all positions (1993, p. 91). A syncretist po-
sition is akin to a pluralist stance of wanting to include all religious traditions within the category of 
acceptable worldviews. However, Rescher argues that syncretism is in the end self-defeating, for it 
cannot avoid seeing the alternatives to itself (scepticism, absolutism, etc.) as equally valid. The syn-
cretist finds himself in the same Procrustean bed as the relativist: by seeing all options as equally 
valid, the syncretist cuts off his or her own chance of having a superior intellectual position. Stated 
differently, while the syncretist aims for a pluralist position towards the first-order aporia, she can-
not do so for the second-order aporia: he or she is forced to take an exclusivist or preferential 
stance. 
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 Secondly, eclecticism is the "internally diversified stance that each lower-level doctrine is 
right in some very partial, merely aspectival respect though wrong in others" (1993, p. 92). While 
syncretism can be classified as a "position-conjoining" approach, eclecticism is rather a "position-
combining" approach.  
 Thirdly, synthesis — or its concomitant position of synthesism — is "the construction of a 
combining standpoint that mixes a piece of one position with some different piece of another,” or 
"that grants one the right in this respect and another the right in that one" (1993, p. 94; italics his). 
 Rescher does not reflect on the relationship between eclecticism and synthesism. However, 
turning to standard definitions, we can derive that eclecticism amounts to (a) the selection of what 
appears to be best in various doctrines, positions, etc., or (b) a selection from a variety of sources. In 
this regard, synthesis would appear to be doing the same thing, that is collect different elements. 
However, the focus in synthesis does not lie with the method of gathering elements, but rather with 
the goal of constructing a whole. Hence, synthesis is opposed to analysis, or the deconstruction of a 
whole into its constituent parts. Conversely, however, we would not state that the opposite of analy-
sis is eclecticism.   
 Since all three theses are forms of pluralism this allows us to identify a syncretic pluralism, 
an eclectic pluralism, and a synthetic pluralism. While syncretic pluralism accepts all claims indis-
criminately, both eclectic and synthetic pluralism discriminate. Eclectic pluralism discriminates on 
the basis of the acceptability of parts, while synthetic pluralism discriminates on the basis of the 
acceptability of the whole. The crucial point of difference between syncretic and synthetic pluralism 
is that synthetic pluralism provides one standpoint amongst many. Rather than conjoining dissonant 
positions, as the syncretist philosopher does, the synthesist aims to co-ordinate dissonant positions 
in order to arrive at a positioned albeit all-embracing stance. However, due to the overdetermination 
of beliefs, incompatible standpoints can always be combined in various ways. We thus end up with 
different syntheses, each vying exclusively for our acceptance.  
7.3.2. Orientational Pluralism 
Rescher understands the doctrine of pluralism as the idea that its is "rationally intelligible and ac-
ceptable that others can hold positions at variance with one's own" (1993, p. 88). However, it does 
not follow from this statement that (a) one needs to endorse a plurality of positions, or (b) that the 
fact that others hold a certain position would constitute sufficient reason for us to do the same 
(1993, p. 89). Concerning (a), Rescher concludes that, unless we opt for a syncretist position that is 
self-refuting, we are forced to make a preferential choice. He writes: 
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We can only resolve our cognitive or practical problems if we conduct our inquiries in the 
doctrinalist manner--only if we are willing to 'stick our necks out' and take a position that 
endorses some answers and rejects others. And we can only do this in a reasonable way if 
we are willing to deploy the resources of reason in this process (Rescher, 1993, p. 89). 
The only way out, therefore, is a pluralism that is co-ordinated with a rational preference based on 
context-relevant considerations. This kind of pluralism has a first advantage that it is self-consis-
tent: it takes its own advice and positions itself as the preferred stance, as superiorly meritorious.  
 Concerning (b), this repeats an issue that I have touched on beforehand (in chapter 5), and 
which is equally a point of interest in the discussions on religious diversity, namely: should the exis-
tence of a variety of alternative positions diminish the epistemic confidence we have in our own 
doctrinal position? Rescher is adamant in stating that it does not. However, neither does he argue 
that we should be merely sitting on one our own claims. If we want to engross truth, we have an 
epistemic duty to investigate whether we could not be wrong about our current claims, and others 
right. However, mere plurality by itself is not necessarily reason enough to doubt our own position 
(see chapter 5). Thus Rescher writes that, while the fact that others agree with us is no proof for the 
correctness of our claims, neither is the fact that they disagree a sign of error (1993, p. 89).  
 Seemingly then, we have two conflicting strategies, a phenomenon we are by now familiar 
with. In other words, we are faced with an aporia between two different mutually conflicting op-
tions: exclusivism, and pluralism. If we apply thesis rejection, then we can come down to either ex-
clusivism, as many authors have done (e.g., D’Costa, Netland), or to pluralism (e.g., Hick, Schmidt-
Leukel). However, we can also apply the strategy of thesis modification and argue for two different 
contexts to which these stances apply. Rescher can be seen to take the latter option when he argues 
that both exclusivism and pluralism are two features belonging to different domains, namely "the 
standpoint of the individual and the standpoint of the group" (1993, p. 89). He writes: 
Pluralism is a feature of the collective group: it turns on the fact that different experiences 
engender different views. But from the standpoint of the individual this cuts no ice. We 
have no alternative to proceeding as best we can on the basis of what is available to us 
(1993, p. 89). 
 !149
While from the perspective of the group we can allow for various positions — and hence for a dis-
sensus — from the perspective of the individual we are forced to take up a specific position, deliv-
ering specific answers to our probative questions. He argues (Rescher, 1993, p. 101): 
(1) That pluralism is compatible with preferentialism: seeing a range of alternative positions as 
deserving of our respect, consideration, and the like, is perfectly consistent with seeing only 
one of them as having a valid claim to our acceptance.  
(2) That a rationalistic preferentialism (i.e. doctrinalism) which insists on the correctness of one 
particular alternative is perfectly compatible with a pluralism that acknowledges that others, 
situated differently from ourselves in the experiential scheme of things, may be fully ratio-
nally warranted and entitled to hold the variant position they in fact adopt. 
Both points state that a first-order exclusivism is consistent with a second-order pluralism. On the 
first-order level, we choose one set of theses above other sets. At the same time we acknowledge 
that there are other cognitive positions possible, which differ from ours, and which we do not take. 
Our own position is arrived through the rational application of evaluative criteria and standards. But 
so are other positions. Be this as it may, they are not the evaluative standards that we prefer to ap-
ply. Importantly, this evaluative choice is not an irrational one. Both partners to the dialogue have 
perfectly good reasons for their position. In the end, these reasons are "evaluative in nature, and 
thus potentially variable" (Rescher, 1993, p. 103). As Rescher writes, "the rational configuration of 
one's standards and criteria exactly consists in this systematically congruent attunement to the reali-
ties of one's experience" (ibid., p. 103) And since experiences and contexts will differ, so will our 
epistemic framework.  
 Returning to my chapter two, we require a locative solution where we position ourselves in 
the world. In first-order philosophy of worldviews, the task is to come to a distinct set of answers, 
and in order to do so we have to make curtailments, for having too many answers is the equivalent 
of having no answers. Taking a step up, and surveying the field of distinct positions, we can howev-
er also allow for plurality. Rescher’s pluralist position, however, is supra-locative and free-floating 
at the second-order level. This is congruent with both Smart’s and Vidal’s understanding of a neu-
tral second-order philosophical activity. Hence, pluralism and exclusivism are two necessary posi-
tions, but distributed over two philosophical activities: first-order and second-order philosophy. 
 However, we are not forced to merely see pluralism as a neutral second-order approach. At 
times, Rescher diminishes the role of what we could call the collective subjective or intersubjective 
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realm. It comes as no surprise that this has seen him at odds with Jürgen Habermas, for whom the 
prerequisite of social interaction is that we come to a consensus. However, Rescher continuously 
points out that diversity and dissensus is an essential feature of who we are as epistemic beings situ-
ated in the world. Rather than striving for consensus, Rescher defends a position of “accommoda-
tion through general acquiescence” (Marsonet, 2009, p. 7). Rescher writes: 
Accommodation through general acquiescence is a perfectly practicable mode for making 
decisions in the public order and resolving its conflicts. And, given the realities of the situa-
tion in a complex and diversified society, it has significant theoretical and practical advan-
tages over its more radical alternatives (Rescher, 1993, p. 166). 
Such an “accommodation through general acquiescence” amounts to what has been called a tolerant 
position towards religious traditions (Schmidt-Leukel, 2002). Thus, to be tolerant implies that we 
accept that some of our peers, who are differently positioned than us, hold different beliefs that are 
equally plausible from their point of view. It also includes the idea that we can appreciate this di-
versity. However, this appreciation still allows us to be critical of those other positions, namely, 
from the point of view of our own orientation. However, none of this implies that the collective 
group cannot also come to a consensus, if need be, and thus arrive at a positioned agreement. If this 
is the case, then pluralism as an epistemic position that arrives at a positioned consensus between 
parties is always an availability, and in fact needs to be. However, whether we do so will depend on 
the goals of our epistemic deliberations, and whether they allow for dissensus, or strive towards 
consensus. 
7.4. Schmidt-Leukel’s Revised Typology 
7.4.1. An Aporetic Set-Up 
Perry Schmidt-Leukel in his defining article Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Ty-
pology Clarified and Reaffirmed, published in Paul Knitter's The Myth of Religious Superiority 
(2005), offers a defence of the classic typology by “transforming it from a descriptive and phenom-
enological typology into a classification that is logically precise and comprehensive” (2005, p. 18). 
This reinterpretation is based on, what Merritt R. Blakeslee (2010) throughout his thesis calls “criti-
cal presuppositions.”  
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 Firstly, Schmidt-Leukel writes that the religious traditions all affirm certain beliefs, namely 
the categories of claims identified in my chapter 2: (a) assertions about what exists or does not ex-
ist,  (b) value judgments, (c) practical instructions (ibid., p. 18). In my same chapter 2, I further ar-
gued that we can see such claims as answers to important worldview questions, which fit the cate-
gories of, respectively, (a) ontology, (b) axiology (ethics), and (c) praxeology (i.e., the study of hu-
man action).  
 Secondly, Schmidt-Leukel argues that the most central religious conviction, which all tradi-
tional religions confirm, is "that there is something more important than anything else in the uni-
verse" (ibid., p. 18). He agrees that this might also be true for so-called “secular religions,” howev-
er, in the case of the traditional world religions, this something more important is affirmed to be a 
"transcendent reality, that is, not one of the finite realities of this world" (ibid., p. 18).  Each of the 140
religious traditions, then, (a) claims some form of knowledge or revelation of this transcendent real-
ity, (b) makes value judgments of the transcendent reality being of the utmost importance and the 
highest good, as well as (c) instructs their adherents in how to "live their lives in such a way that 
they truly reflect this utmost importance of ultimate reality" (ibid., p. 18). Schmidt-Leukel refers to 
the latter by the term salvation, here understood as a tradition-neutral term.  Salvation, in his 141
words, is the "proper orientation of life and the hopes connected with it," that is, within the context 
of a transcendent reality.  
 On the basis of these presuppositions, Schmidt-Leukel concludes that “the religions, at least 
the traditional ones, claim—each in its own way—to mediate a salvific knowledge or revelation of 
a transcendent reality” (ibid, p. 18). His next step is then to assign a variable P to this assertion, and 
make the following statements:  
(1) P equals mediation of a salvific knowledge of ultimate/transcendent reality;  
(2) P is a property of a religious tradition, (a) if the tradition claims to be in possession of P, and (b) 
if this possession is deemed veridical, i.e. true.  
 This presupposition, that religious belief systems hinge on belief in a transcendent reality, can be contested. The au140 -
thor states that he only considers the traditional world religions. In other words, he only counts those religions which fit 
his definition of what constitutes a religion. But even if we only consider the so-called world religions, this characterisa-
tion is perhaps most appropriate for the Abrahamic faiths (Christianity, Judaism, Islam), and arguably less so for such 
Asian traditions as Daoism, Confucianism, or even Buddhism.
 The term salvation is taken from a Christian context. Somebody with a Christian background will find it hard to see 141
the term as "tradition-neutral," as the term conjures images of a Christian salvation. A Buddhist, not having been raised 
in a Christian context, will escape this fate (or faith), but might be likely to think of a Buddhist salvation instead, based 
on ideas of personal enlightenment.  
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Thus, P being a property of a religious tradition means that the religious tradition in question has 
knowledge of the proper conduct for (a) right relation to, or (b) right reflection of a transcendent 
reality. On the basis of this, we have now recourse to four assertions (Schmidt-Leukel, 2005, p. 19): 
1. P is not given among the religions. 
2. P is given among the religions, but only once. 
3. P is given among the religions more than once, but with only one singular maximum. 
4. P is given among the religions more than once and without a singular maximum.  
These four assertions together constitutes an aporia, since: 
(a) The four claims are grouped together as answers to a leading question, namely whether we can 
find salvific knowledge, centred on an ultimate and/or transcendent reality, in any of the religions. 
(b) We have good reasons to accept each of these claims. This is shown by the fact that each one of 
the four options has previously and continuously been defended in public debates and discourses. 
Each proponent believes she has good reasons for her own position, as well as that she is choosing 
the right option, since, if she did not believe this, she would choose another one.  
(c) Taken together, the four assertions form an inconsistent set. All the theses are mutually inconsis-
tent.  
Given that there are four theses, each of which is incompatible with the others, the total amount of 
possible exits out of inconsistency will therefore also be four. This means that we are confronted 
with an aporetic quad, that is, an aporia with four possible exits out of the ensuing inconsistency. 
Affirming any of the answers, and hence denying others that are inconsistent with it, forces us to 
take up a specific philosophical stance, expressed by the four options of the quadripartite typology 
(see chapter 2), namely: 
[0] Atheism/Naturalism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by none of the 
religions (because a transcendent reality does not exist). 
[1] Exclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by only one religion 
(which naturally will be one's own). 
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[2] Inclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more than one religion 
(not necessarily by all of them), but only one of these mediates it in a uniquely superior way (which 
again will naturally be one's own). 
[3] Pluralism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more than one religion 
(not necessarily by all of them), and there is none among them whose mediation of that knowledge 
is superior to all the rest. 
Schmidt-Leukel emphasises that this classification is fully comprehensive, due to it being fully dis-
junctive. Thus he concludes: 
Either P is given or not. If P is given, it is given only once or more than once. And if P is 
given more than once, it is either with or without a singular maximum form (Schmidt-
Leukel, 2005, p. 19).  
7.4.2. Applying Thesis Exclusion 
Schmidt-Leukel argues that the typology entails that there are only four options available (i.e., to 
exit the aporetic cluster), and that it would therefore be a waste to look for any other options (ibid., 
p. 21). Choosing some claims and rejecting others is a standard aporetic procedure, as well as the 
hallmark of the exclusivist.  If we adopt thesis rejection, then Schmidt-Leukel is right: logically, 142
only four exits are available. Each option rejects or abandons three items. Not choosing, as Rescher 
points out, is certainly another option, but it is also the least informative, and the least desirable. 
Hence, all we really need to dissolve the secondary aporia is apply thesis rejection. However, if we 
apply the aporetic strategy of thesis modification, alternative exits become possible, which include 
claims which we would otherwise have to reject. Salvaging inconsistent claims opens up further 
possibilities, expanding the typology beyond just four options.  
 Let me recapitulate. Firstly, thesis rejection is the simple aporetic strategy of accepting some 
claims and abandoning the ones that are compatible with it. Since abandonment is achieved through 
exclusion we can call this strategy thesis exclusion. Similarly, we can rename thesis modification as 
thesis inclusion: here, we do not abandon a claim, but we include it into our set of acceptable claims 
through modification or qualification. While the term thesis modification stresses method, the term 
thesis inclusion stresses the goal to include otherwise objectionable theses. If we call thesis “logical 
 Schmidt-Leukel would not agree with this statement. However, I merely claim that the exclusivist only needs to 142
apply thesis rejection to arrive at his position.
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exclusivism,” then we can distinguish it from an “epistemic exclusivism” as a second-order theory 
(e.g., D’Costa, 1990, 2009). However, both are related since epistemic pluralism is arrived at by 
adopting a logical exclusivism.  In other words, there seems to be no obvious difference between 143
logical exclusivism and epistemic exclusivism. For instance, we can redefine epistemic exclusivism 
by reference to an injunction: when confronted with a religious aporia, take the set of theses that 
you find acceptable, i.e., consider salvific knowledge, and reject the others (i.e., apply thesis rejec-
tion). It should therefore be clear that Schmidt-Leukel’s presentation forces us to equally apply the-
sis rejection (i.e., exclusivism) to the second-order aporia. Following the injunction of thesis rejec-
tion, we thus easily arrive at the different epistemic stances. Naturalism rejects all claims, because it 
denies truth value — in one way or another — to all religious claims. Exclusivism rejects a specific 
set of religious claims (which constitute salvific knowledge), and rejects all others. The inclusivist 
can accept that other religious traditions have some salvific knowledge, as long as they are not in 
contradiction with the set of religious beliefs from the home religion. The inclusivist states that one 
religion can claim a maximum of salvific knowledge, while admitting that salvific knowledge is 
also given in other religions. For the pluralist stance — again, as an epistemic stance towards the 
first-order aporia — things appear to be more complicated. In general, pluralists take offence at the 
idea that exclusivists take their own religious position to be solely true, and the religious position of 
others to be false. In reply, pluralists argue that all the religions (or at least a preferential selection of 
those religions they deem appropriate) are positioned equally in relation to the truth. The pluralist, 
unlike the exclusivist, is now confronted with a problem: if we affirm the truth of all (or most) reli-
gious claims present in those religious traditions, then we end up with multiple inconsistencies. The 
pluralist therefore makes a trade-off. She states that no religion is superior regarding truth, and con-
fronts the resulting inconsistency; an inconsistency which will somehow have to go. The pluralist is 
therefore faced with the following antinomy: 
(1) All religions have P — i.e. are true belief systems. 
(2) The total set of all religious truth claims is inconsistent. 
The exclusivist takes the easy way out by denying (1). Since the pluralist refuses to take this road, 
her only recourse is to somehow deny (2). But since the outright denial of (2) would be suspect, the 
 I can see no reason why Schmidt-Leukel would not agree to at least this. 143
 !155
only way out is to somehow modify the claim.  The pluralist can modify (2) by stating that the 144
“[different] religions testify to the same ultimate transcendent reality despite the different forms this 
testimony takes, and they do so with the same genuine authenticity and an equal salvific 
potential” (Schmidt-Leukel, 2005, p. 21). Thus both John Hick and Schmidt-Leukel dissolve the 
issue of inconsistency by taking recourse to thesis modification. That is, they postulate an Ultimate 
Reality, a transcendent or noumenal reality, to which all religions refer. Doing so, they are commit-
ted to taking the different religious theses from the different traditions seriously, and state (by way 
of making a novel distinction) that they all refer to this Ultimate Reality. Thus, we arrive at their 
preferred choice of identist pluralism. However, thesis modification always also implies the giving 
up of an original thesis. Therefore, this strategy leads to the well-known criticism that the identist 
pluralist does not take the different religions really on face value, but rather reinterprets their beliefs 
to fit the idea of a single transcendent reality. For instance, Victoria Harrison (2006) writes: 
One problem with Hickean transcendental pluralism is that, in separating religious phe-
nomena from their supposedly noumenal source, Hick is compelled to describe religions as 
other than their adherents take them to be. In particular, he insists that the “gods” which 
religious believers worship are not the real thing. While this does not place one religion 
above any other, it nevertheless appears to imply that all believers are to some extent mis-
taken in their beliefs (Harrison, 2006, p. 295). 
7.4.3. Applying Thesis Inclusion 
The Orientational Pluralist agrees with Schmidt-Leukel that one should choose one of the exits 
available — and deny the others —, but adds that this ignores the alternative strategy of thesis mod-
ification (or thesis inclusion). Through thesis modification, the aporetic decider is able to add fur-
ther distinctions to the aporetic set. The Orientational Pluralist does so by making a distinction be-
tween the plausibility and acceptability of claims. This implies that now a fifth position or option 
becomes possible, despite Schmidt-Leukel’s insistence that “no other options exist” (see supra). 
 Firstly, the Orientational Pluralist is committed to taking up a specific or locative philosoph-
ical position (i.e., in first-order philosophy) as to which claims she endorses and which claims she 
rejects. She might agree that none of the religious claims are acceptable ("P cannot be found in the 
religions"), on the basis of perhaps scientific standards of acceptance, and therefore take the exit of 
 As we have seen, mere thesis rejection ignores the crucial alternative strategy of making distinctions, of salvaging 144
parts from those claims we are rejecting, by means of thesis modification (chapter 5).
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the naturalist. Or, she might endorse a singular religious tradition, and reject the claims from other 
religions when they are inconsistent with her religious position. In such case, she would either be an 
exclusivist or an inclusivist in Schmidt-Leukel's typology. The fact that the Orientational Pluralist 
takes up a specific position towards the first-order worldview questions allows him or her to have 
access to both exclusivism and inclusivism. Moreover, he or she has equal access to pluralism as 
well, if we understand pluralism here as a positioned epistemic stance.  Moreover, the Orienta145 -
tional Pluralist is also committed to a meta-philosophical, or supra-located second-order position, 
where she grants that multiple solutions are always attainable on the basis of differing probative 
orientations. Bracketing her own preferred position — whether this be a religious or a non-religious 
position — she grants that P is given among the religions more than once and without a singular 
maximum. From a certain perspective of probative orientations, only one plausible position (i.e. one 
set of claims) can be taken; however, different perspectives can certainly allow for different posi-
tions without a “singular maximum,” as each position represents its own maximum under its own 
constraints. 
7.4.4. A Superior Position 
Schmidt-Leukel’s concept of a “singular maximum” amounts to a position where one regards one’s 
own position as superior. Schmidt-Leukel, as a religious pluralist, explicitly rejects the idea that re-
ligious traditions can “mutually claim their superiority” (2005, p. 25). He is thus opposed to a mu-
tual epistemic exclusivism, where each religious tradition considers their own position as epistemi-
cally superior. However, true to his own position, Schmidt-Leukel forwards pluralism as superiorly 
meritorious, thereby taking an epistemically exclusivist (i.e., not just a logically exclusivist) posi-
tion towards the different stances.  
 In contrast, Orientational Pluralism represents a self-consistent position. The Orientational 
Pluralist professes the superiority of her own worldview stance (i.e., the first-order aporia), and also 
affirms the superiority of her epistemic stance of orientational pluralism (i.e., the second-order apo-
ria). Moreover, she acknowledges that other positions are always possible: dependent on one’s 
evaluative framework one can always come to a different position. One could always argue that a 
certain set of epistemic values will be superior to the other, to which all must agree. This position, 
however, must therefore be itself justified by some standard. This of course, amounts to a regress, 
and as Rescher has pointed out, “we had best deny that it is infinite” (1985, p. 142). Orientational 
  I will return to this issue shortly when I discuss Heim’s inclusivism.145
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Pluralism takes the position that the regress terminates in a “self-supportive set of cognitive 
values” (1985, p. 142). Although cognitive or epistemic values allow for alternatives, these are un-
available to our position since we are already pre-committed in that regards. The regress therefore 
terminates locally, rather than globally, in a way that is convincing to those who hold a particular set 
of cognitive values — and only to those. Orientational Pluralism denies that there is a “neutral, 
evaluatively presuppositionless standard” (ibid., p. 142) that would somehow resolve the issues by 
some common measure.  146
7.4.5. The Giving of Reasons 
Once the aporia has been established, Schmidt-Leukel suggests that we attempt to dissolve it by 
giving our reasons for or against each of these positions: 
[Since we settled on only four options] the theological/philosophical debate can [now] con-
centrate on the reasons that speak for or against each of the four options and its possible 
sub-forms and should try to refine them. But in the end one has to choose one of them (ibi-
dem, p. 21; between square brackets mine). 
Once we know what the options are, Schmidt-Leukel argues, it is merely a matter of assessing the 
reasons for each option and adjudicating which (religious) option would be best. Presumably, the 
assessment of reasons will lead us to achieve a consensus — i.e., will convince all rational people 
— as to what option is best to take: we, the community of thinkers, would come to agree, after as-
sessment of the available evidence, on a single option. The available evidence, however, suggest 
that this has not happened (yet).  
 In contrast, the Orientational Pluralist explicitly denies that we can solve or dissolve aporias 
by merely “concentrating on the reasons that speak for or against each of the four options.” Aporet-
ics states that an appeal to evidence will usually not settle the matter as to which exit to take out of 
an aporia. Of course, to justify holding our beliefs we need to show that we have good reasons for 
holding them. A key feature of aporetic clusters is that they are made up of rationally defensible 
propositions. However, since we have good reasons to believe each of the different claims, all of the 
evidence that we can gather is already brought to the table. It is here that we will have to make our 
 The ensuing incommensurability only obtains to epistemic values, and not to truth claims within a single perspec146 -
tive. As to the criticism of relativism, see supra, or consult Rescher, 1985, p. 191.
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eliminative choices.  Presumably, we will want to choose those claims with the strongest appeal. 147
But this assessment, as to which claims are the most plausible to accept, typically generates dis-
agreement as well, and not the mutual agreement that one might expect or hope for. The choice be-
tween different positions cannot, therefore, be made purely on the basis of evidence and reason 
alone: it requires recourse to evaluative judgments and previous commitments. Rescher summaris-
es:  
Discussion [i.e. understood as reason-giving or probative discussion] across the divide of 
conflicting positions, however useful it may be in highlighting the issues, will not settle 
philosophical disputes. Different values [i.e. epistemic values] express themselves in differ-
ent cognitive priorities and thus in variant resolutions to philosophical problems (Rescher, 
1985, p. 115, between square brackets mine). 
7.5. Mark Heim’s Orientational Pluralism 
The best known case of an application of Orientational Pluralism to the question of religious diver-
sity is the work of Mark Heim, for instance, Salvations (1995) and The Depth of the Riches 
(2001).  In these monographs, Heim defends the view that a person can rationally hold that his or 148
her own religious beliefs are superior to those of others, and that others are justified in holding dif-
ferent beliefs. He therefore deliberately positions himself as an Orientational Pluralist: 
“[O]rientational pluralism insists there is only one reality and we are trying to know it. It is 
not committed to regarding other substantive views as equally valid, only as tenable from 
different perspectives. What is fragmented is not truth but justification or warranted as-
sertability. The justification offered by a philosophy may be orientationally limited in ap-
peal, but the claims themselves can be universal and unrestricted (Rescher, 1985, 190). 
People who rationally hold contradictory views from different orientations are each justi-
fied in thinking the other wrong. ‘We can only pursue the truth by cultivating our 
truth’ (Rescher 1985, 199). Philosophical positions are not opinions but judgments” (Heim, 
1995, p. 137). 
 In Schmidt-Leukel’s typology, the reasons for each of the different positions are not explicitly laid out on the table. 147
However, Schmidt-Leukel assumes that once they are laid out, those reasons will guide our hands (and heads) towards 
an aporetic solution.
 Other authors include James, 2003; Kiplinger, 2005; Saarinen, 2003; Thomas, 1994.148
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However, at the same time, Heim also positions himself as a Christian inclusivist, and rightly so 
(i.e., based on his own epistemic values). On my view, then, Heim can be seen to be making three 
separate decisions: (1) a first-order decision, (2) a second-order decision, and (3) a third-order deci-
sion: 
(4) At the level of the first-order problem of conflicting claims, Heim chooses to be a Christian — 
and nothing but his own set of criteria forces him to do so.  
(5) At the level of the second-order problem of epistemic stances, he chooses to be an inclusivist — 
and nothing but his own set of criteria forces him to do so.  
(6) At the same time, Heim chooses to be an Orientational Pluralist as a third-order solution to the 
second-order problem.  
While giving an in-depth discussion of Heim’s theology would take me too far, I will give here a 
brief overview of his propositions. Firstly, Heim argues for the thesis that the different religious tra-
ditions represent not just multiple ways of salvation, but rather multiple salvations. This position is 
congruent with a differentialist pluralist position (see chapter 2). On this account, each religious 
tradition authentically offers its own unique and ultimate aim that differs from other traditions. 
However, if Heim was an epistemic (differentialist) pluralist, he would have to state that none of 
these traditions are superior, and that there is no single salvation that is superior to the other. Seem-
ingly this would prevent him from being an Orientational Pluralist, since it is in contradiction with 
its first principle, namely to hold one position as superior. However, Heim could still argue that we 
should indeed accept multiple traditions, and take up a pluralist Orientational Pluralism (see infra). 
Nevertheless, he does not choose this road, as we will see next.  
 Secondly, Heim argues for the thesis that the fact of multiple religious ends is rooted in the 
differences within God. The goal of his second book, The Depth of Riches (2001), in fact amounts 
to an attempt to “map a Christian theology that has distinct religious ends” (Heim, 2001, p. 12; also 
quoted in Adiprasetya, 2013, p. 51). It is here that Heim in fact shows himself to be in fact a Christ-
ian inclusivist. Other religious traditions are not just given a place of their own — a stance reflect-
ing his Orientational Pluralism —, but are incorporated within his Christian view of the world. 
Adiprasetya similarly adds that Heim’s theology is “an inclusivist theology in the sense that it ar-
gues for a particularly Christina ultimate end that includes all other religious ends as penultimate 
(Adiprasetya, 2013, p. 51). In particular, Heim’s theology is based on the Trinity, where religious 
multiplicity is generated from God’s reality as Trinity.  
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 The question we can ask here is whether Heim’s Orientational Pluralist stance forces him to 
be a (Christian) inclusivist? By no means. Heim could have still been an Orientational Pluralist, 
even if he was a Christian exclusivist, or an identist or differentialist pluralist. However, in order to 
do so he would need a different valuational orientation than the one he presented in The Depth of 
Riches. Given that Heim opts for a Christian inclusivism of multiple religious ends, such a path is 
no longer available to him. Although an Orientational Pluralist takes up a specific stance towards 
worldviews, it does not follow from this that he or she is therefore an exclusivist, or that it equates 
to an inclusivism. Rather than being an exclusivist, the Orientational Pluralist has access to the ex-
clusivist stance, just as he or she has access, in principle, to inclusivism, and pluralism. Similarly, 
being orientated towards multiple worldviews does not imply that the Orientational Pluralist is a 
second-order pluralist. Heim could simply have been an Orientational Pluralist and have argued that 
other religious traditions are plausible from different epistemic orientations (of whatever nature). 
However, none of these other religions have turned out to be acceptable to the Christian inclusivist. 
Moreover, tolerance for other traditions is already guaranteed by the Orientational Pluralist stance, 
and does not need to depend on an inclusivist stance.  
 In short, rather than being a second-order pluralist, the Orientational Pluralist has access to 
epistemic pluralism. The difference between being and having is what distinguishes Orientational 
Pluralism, and what makes it into a higher-order position. Stated differently, the defining aspect is 
that at any given order — or level, if one prefers — one can only look (a) down or (b) across, but 
not (c) up. Thus, the exclusivist can look down at religious worldviews, and across to other epis-
temic stances. The Orientational Pluralist can look down to all of the epistemic stances. We can 
summarise this as follows: the Orientational Pluralist (third-order) has access to the diversity of 
epistemic stances (second-order), which have access to the diversity of religious and non-religious 
worldviews (first-order).  
 At first sight, it seems paradoxical or counter-intuitive to state that the Orientational Plural-
ist has access to the different epistemic stances such as exclusivism and inclusivism: after all, isn’t 
the Orientational Pluralist a pluralist? However, this is no different from stating that the exclusivist 
(i.e., second-order) has access to all of the worldviews (i.e., first-order). Of course, this access is 
merely potential, and not necessarily actual. This principle of potential access allows us to explain 
why we find find exclusivists in the different traditions in the first place. Similarly, the Orientational 
Pluralist has potential access to the different epistemic stances, and how these get actualised de-
pends on the Orientational Pluralist’s choices, as in the case for instance of Heim.  
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 If indeed the Orientational Pluralist has equal potential access to the different epistemic po-
sitions, then the Orientational Pluralist can choose whether or not to be also a second-order exclu-
sivist, inclusivist, or pluralist. This choice will be dependent on what worldviews — or sets of be-
liefs — the Orientational Pluralist finds acceptable. For instance, an exclusivist Orientational Plu-
ralist will find only one worldview acceptable. The pluralist Orientational Pluralist will find several 
worldviews acceptable: amongst the multiple plausible worldviews he or she will claim that at least 
two are superior worldviews. A good example of this is the phenomenon of Multiple Religious Be-
longing (MRB). A person committed to MRB will typically find him or herself caught between the 
Scylla and Charybdis of forming a closed, positioned stance that makes clear-cut claims, or an open 
stance that allows for a diversity of views simultaneously. The first strategy holds the danger of cre-
ating a positioned stance that does not properly belong to any worldview tradition (e.g., neither 
Christian, nor Buddhist; see chapter 2), while the second holds the danger of continued cognitive 
dissonance due to inconsistencies between two different frameworks of looking at the world.  
 Even within a singe epistemic stance such as the exclusivist stance, different types of exclu-
sivism might occur, due to the preferential selection of types of validity claims. Within the trifecta 
we can differentiate between three value pairs, viz., subjective versus objective, subjective versus 
intersubjective, and intersubjective versus objective. Since these are value pairs, aporetic differ-
ences will occur between claims at each end of those dyads. Thus a subjective exclusivist might be 
preferentially inclined to choose subjective claims over and against other types of claims.  
 For instance, a naturalist Orientational Pluralist has equal access to exclusivism, inclu-
sivism, and pluralism on the basis of a first-order philosophical stance. A naturalist can be an exclu-
sivist Orientational Pluralist, or an inclusivist Orientational Pluralist.  The same naturalist Orienta149 -
tional Pluralist can accept both (1) and (4) on the basis of a modification of the variable P (see 
supra).  She could confirm (1) by means of objective criteria, where P represents a validity claim of 
objective truth. However, she could also readily confirm (4), namely that P is present amongst the 
religious traditions, to which she herself does not adhere, on the basis of subjective and intersubjec-
tive (i.e. normative criteria) criteria, given that P represents either a validity claim of truthfulness or 
normative rightness. For instance, she could propose a slightly altered (4), which adds the tail “on 
the basis of differing epistemic values," that is subjective and intersubjective criteria. She would 
then affirm: (4.1) P is given among the religions more than once and without a singular maximum, 
on the basis of differing epistemic values. 
 Or be a pluralist, but then she would most likely have to qualify her naturalism to a certain degree. 149
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 From this follows that Orientational Pluralism is not exactly a pluralist theory, if by plural-
ism we understand epistemic pluralism as it features in the tripartite typology. Pluralist theories are 
(second-order) meta-theories that take the different worldview claims as their data. Orientational 
Pluralism, however, is a (third-order) meta-theory that takes epistemic stances as its data, including 
pluralist theories: it takes a stance towards epistemic stances, so to speak. We could therefore argue 
that Orientational Pluralism is polyphonic in nature (i.e., multiple voices), rather than pluralist. Plu-
ralist theories tend to imply the creation of synthetic worldviews based on certain features that the 
worldview holder deems significant (i.e., identist pluralism), or syncretic worldviews based on the 
acceptance of distinct worldview systems thereby creating. In each case, a new worldview is being 
forwarded. 
7.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, again following Nicholas Rescher, I argued for a distinct epistemic position towards 
religious diversity. This position claims that we should come down to a specific set of answers to 
our worldview questions: that is, we should formulate concrete answers to our cognitive, evaluative 
and practical concerns. Each religious tradition will be confronted with a similar task since the 
worldview questions are universal concerns: what should we believe, what should we do, how 
should we act, what is right and what is wrong, etc. In order to derive answers, the Orientational 
Pluralist takes up a specific point of view, based on a preferential selection of cognitive values and 
priorities. These values are not mere preferences or tastes, but rationally grounded, albeit this 
grounding itself will again be axiological (i.e., in terms of epistemic values).  
 The Orientational Pluralist acknowledges that different positions can always be taken to-
ward similar issues. The outcome of such positions will be — at least for some — plausible and ac-
ceptable from the point of view of a different epistemic framework. However, these are positions 
that the Orientational Pluralist herself does not take. Confronted with sets of inconsistent claims, the 
pluralist can avail herself of two strategies to accomplish her position. Applying an explicit or im-
plicit set of cognitive criteria, she weeds out claims either by means of thesis rejection, or by means 
of thesis modification. Thus, she can only accept a certain set of claims and reject others, or she can 
modify claims to make the set more consistent. In terms of the traditional typology, all of the op-
tions are open to the Orientational Pluralist. She can be a naturalist, and reject all religious claims 
— for instance, based on a epistemic orientation of purely objective criteria. She can be an exclu-
sivist, taking up a specific religious tradition. She can be an inclusivist, accepting claims of other 
traditions that are consistent with hers. She can be a pluralist on the basis of a procedure of thesis 
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modification, and thus again come to a specific doctrinal stance. All of these options are consistent 
with the two prime directives of the Orientational Pluralist: (1) come down to a position based on an 
orientational epistemic axiological framework (i.e., first-order), (2) while acknowledging that things 
could always be otherwise (i.e, second-order). As Rescher puts it succinctly: “The situational differ-
ences of our contexts simply lead to different rational resolutions. And that's just the end of the mat-
ter” (1993, p. 117). 
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Conclusion 
The problem of religious diversity, the central issue at the heart of my dissertation, can be under-
stood as the incompatibility of claims. Such incompatibilities between religious traditions usually 
lie dormant until the coming together of such claims, either in formal discourse settings, or in in-
formal dialogues and encounters between faith adherents. We can trace back such incompatibilities 
to the web of belief that is our worldview: i.e., the various answers that we give to our probative 
inquiries into ourselves as subjects, our peers with whom we constitute an interpretive and mean-
ing-generating community, as well as the objective world of objects and events. These three object 
domains, of the self, others, and world, will generate different epistemological relationships, differ-
ent ontologies, and different methodologies for “mining for data.” From this follows that the in-
compatibility of claims will similarly be diverse: that is, different types of claims will require dif-
ferent conditions to be fulfilled in order for the validity of the claim to be fulfilled. For claims about 
the subjective object domain, we will require authenticity. Claims will form incompatibles when the 
subject cannot hold both claims without cognitive absurdity or dissonance, thereby draining cogni-
tive energy if the incompatibility continues to exist within the subject. For claims about the inter-
subjective object domain, we will require rightness. This implies that our claims must fit the norma-
tive background of our own community, if not of the global community of all epistemic peers. If 
they do not fit a certain community, whether our own community or another, incompatibles will 
form. Finally, for claims about the objective object domain, we will require truth. Similarly, we can 
define truth in terms of fit or coherence, where our claims fit with the object domain. We can estab-
lish such fit by the applications of parameters or criteria that help us measure such coherence. Con-
flict will form when our claims about the objective world are equally justified but nevertheless con-
stitute a contradiction. Due to the fact that, as epistemic beings, we simultaneously orient ourselves 
to ourselves, others, and the world, claims will tend to imply all three validity claims at once. How-
ever, we can also raise a single validity claim, or multiple validity claims at once, when we put up 
claims to our community of peers.  
 Incompatibles of this kind will form aporias, where an aporia is constituted by claims com-
ing together in a specific set, usually as answers to a leading question, where each of the specific 
claims is justified and backed by good reasons to an equal degree, but taken together the claims 
form inconsistencies. Thus we are in need of an aporetic procedure understood as aporia manage-
ment. The resultant Aporetics is therefore a specific task for a philosopher interested in answering 
the Big Questions as well as in the coordination of our answers to such Big Questions. Such a 
philosophy can be understood as a Philosophy of Worldviews as it takes the concept of worldview 
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as its intentional object. Three main tasks of such a Philosophy of Worldviews are (1) worldview 
analysis, where we analyse the nature of worldview claims, (2) comparative analysis, where we in-
vestigate how incompatibles are formed between the various worldviews, including religious and 
non-religious worldviews, and (3) the investigation of right-of-way criteria that help us decide 
which claims are most acceptable. All three tasks form an inherent component of the aporetic meth-
od. However, of particular interest to the Aporetician — anyone either formally or informally in-
volved in the dissolution of such cognitive conflicts — is the application of right-of-way criteria to 
determine the acceptability of claims premised on a rational preferentialism. Such a rational prefer-
entialism will engender a cognitive pluralism towards solutions of aporias thereby generating a 
second-order conflict. Not only do the answers to our worldview questions conflict, also our pro-
posed solutions out of such conflicts will conflict. To address this issue we therefore need recourse 
to a third-order solution that combines a rational preferential position, with a pluralistic supra-locat-
ive stance of what we could call tolerance towards other epistemic orientations. Such an Orienta-
tional Pluralism does not need to imply that consensus, or the coordination of our belief systems to 
reach agreement on issues, cannot be built into our aporetic deliberations.  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